

THE ECLECTIC REVIEW,

FOR JUNE, 1833.

- Art. I. 1. *Report from the Select Committee on Secondary Punishments.* Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed; June, 1832. With Notes and Appendix by the Committee of the Society for the Improvement of Prison Discipline. 8vo. pp. 80. London, 1832.
2. *Thoughts on Secondary Punishments*, in a Letter to Earl Grey. By Richard Whately, D.D., Archbishop of Dublin. To which are appended, Two Articles on Transportation to New South Wales, and on Secondary Punishments; and some Observations on Colonization. 8vo. pp. 204. Price 7s. London, 1832.

IT would seem to be the dictate of sound policy, as well as of justice,—a principle of common sense, that the criminal and the unoffending victim of misfortune should not be subjected to the same treatment. Yet, in more cases than one, we find this rule practically violated by our social institutions. To instance the punishment of temporary imprisonment. Of the numbers committed to gaol on different charges, varying from the smallest to the most atrocious offence, the proportion of those against whom no bills are found, is about *one tenth*; of those who are acquitted, nearly *a fifth*; so that, of those who suffer a degrading and demoralizing imprisonment for a longer or shorter term, about three in ten, or not quite a third, are legally innocent; and of these, a large proportion actually blameless. This is exclusive of vagrants summarily committed, and debtors, whose only crime, in a large proportion of instances, is poverty. Again: there is the heavier punishment of penal bondage. A convict is sentenced to be deprived of his freedom, and to be kept to hard labour, for some aggravated offence against society. But what is the crime of the creole offspring of a negress in one of our West India colonies, for which he is doomed to the perpetual loss of liberty, and to toil in the plantations under the fear of the task-master's

lash? Would it not be more consonant with justice, to give the unoffending slave his freedom, and send the inmates of our hulks to work out their time in the sugar colonies? Once more, there is appointed for crimes of the deepest dye, the punishment of transportation. For this, the capital sentence is often commuted. Yet, call it colonization, and the self-same punishment is continually being inflicted upon scarcely less reluctant, but unoffending exiles, with this only difference; that the convict is sent to run out his bold career under the fine climate of Australia, the emigrant to shiver in Canada.

Of all secondary punishments, what is called transportation would seem to be the least efficient and the most objectionable, since its effect depends altogether upon the previous habits and situation of the convict; and in proportion as he deserves punishment, it ceases to be of penal efficacy. ‘Agricultural labourers ‘with families’, it is remarked in the Report before us, ‘dread it ‘extremely; while, to single men, to mechanics who are sure of ‘receiving high wages, and generally to all those who feel a desire ‘of change, and a vague expectation of pushing their fortunes, it ‘appears to hold out no terrors whatever.’ To the great bulk, therefore, of those who are actually transported, the punishment amounts to this; that ‘they are carried to a country whose climate ‘is delightful, producing in profusion all the necessaries and most ‘of the luxuries of life;—that they have a certainty of maintenance, instead of an uncertainty; are better fed, clothed, and ‘lodged than (by *honest* means) they ever were before; and if ‘their conduct is not intolerably bad, are permitted, even before ‘the expiration of their term, to become settlers on a fertile farm, ‘which with very moderate industry they may transmit as a sure ‘and plentiful provision to their children.’ Archbishop Whately may be thought to have here painted transportation in very glowing colours; but the correctness of the statement is borne out by the evidence brought before the Select Committee. The accounts sent home from New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land are stated, in the Report, to be so favourable, as to produce a strong impression, that transportation may be considered as an advantage rather than a punishment.

‘From the structure of society there, these objections can with difficulty be overcome. The labourers are so scarce, that on the arrival of a convict-ship, every convict not retained in the service of the Government, is eagerly engaged by the settlers, who are always ready to take more than can be furnished to them. As the object of a settler, in taking a convict into his service, is to improve his own property, and benefit himself, without reference to any considerations of a public nature, instead of inflicting any punishment on him, he naturally endeavours to render his situation as little irksome as possible. Ample proof will be found in the former part of the Minutes of Evidence to

shew, that, the sense of degradation once overcome, the situation of the convict assigned to a settler is in many respects preferable to that of the agricultural labourer in this country ; that his food is more abundant, his clothing better, and that, to add to his enjoyments, he has the advantage of a fine climate, with the certainty, if he conducts himself with propriety, of becoming virtually free in a few years, by obtaining a Ticket of Leave. If the condition of agricultural labourers is improved by transportation, mechanics find themselves still more advantageously situated ; the demand for their labour is so great, and its remuneration so high, as to render it easy for many who are in the service of Government to purchase the connivance of the overseers (themselves convicts), by which they find means of sleeping out of the Convict Barracks, and of working after-hours at their respective trades ; and many others are allowed to do so as a reward for good behaviour. Those mechanics who are assigned to settlers have still greater facilities for indulgence, as their masters find it to their interest to offer them very advantageous terms and privileges wholly inconsistent with a state of punishment, with a view to obtain, in return, the full value of their labour. They are consequently enabled to lead a life of comparative ease, with few of the restraints befitting a state of punishment, and quite inconsistent with moral improvement.

‘Such is, generally speaking, the condition of the labourer or mechanic, while undergoing the severe part of his sentence ; but if he so conduct himself as to remain in the service of one master, he is allowed, if transported for seven years, a Ticket of Leave at the end of four years ; if for fourteen years, at the end of six years ; and if for life, at the end of eight years. The acquisition of a Ticket of Leave may be considered as one step towards emancipation ; the possessor of it, though confined to a particular district, and liable to be deprived of it for misconduct, is allowed to work on his own account ; and the high rate of wages furnishes him with the means of acquiring capital, with which he is enabled, at the expiration of his sentence, to set up in business ; and it is stated, that instances are not unfrequent of persons sent out originally as convicts having become possessed of considerable wealth.’ Report, pp. 26, 27.

There is this further evil in transportation, noticed by Archbishop Whately as peculiar to this equivocal punishment, that when a convict is transported, (the execution of the sentence being itself uncertain,) there is an immense variety of lots that may befall him.

‘He may live either in the town or in the country ; may serve the government or a settler ; have a good or a bad master ; remain poor or grow rich ; be well or ill treated ; be a tutor or a shepherd ; a government clerk or a tavern waiter : whence it arises, that every one selects the condition which is most agreeable to himself, and expects to meet with that particular destination: any case of hardship which may come to his ears, he sets down as a lamentable accident for the unhappy sufferer, who is much to be pitied for his misfortune ; but he never thinks of applying it to his own case. The banker’s clerk, or the

London thief, expects to be a tutor, or to be employed in a public office: the mechanic expects to cheat the government and work for his own profit: the agricultural labourer to have little fatigue, and be well fed, clothed, and lodged. And the truth is, that they are generally right in their respective calculations, as the government is forced to employ them in the way which best suits their former habits; in other words, in the way most agreeable to themselves. Transportation may, indeed, be said to unite in itself all the attributes of a bad punishment; to furnish a model for a penal system which should be imitated by contraries. Even if it were rendered certain by making it the *only* secondary punishment, this change would rather aggravate the evil. For its chief defect is its extreme mildness and want of terrors, and the happy facility with which it adapts its various pleasures to the case of each individual. Hence, by persons under sentence in England, it is coveted rather than dreaded, and is an object of ambition rather than aversion. While of the convicts, some are tormented with the fear of death; some depressed with the disgrace of a conviction in their native country; some with the dread of the hulks, others of the penitentiary; and while most are intent on the prospect of wealth and importance in a new home, the tickets of the lottery are drawn, and happy they who get the prize of transportation.

“*Alii panduntur inanes*

Suspensi ad ventos; aliis sub gurgite vasto

Infectum eluitur scelus, aut exuritur igni.

Quisque suos patimur manes: exinde per amplum

Mittimur Elysium, et pauci læta arva tenemus.”

‘The pain inflicted by this punishment is insufficient in amount, irregular in its operation, often unknown on account of the distance at which it is endured, and if known, so uncertain as not to be reckoned on: its disgrace is not felt, because the sufferers are out of the sight of those whom they respect: it injures the mother country by substituting the semblance for the reality of punishment: it injures the colony by forming a society of the most worthless and abandoned wretches drafted from the prisons of a large community. By annually pouring in fresh supplies of this moral poison; by concentrating, multiplying, and perpetuating the scattered and transitory forms of vice, it has made this new and wealthy settlement a storehouse of depravity, one vast heap of moral corruption. It is a system from which nothing is to be hoped, and everything to be feared; a system of elaborate mischief and consistent impolicy, originating in helplessness, continued in ignorance, and tolerated only by supine and culpable indifference.’

Whately, pp. 161—164.

This is very strongly put; but really, the more the system is examined in all its bearings, in its costliness, its inefficiency, its irregular and unequal operation, and its prejudicial consequences, the more astonishing it will appear that it should so long have been persisted in. The only recommendations of this punishment are wholly foreign from its penal efficiency. They are, so far as we can discover, simply these two; that it provides the

Australian provinces with bond-servants, and that it gets rid of the individuals, as regards the country which sends them out, but which pays dearly for the riddance. As to the first point, it seems, that 'all proposals to discontinue the annual shipments of convicts to the Australian provinces, meet with great opposition from the free inhabitants of those colonies, who consider that they have a *vested right* to be provided with bond-slaves at the public expense; and that the system, which might have been less objectionable in the early state of the colony, is to be maintained for their benefit, however injurious it may prove to the lasting interests both of the mother country and the colony itself.' Of all imaginary 'vested rights', (the phrase is an absurd one,) this is, perhaps, the most extraordinary that was ever made the subject of a claim with a view to resist an important melioration. The opposition of the Australian colonists to the discontinuance of a system which operates as a bounty upon crime, in order to *qualify* offenders to become their bondsmen, will not, it may confidently be hoped, be allowed to weigh much with the home Government.

But then, there is the recommendation which the system presents, not as a punishment, but as an expedient for getting rid of the malefactor. Let us examine this; for, if it be necessary to get rid of him, and this be the cheapest and best way of accomplishing it, then, though in itself a bad punishment, it may be a useful regulation for the interests of society.

The old plan of ridding society of malefactors was by hanging them. Death, if not the most formidable of all punishments to the offender, is perhaps 'the most economical.' But capital punishments not only lose their salutary effect in deterring from the commission of crime, by their frequency and by the indiscriminate application of the same extreme penalty to crimes of different malignity: they also defeat their own purpose, by multiplying the chances of impunity, arising from the general reluctance to prosecute and to convict where the life of the culprit is at stake. And they have moreover an injurious effect on society as tending to lessen the horror for crime, by converting minor offenders into objects of pity, and sometimes dignifying even greater criminals with a sort of heroism. Thus, as, with a rapidly increasing population, the number of crimes is augmented, at the same time that civilization advances, it becomes impossible to enforce the capital penalty in that wholesale application which the laws formerly authorized, or to keep down the population of the prisons by this convenient but ruthless expedient. We do not at present enter into the question of the lawfulness of capital punishments, but confine ourselves to the fact, that they are found to be, in the present state of society, inexpedient and, upon a large scale, impracticable.

This plan of ridding Society not being found to answer, the next idea which seems to have presented itself to the Legislature was, to send the culprit as far away as possible,—to inflict a political death upon the offender by banishment. There are some crimes which might, we think, be properly visited with simple banishment. The culprit, in that case, is free to live where he pleases, so long as he does not return to infest his own country. This is certainly a cheaper method of getting rid of the bad folk, inasmuch as it saves the charge of transportation across seas, and all future expenses involved in the safeguard or control of the convict. And if the object of the punishment be simply what Jeremy Bentham calls *disablement*, this end is answered as completely by expulsion as by penal colonization. The only thing to be guarded against is, the clandestine return of the banished party, which would require to be visited with heavier penalties.

But of what is it desirable that Society should get rid? Of the presence of the offender, of the cost of maintaining him, or of the apprehension of his future misdeeds? The culprit is as effectually removed from society by being imprisoned in a penitentiary or a convict ship, as by being sent to Botany Bay. As to the cost, that is not got rid of by his transportation, which is the most expensive mode of punishing him. As to the apprehension of his doing future mischief, if it be merely a question, whether he shall do mischief in this country or in another country, in the moral and political welfare of which we are deeply implicated, and where his evil example would be still more pernicious, surely the changing the scene of his delinquency is not a valid reason for adopting this compromise of punishment. Upon this point, we think there is considerable force in the following remarks, which we transcribe from an article on Secondary Punishments in No. XIX. of the Law Magazine; a Quarterly Journal conducted with much ability. After citing from the Report of the Committee some observations to which we shall presently advert, in favour of this mode of disposing of criminals, the writer says:

‘ Now, in the first place, this argument assumes, that the mother country is justified in sacrificing the interest of the colony to its own interest; that the English Government is not to regard the welfare of N. South Wales, but is free to use it as a receptacle for those persons who are too dangerous to remain at home. Now this is a maxim of colonial government, which, though unhappily it has been too prevalent in many states, we take the liberty of rejecting as both impolitic and unjust. Colonies are subordinate political societies belonging to the society which is their mother country; subject with her to one sovereign power, and equally entitled to its protection and consideration. To establish a colony, therefore, in order to serve as a drain for the impurities of the mother country, is to do an act which no casuistry can defend. Even if it were possible, by founding a new society with

the worst outcasts of a large nation, to exterminate or greatly reduce the body of persons who live by the commission of crime, nothing could, in our opinion, justify such a measure. In a large nation, the discharged convicts, whether criminals or not, could never, under a tolerable penal system, make a large part of the whole population; and if criminals are mischievous when they form a small part of the community, what must they be when they form the whole? But it is *not* possible to reduce the number of criminals by drafting off convicts to a place of reward; and we may say of transportation without punishment, what has been said of emigration without amendment of the poor laws, that "to attempt to diminish crime by removing a portion of criminals, and yet leaving in full force the most powerful machinery ever applied to the increase of crime, is to attempt to exhaust by continual pumping the waters of a perpetual fountain." There is no doubt that wicked men, intent on the commission of crime, whether they have been convicted or not, are an evil to a country; nevertheless they are a less evil in the mother country than in a penal colony. Poisons which are almost harmless when extenuated and diffused in a large mass, work with a fatal vigour if taken in a concentrated and separate form. Nor is it a simple question of numerical proportion, whether a bad man is more mischievous with ninety-nine good men or with ninety-nine bad men; but the future increase of the one bad man is likewise to be considered. In the midst of a large society, discountenanced by the general opinion, neglected and shunned by their relations and friends, outstripped by the industrious, oppressed with the sense of disgrace, blighted in all their prospects by the knowledge of their dishonesty, rarely marrying on account of their bad character and irregular habits, criminals commonly terminate by an early death their career of riot, dissipation, debauchery, wretchedness, and outrage, and sink into the great ocean of society "without a grave, unknelt, uncoffined, and unknown." Such is the way in which the propagation of vice is hindered in the regular order of society. We, however, in our wisdom, thinking to improve on this arrangement, and too impatient of the presence of the vicious to await their natural extinction, save them from this moral shipwreck, and collect them into one spot, where there is no example to deter, no virtuous public opinion to discountenance, no honest industry to compete with them, no odious comparisons to be undergone; and then, insuring always a regular supply of additional recruits from the gaols of the mother country, like the physical philosophers of antiquity, from this corruption we generate a new society.' Law Mag. No. xix. pp. 12, 13.

But it is alleged, (in the Report of the Select Committee, p. 25,) that 'unless there existed some such mode of disposing of criminals whose offences do not merit the penalty of death, but whose morals are so depraved that their reformation can hardly be expected, no alternative would remain between perpetual imprisonment and the constant infusion into society, of malefactors who, after the term of their punishment had arrived, would again be thrown as outcasts on the world, without character and

‘without the means of gaining an honest livelihood.’ In answer to this plea for retaining transportation as a secondary punishment, we would remark, first, that this constant infusion into society of malefactors, is going on at a rate which the existence of the penal colonies may, in the first instance, mitigate; but against the proportion which they subtract, must be set the encouragement which transportation holds out to desperate offenders. Of 12,800 persons convicted and sentenced in England and Wales in 1830, it appears that there were

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In the same year, there arrived in New South Wales, 3225 convicts, and in Van Diemen's Land 2045; together, 5270. In the previous year, the number was upwards of 5000. It does not appear how these large numbers are produced, since those sentenced to be transported for not more than seven years, are rarely (if ever) sent across the seas; and the numbers sentenced to be transported for a longer period in Scotland and Ireland, were only about 500, making with the English convicts less than 3000. However this may be, the number of those sentenced to be transported for seven years, or to be imprisoned for different terms, from six months to five years, in England and Wales, during the last seven years, is 68,702, or, on an average, 9820 *per annum*, exclusive of about 5000 committed to gaol, but acquitted or discharged. Here, then, is an infusion of nearly 15,000 tainted, if not incorrigible persons every year into English society, exclusive of discharged debtors and vagrants. To lessen this frightful amount, becomes an object of vital importance; but the question before us is, whether the system of transportation is an efficient alleviation of the evil, or whether it does not tamper with the disease, instead of acting with remedial virtue.

The argument assumes, that those selected for transportation are criminals whose offences do not merit the penalty of death, but whose depraved morals preclude the hope of their reformation. This assumption is erroneous in both respects. The convict, in a large proportion of cases, is one who has been sentenced

to suffer death, and whose offence must therefore be considered as 'meriting death,' as much as any crime short of murder can be said to merit that penalty. But the greatest crimes are not always committed by the most depraved offenders; nor does the crime for which the delinquent is sentenced to transportation, afford any criterion of the degree of depravity which he had attained, when arrested in his career of crime. It might have been his first offence, committed under the instigation of sudden passion, or the persuasion of more hardened accomplices. The most depraved and incorrigible offenders are often found among those who are continually violating the laws, but who keep clear of the bolder crimes for which the laws have reserved the penalty of death or of permanent transportation. Thus, that very class of malefactors which it is so desirable to prevent being thrown back upon society, for the most part, escape the sentence which secures their removal, and after the expiration of their term of imprisonment, are re-infused into the general mass. It is true, that sometimes old offenders are sentenced to transportation for life, on account of their notoriously bad character, rather than for the specific crime of which they are found guilty. Waiving the question how far this can be considered as a sound principle of criminal justice, we would simply remark, that such old offenders form but a certain proportion of the criminals actually sent out of the country. Thus, some are transported on account of the particular crime committed; some on the ground of bad character or presumed moral depravity. But the latter are as unfit to be selected as colonists, as the former may be undeserving of being confounded with the thoroughly depraved and incorrigible. It is, however, those who are *not* so depraved as to preclude the hope of their reformation, who would be the most eligible subjects of the experiment of penal colonization.

Transportation, if deprived of its penal character, if abolished as a punishment, would answer well as an expedient for disposing of discharged criminals who had behaved well during the period of their imprisonment. The helpless predicament of such persons on being thrown back as outcasts upon society, without character and without the means of gaining a honest livelihood, render them peculiar objects of compassion and of the wise beneficence of Government. Hitherto, they have been most inconsiderately neglected, till a repetition of crime, under such circumstances almost inevitable, has procured for them the boon of a second sentence followed by their removal. In many cases, transportation, if held out as a refuge to the discharged and destitute delinquent, would be the preventive, instead of the consequence of crime, at a manifest saving of expense to the community, as well as a diminution of guilt in the individual. Surely, the interests of society are better secured by getting rid of those

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who, if they remained in this country, would almost infallibly commit crime, than by getting rid of actual offenders. But, in proportion to the facility of getting rid of culprits, will be the supineness that prevails as to the means of preventing or obviating the temptation to the commission of crime. In this respect, as well as in its effect upon criminals who regard it as a desirable fate, transportation, in the present system, has tended to multiply crime.

Society ought to be made to feel the inconveniences resulting from the crime which is the fruit of its own neglect, or of unwise legislation. That the increase of delinquency in this country is mainly owing to the neglect of the means of prevention, will not be questioned by any persons who have competently examined the working of our criminal system. And if this be the fact, a facile mode of disposing of criminals, must serve only to render our legislators and magistrates more indifferent to the demoralizing effects of ignorance and pauperism, of game-laws and trespass-laws, of beer-shops and gin-shops, of sabbath-breaking, of precipitate and unnecessary commitments, of crowded and ill regulated gaols, and of those other defects in our criminal institutions which contribute to the multiplication of offences and the encouragement of crime*. It is not till the question becomes embarrassing, What shall we do with our convicts? that there is any chance of obtaining due attention to what ought long ago to have undergone more thorough inquiry, What are the best means of preventing men from becoming criminals?

One obvious means of prevention, too little considered by our magistrates, is, not to treat a man as a criminal before he is proved to be such, which is the direct way to make him one. The extreme readiness of magistrates to commit, instead of accepting bail, is not only a very principal cause of the increase in the number of commitments, but, in its ultimate consequences, a cause of the actual increase of crime. No one comes out of gaol as he went in, as respects either his character or his position in society. Now we have already adverted to the large proportion which the number of persons discharged by grand juries or acquitted, bears to the total number of commitments. By the general acceptance of bail, the number of untried prisoners might be reduced at least one half, without any prejudice to the interests of the community, and with great advantage to the discipline of prisons. Few magistrates are disposed to accept of bail; and their anxiety to avoid responsibility, leads them to fill the gaols with petty offenders who, formerly, would have been discharged after personal chastisement. Nothing is more easy than to get an offender committed. The ultimate cost to the community of

* See, on the Increase and Causes of Crime, *Ecl. Rev.* vol. vii. 3rd Series, pp. 313—324.

such commitment, from its certain effects upon the supposed culprit, is a consideration that seldom troubles the worshipful administrators of our penal injustice.

For injustice it certainly must be deemed, to punish a man who has not been tried or proved guilty of any offence. Now imprisonment is punishment, if any thing is. Nor can any improvement in our system of secondary punishments take place, till a proper distinction is made between the convict sentenced to the forfeiture of his liberty, and the subject of an alleged but unproved charge. Imprisonment may be necessary for the safe keeping of the presumed culprit under charges of a serious nature; but, in that case, it should wear as little as possible the character of punishment, and be simple detention. On the other hand, imprisonment, when inflicted in virtue of a judicial sentence, requires to be rendered much more effective for the purposes of punishment.

‘There are three, and only three objects,’ remarks Archbishop Whately, ‘with a view to which punishments can be inflicted or threatened: 1. Retribution; 2. Correction; 3. the *Prevention* of the offence, generally, by the terror of a punishment denounced.’ As for the first of these purposes, the infliction of just vengeance on the guilty, the learned Prelate contends, that ‘it is clearly out of *man’s* province.

‘Setting aside the consideration, that the circumstances on which moral guilt depends, the inward motives of the offender, his temptations, and the opportunities he may have had of learning his duty, can never be perfectly known but to the Searcher of hearts,—setting aside this, it does not appear that man, even if the degrees of moral turpitude could be ascertained by him, would have a right to inflict on his fellow-man any punishment whatever, whether heavy or light, of which the ultimate object should be, the suffering of the offender. Such a procedure, in individuals, is distinctly forbidden by the Founder of our religion, as a sinful revenge: and it does not appear how individuals combined into a community can impart to that community any right which none of them individually possessed;—can bestow, in short, *on themselves* what is not theirs to bestow. Our Saviour and his apostles did not mean to deprive even an individual of the right of defending (when there is no other defence to be had) his own person and property; and this right he is competent to transfer, and is considered as having transferred, to the community; but they meant to forbid the “rendering of evil for evil,” for its *own sake*: and as no man is authorized to do this, or can authorize others to exercise such a right, even over himself, so neither can ten men or ten millions possess any such right to inflict vengeance; for “vengeance is mine, saith the Lord.”’ Whately, pp. 59, 60.

There is, however, an important distinction, assuredly, between judicial retribution and private revenge. According to the argument in the above extract, murder being absolutely forbidden

by the law of God, the magistrate can have no better right than an individual, to take away the life of a criminal, since 'individuals combined into a community, cannot impart to that community any right which none of them individually possess.' The same mode of argument would prove every species of punishment to be at variance with Christianity, since individuals are enjoined to suffer wrong patiently, and not to resist evil, to give to him that asketh, to forgive their debtors. Taken literally, these precepts would preclude the obtaining of civil compensation, as much as they do the principle of vindictive retaliation. But the fact is, they were never intended by Our Lord as maxims of government or public justice. We are forbidden to avenge ourselves, or to act in the spirit of revenge or retaliation: if our enemy hunger, we are to feed him; if he thirst, to give him drink. Can public laws be administered upon this principle? If retribution belongs to God, is it not also said, that the magistrate is "the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil" (Rom. xiii. 4.); and that he "beareth not the sword in vain?" The 'infliction of just vengeance on the guilty,' is clearly, then, within the province of the magistrate; although it by no means follows, that the suffering of the offender is 'the *ultimate object*' of retribution, whether Divine or human. To represent this as the character of the Divine wrath, would be impious. The principle and design of judicial retribution are altogether incorrectly described by the learned Writer; and his theory of punishment partakes of the vicious ethics of King and Paley, which would rest the eternal principles of justice upon general expediency. They are doubtless ever in accordance with expediency; but, for the laws which govern human actions, there are higher reasons.

Of the other two legitimate objects of punishment, the learned Author remarks, 'the prevention of a repetition of the offence by the same individual, whether by his reform or removal, is of incalculably less importance than the other,—the prevention of crime generally, by the terror of example or of threat.'

'If we could ever so completely attain the other objects, by some expedient which would yet fail of, or very inadequately accomplish, this last, such a system must be at once pronounced inefficacious. Could we be sure of accomplishing the reformation of every convicted criminal, at the same time making his services available to the public, yet, if the method employed should be such as to deter no one from committing the offence, society could not exist under such a system. On the other hand, if the punishment denounced had no other tendency whatever but to deter, and could be *completely* effectual in that, it is plain that it would entirely supersede all other expedients, since *it would never even be inflicted*. This truth, though self-evident, is frequently overlooked in practice, from the necessary imperfection of all our expedients. Hardly any *denunciation* of punishment ever was

thus completely effectual ; and thence men are often led to look to the actual infliction as the object contemplated. Whereas it is evident, that every instance of the infliction of a punishment is an instance, as far as it goes, of the *failure* of the legislator's design. No axiom in Euclid can be more evident, than that the object of the legislator, in enacting that murderers shall be hanged and pilferers imprisoned or transported, is, not to load the gallows, fill the gaol, and people New Holland, but to prevent the commission of murder and theft ; and that consequently every man who is hanged, or transported, or confined, is an instance, *pro tanto*, of the inefficacy, *i. e.* want of *complete* efficacy of the law. The imprisonment may reform the offender ; death removes him from the possibility of again troubling society ; and the example may in either case operate to deter others in *future* ; but the very necessity of inflicting the punishment, proves that the dread of that punishment has, so far at least, failed of producing the desired effect. This absolute perfection indeed—the entire prevention of crime—is a point unattainable ; but it is a point to which we may approach indefinitely ;—it is the point towards which our measures must be always tending, and we must estimate their wisdom by the degrees of their approach to it.' Whately, pp. 60, 61.

That it forms no part of the legitimate object of penal laws, to promote the reformation of the offender, must, we apprehend, be admitted. The simple object of penal sanctions is to deter, by the influence of fear, from the violation of the law ; and the design of the law is the protection of society. 'The law worketh wrath,' *i. e.* penal vengeance ; and moral discipline or paternal chastisement seems to be wholly foreign from the stern operation of criminal statutes. It is strange, that the learned Prelate should explain 'correction,' as 'the prevention of a repetition of offence 'by the same individual, whether by his reformation or his removal.' His removal, it is true, whether by death or by transportation, is designed to secure society against a repetition of the crime by the same individual ; but how can this mode of prevention be termed correction ? Correction is punishment, which may or may not lead to reform ; but its design is to prevent a repetition of the offence, by producing fear of a repetition of the punishment, as well as to strike terror into others by the example of the culprit. In short, the three-fold object of punishment resolves itself into one ; namely, to restrain from crime by the operation of the principle of fear. Human laws, in this respect, strike in with the general law of the Divine Government, which indissolubly connects vice and suffering, crime and penalty, in the ultimate issue. But, although necessary, this connexion is not obvious, tangible, or immediate, the consequence being remote and indefinite ; whereas the efficacy of punishment upon the ignorant and sensual, upon all in whom the moral principle is enfeebled, as well as upon children and animals, depends upon the speediness and certainty with which it follows transgression.

Hence, the fear inspired by penal laws is found to operate upon those who are not restrained by religious fear, because in them the principle of faith is absent.

The prevention of crime by fear of suffering is, then, we should say, the only object of penal sanctions. But other means of preventing crime than those contemplated by the criminal law, fall within the province, and demand the attention of an enlightened Government. A wise economy, not less than the dictates of philanthropy, recommends the adoption of any plan that may promote the reformation of the delinquent, although that moral benefit is neither comprehended in the theory of punishment, nor is the natural effect of suffering. The two objects may be pursued together, and both may be attained by a judicious system of prison discipline and punishment; but they are distinct objects,—equally claiming the concern of the rulers of a State, but still as distinct as education and criminal law. We agree, therefore, with Dr. Whately, that the reformation of the convict, desirable as it is in itself, is, as regards the penal laws, a secondary object, or rather an incidental advantage not belonging to punishments as such. We admit it to be ‘an indispensable object of prison discipline,’ but not of penal enactments. ‘The design of punishment,’ it is said, ‘is not merely to inflict pain and deprivation.’ The infliction of suffering is allowable only as it may ‘deter, correct, and reclaim.’ (Report, note 15.) But to deter and to reclaim are two very different things. Men are deterred from crime by fear of suffering, but they are never reclaimed by suffering, nor is this the use of punishment. To reclaim the vicious, whether criminals or not, is both the interest and the duty of a Christian community; but the law deals with the vicious, not as such, but simply as criminals. ‘Unjustifiable as are vindictive penalties, the offender must be made to feel that punishment attends the violation of the law.’ And others must be made sensible of this by his example. Here, the end of punishment and its efficacy terminate. Yet, that ‘the prevention of crime will never be effected by the influence of fear alone,’ that is by punishment alone, we are fully sensible. Nay, we contend that the best mode of preventing crime does not fall within the province of penal legislation, but consists in the impartation of religious instruction, which is the duty not so much of the magistrate as of the minister. ‘Religious instruction forms, in fact,’ say the Committee of the Prison Discipline Society, ‘an indispensable branch of prison regulation: it is a component part of the system. Without such reformation, the object of prison discipline cannot be attained. Without religious impressions, reformation is hopeless.’ (p. 64.) We need not say how entirely we concur in these sentiments. Advocates as we have ever been of a reformatory discipline, we cannot be so far misunder-

stood as to be suspected of underrating its importance or of doubting its efficacy. We wish only to place in a clear light the essential distinction between the proper design of punishment, and the proper design of discipline, and their diverse operation. In the punishment of the criminal, the benefit of society is the immediate and primary object, not the moral benefit of the sufferer, which may be the accidental result. In attempting his reformation, the good of the individual is the primary object, and the benefit of society is only contemplated as the remote consequence. It is the interest of the community that the vicious should be reclaimed. It is still more desirable that men should be prevented, by the influence of education and religious instruction, from becoming vicious.

We have been led to insist upon this distinction, perhaps somewhat tediously, by finding both in the publication of the Prison Discipline Committee, and in that of Archbishop Whately, views upon the subject of Punishment which we must regard as obscure and unsound; and though the error which pervades those views is on the side of humane sentiment, even amiable errors are not always harmless. '*La verité vaut mieux absolument.*'

The whole system of our secondary punishments demands revision; and it is of the highest importance, that that revision should be based upon sound principles; that it should be clearly understood, what punishment can do, and what it cannot do. There can be no doubt that punishment might be rendered much more effective as a means of deterring from crime by inspiring dread, even without increasing its severity, were it more certain and more speedy. The chances of escape have far more influence upon the calculations of the delinquent, than the degree of suffering which awaits his conviction. Punishment, however, must inspire dread, or it is altogether deprived of its efficiency. This is the case, to a great extent, with capital punishments, which carry little terror to the hardened and desperate offender, and with transportation. The dread of hard labour, of seclusion, and of restraint, is adapted to operate still more powerfully upon a large class of offenders; and this species of punishment has the additional advantage, that it may be converted into a powerful instrument of moral correction, by reforming the habits of the criminal. The American system of penitentiary discipline is strongly recommended to the attention of the Legislature in the publications before us.

'This system combines all the advantages which transportation has not; it begins immediately after sentence; it is painful in the extreme, by enforcing strict silence and hard work by day, and solitude by night; it is constant and uniform; in cheapness, it far exceeds every other punishment except death; and it affords the best chance of reformation which any mode of reclaiming depraved persons can afford,

inasmuch as it connects labour and instruction with their most agreeable associations, as silence is never broken except by the voice of the teacher ; and where conversation and amusement are forbidden, labour itself is a relief.' Whately, p. 165.

Add to which, this discipline admits of a great variety of combination, and is therefore adapted to the treatment of offenders of different classes of criminality.

'The beneficial effects which the penitentiary system, when fairly tried, has thus produced, prove that imprisonment may be rendered efficacious for all the just purposes of penal legislation, without resorting to extreme severity. The adoption of a similar discipline in this country, under certain modifications, would prove a salutary substitute for the penalty of Death ; and its principle has long been recognised by the Legislature. The 19th Geo. III. c. 74. (an Act drawn by Sir Wm. Blackstone assisted with the advice of Mr. Howard,) has this preamble: "Whereas if many offenders convicted of crimes for which transportation has been usually inflicted, were ordered to solitary imprisonment, accompanied by well-regulated labour and religious instruction, it might be the means, under Providence, not only of deterring others from the commission of the like crimes, but also of reforming individuals and inuring them to habits of industry." ' Report, p. 43.

The whole subject will, we trust, before long undergo a full discussion preparatory to introducing those economical reforms into the existing system, which enlightened policy and humanity unite to recommend. We hope to see the system of penal transportation wholly done away. Instead of employing it as an inefficient engine of punishment, let it be held out as a relief and a reward, and both the mother country and our Australian colonies will derive advantage from the change.

The preceding remarks were in the hands of our Printer, when a pamphlet reached us, entitled, 'Hints on the Necessity of a Change of Principle in our Legislation, for the efficient protection of Society from Crime': reprinted from the Edinburgh Law Journal. The ingenious and philanthropic Writer has fallen into the common error of mistaking one side of a subject for the whole truth. Because punishment is inefficacious for the purpose of reform, he jumps to the conclusion, that it is useless, and that, being inefficacious, it is cruel. He asserts, that 'formidable punishment and reformation cannot be united ;' and he would therefore abolish entirely the penal character of the treatment of criminals, and attend exclusively to their reform. In a word, he would convert all prisons into asylums. The following remarks are intended to serve as the philosophical basis of the Writer's argument.

'The material to be worked upon is the WILL OF MAN. In relation to the impulses and tendencies of this will, minute and attentive observation has shewn, and the parables of the Talents and the Sower

illustrate the observation, that human beings present three classes. *First*, those whose animal appetites or propensities are so powerful as to overbalance the restraining force of their moral and intellectual faculties, and, like thorns, choke any good seed sown in them. Beings of this constitution of mind are under the dominion of strong lusts, violent passions, and intense selfishness. Their impressions of moral duty are so weak as to offer no restraint to the gratification of their selfishness, at any cost of property, limb, or life, to those, no matter how unoffending, who stand in their way; while in most of them a limited intellect has obscure views of the real nature of things, confused perceptions of consequences, overweening confidence in their own power of concealment, evasion, and escape, total blindness to the guilt of their actions, a fixed rejection in their own case of all idea of retribution,—on the contrary, a persuasion that all restraint imposed on themselves is the unwarrantable act of the strongest; and, finally, the feeblest powers of controlling their passions, even when they do see the fatal consequences of yielding to their sway. Any better endowment of intellect in this class is always perverted to the purposes of crime; hence expert plan-laying thieves, pickpockets, swindlers, and forgers.

‘The *second* class of mankind are very numerous; those whose *animalism* is nearly as strong as in the first class, but whose moral and intellectual powers of restraint are so much greater, as to bring the tendencies to indulgence and forbearance almost to a balance. External circumstances in such persons turn the scale. In low life, uneducated, neglected, and destitute, they have often become criminals; in a more favourable condition of education and society, they have continued respectable; but, within the influence of bad example, they will be found sensual and often profligate, and they are always selfish and self-indulging. In them is the scriptural want of earth to preserve the plant which springs up, from the withering action of the sun.

‘The *third* class are the good ground, that produces in different degrees, but all plentifully. They are those who, the Apostle says, are “a law unto themselves.” In them the animal propensities are sufficient for their legitimate ends; but the decided predominance of intellect and moral feeling, as faculties of their minds, renders it nearly a moral impossibility, that the inferior tendencies should ever master them so far as to impel them to commit a crime. It is *physically* possible for such men to rob, or steal, or torture, or murder, but it is *morally* impossible; and they would attempt any physical difficulty in preference. They enjoy strong moral and intellectual perceptions. Their passions, sometimes vigorous, are reined by their higher feelings; they feel the law written in their hearts with the same Finger that graved it on tables of stone; instead of all their inspirations and aims being selfish, they have time, and thought, and exertion, and money, to spare for their fellow creatures; and are made happy by the extension of the virtuous enjoyment of life throughout the world. They cannot exist in a grovelling atmosphere, and tend upwards into a purer moral medium, when by circumstances depressed into vicious contact. These, lastly, are the men who are sincerely, conscientiously, rationally, and practically religious, and whose morality is based in the

Divine will and the precepts of Christianity. It is manifestly the Creator's design, that such men, from intellectual as well as moral power, shall rise to the guidance of society ; and liberty, and light, and national happiness, are in the direct ratio of their ascendancy. An enlightened and effective criminal code will emanate from them alone.

' One grand error in criminal legislation has been, that the threefold distinction now drawn has never been taken into account as true in nature. There is no practical belief that it exists. We do not find it adverted to in any of the thousand and one treatises already written, and by the most talented of men, on criminal legislation. Yet we venture to predict that, till it shall be acted upon as a practical truth, speculation after speculation, code after code, and institution after institution, for the protection of society from crime, will fall to the ground. The prevalent practical belief of the million, and of the law-makers in whom they confide, is, that in power to obey the laws there is among men no difference of mental constitution ; that a good man has *willed* to be virtuous, and a bad man has *willed* to be vicious, and that either might have willed equally easily the opposite character ;—that it was a mere voluntary choice that, on the one hand, filled the prisons with wretches whom a Howard visited, and that determined Howard, on the other, to visit them. Hence the indignation and resentment felt against the criminal, and the tendency to visit upon him the retribution considered due to a deliberate choice of the wrong, in spite of a clear perception and feeling of the right. Now, the truth will challenge the strictest investigation, that the great majority of criminals in this country have minds so constituted, and that independently of their own volition, as to rank them in the *first* class above described. They are born with a greatly preponderating animalism, which grows with their growth, and strengthens with their strength. Belonging to the lower, and often the lowest, ranks of life, having neither moral nor religious training and exercise, little or no intellectual education, no habit or practice of industry, frugality, sobriety, or self-denial ; strangers to all encouragement from a higher moral society to value character ; on the contrary, familiar from infancy with the example of debauchery, profligacy, and recklessness, and crime in their very parents and relations, trained often to early mendicity, and always to thieving, habituated to hear debauchery and successful villany lauded in the society with which they mix, and morality and justice ridiculed or defied, they may be said to be indeed born in iniquity, and bred in crime. Such are the beings whose acts create resentment and retributive revenge in the minds of the unreflecting, the untempted, and, in regard to a sound philosophy of man, the uninformed.

' Now, minds so constituted ought not to be judged of in the same manner as those of a more moral and intellectual constitution. Justice demands a large allowance for their unfortunate constitution and not less unhappy circumstances ; and, above all, observing that punishment, however severe, does NOT operate upon them as example, it would consider whether there are not means, at once more just and more effectual, of protecting society from the acts of these its dangerous and reckless members.'

That punishment has *no* exemplary force, even upon num-

bers of this first class, is an assumption by no means warranted; and if it were true, its operation upon the second class would justify its infliction upon individuals who might be referred to the first. The classification, however, it must be recollected, is purely theoretical. The Writer contends, indeed, that those 'decidedly predisposed to crime' are much more of a class than is supposed; that they are 'a class nearly all of whom, at least in the lower ranks, come in contact with the law;' and that 'a proper penitentiary system is nearly certain of getting them all into its hands.' Were this the fact, it would surely be practicable to deal with them *before* they came in contact with the law, by a preventive benevolence. Of this policy, it is but justice to the Writer to say, that he is the zealous advocate; and he confidently relies upon Infant schools, conducted upon a religious basis, as the most rational and the only effectual preventive of crime. Next to Infant Schools, in efficiency, he seems to rank Prison Education.

'When, by an enlightened age, penitentiaries shall be held to be hospitals for moral patients, and not engines to protect society, by holding out the spectacle of the sufferings of perfectly free agents, either *paying back* that loss which their actions have occasioned, or deterring others from crimes by their example, the duration of the convict's detention will depend, not upon the mere act which brought him there, but upon the continuance of his disease. As long as penitentiary discipline shall consist of severe and degrading compulsory labour, of stripes, irons, insults, and brutality, without an attempt at improvement mental or moral, beyond being herded into a chapel on Sunday for an hour or two,—and this constituted the old idea of a house of correction,—a prescribed and short duration of such irrational usage is imperative. Nay, it was and is the prominent problem of criminal legislation, to proportion punishments to crimes,—to weigh out, to an odd scruple, the quantum of suffering which shall counterpoise the quantum of guilt in the *act* committed; and certainly it would be monstrous to detain the convict, on such a principle, one moment longer in the place of mere suffering, than the exact time necessary to permit society to *take out*, in his groans, the supposed debt *ex delicto* contracted by him. But no one is ever sent to an hospital for a previously prescribed period. Sixty days of the infirmary, or the madhouse, as a medical prescription, would be justly ridiculed, in and out of the faculty; and so it will come to be, when moral infirmaries, applying rational and effectual means of cure to those afflicted with that worst of diseases called a proclivity to crime, and being withal mild, benevolent, and encouraging to the patient, are substituted for the present irrational treatment. The unhappy criminal will then be regarded more in relation to his moral constitution than his conduct; or, if the latter be estimated, it will be in the way of evidence of the former. His sentence for an overt act of crime will be the restraint of the penitentiary, till an authority, beyond all question as to intelligence, and all suspicion as to uprightness and benevolence, shall deem

it safe to venture him once more in society. It is evident that, for such a process, the shortest time must be long. Ordinary education is the work of years ; and *a fortiori* must moral training be, when working against the wind and tide and current of criminal propensity. Nay, as in lunatic asylums there may be cases of very long duration, there may be cases for life in our asylum, cases of relapse after dismissal, and return to necessary restraint on fresh conviction. These last ought to be held cases for life. If any one shall object, that this is any thing but mild treatment of criminals, and that there is more justice in inflicting a month's confinement for a first and slight offence, and then giving the criminal another *chance* for a good life ; we would answer, that the latter course is but the first step of a series of penal inflictions, alternating with intervals of the most wretched sensualities and profligacies called freedom, which necessarily bring the sufferer back to punishment—and that, on the proportion principle, more severe than the first—to be again dismissed to greater misery than he leaves, and more resolved upon, and better fitted for, crime. He returns a third time, of course, to your bridewell, to be visited with yet increased infliction, till at last the account of proportion has so much accumulated to his debit, that a violent and ignominious death alone is held adequate expiation. What is the restraint of a few—of a number of years—of a lifetime—in a well constituted reformatory asylum, compared to the cruelty, the injustice, the irrationality of this ?

‘ Would you send a boy for years to your Penitentiary, who for ‘ the first time steals a shilling ? ’ To this ‘ natural question ‘ under the old impressions,’ the Writer replies : ‘ The theft of ‘ the shilling is the symptom of a moral disease which requires ‘ the boy’s being put under treatment ; and it is mercy to him to ‘ seclude him, and subject him to the education and training ‘ which his unfortunate case requires.’ We agree with the Writer, that such a young offender is a subject for reformatory treatment, rather than for punishment ; therefore, we would not have him sent to either prison or penitentiary, but rescued by benevolent interposition from the hand of criminal justice. But justice is altogether excluded from the Writer’s theory.

‘ We should have no right,’ he says, ‘ on the principle of either retribution or example, to go beyond a nice apportionment of the penalty to the act ; but, when the object in view is the moral cure of the individual himself, there is no variance between moral feeling and expediency, even although that cure should require a long seclusion. We never think the longest confinement to a sick bed unjust or disproportionate.’ p. 28.

What does this prove, but that the moral cure of the individual is not that which justice contemplates, or which is the object of penal enactments ? According to the theory, however, the very principle of justice is to be banished from legislation, and the judicial bench ought to be converted into a college of physicians. The moral desert of crime is thus virtually denied ; and

the demerit of the criminal is entirely resolved into misfortune. It is but a step further, if a step, to arraign the right of even the Supreme Governor to punish, and to explode the idea of a day of Retribution.

Art. II. *Remarks on the Use and Abuse of some Political Terms.* By George Cornewall Lewis, Esq., Student of Christ Church, Oxford. 8vo. pp. xxxii. 264. Price 9s. London, 1832.

TO such of our readers as are anxious to cultivate the Art of Thinking, and to understand either the opinions they hold or those they disavow, we strongly recommend the present work, with the confidence of obtaining their thanks for bringing it under their notice. And such readers we may invite to a perusal of the subsequent remarks;—for we cannot venture to promise to others a very entertaining article.

‘There is, perhaps,’ remarks Mr. Lewis, ‘no moral or political treatise of any length, certainly no considerable argumentative work, of which the conclusions are not in some degree affected by an incautious employment, or an unperceived ambiguity of language.’ To so great an extent does this source of fallacious reasoning mingle itself with the decisions and arguments of our highest authorities, that Locke goes so far as to express a doubt, ‘whether language, as it has been employed, has contributed more to the improvement or to the hinderance of knowledge.’ This opinion, it is impossible to regard as any thing more than an hyperbole; since language, whatever be its ambiguities, is the only means of knowledge, as well as ‘the instrument by which we think and reason.’ But the instances cited by the present Writer, of the liability of even the most acute reasoners to impose upon themselves and mislead their readers by verbal fallacies, will surprise those persons who have not considered the powerful influence of equivocal language in deceiving the mind. The speculative parts of Blackstone’s Commentaries, the most elegant production, perhaps, in our legal literature, Mr. Lewis characterizes as ‘an epitome of popular fallacies and misconceptions on most of the fundamental doctrines of jurisprudence and government.’ Paley, the most lucid of writers, occasionally falls into similar error. We undertook, in our last volume, to shew that Hooker’s whole fabric of argument is built upon a fallacy of this description.* In noticing the recent disputes about the constitution, it was also shewn that the whole question hinged upon the ambiguity of the term.† In metaphysical theology, the same cause has given rise to tedious and angry logomachy.

* Eclectic for October, 1832, p. 285. † Eclectic for June, 1832, p. 471.

The remedy usually proposed by logicians and philosophers for this acknowledged source of misapprehension, is technical definition. When writers have precisely defined their terms, they imagine that they have secured themselves against all danger of using them fallaciously. Metaphysicians have pleased themselves with the idea of thus reducing their terms to the simplicity and unchangeable force of algebraic signs. Definitions, however, are generally little better than assumptions, implying a meaning that requires both to be explained and to be proved. Besides, as Archbishop Whately remarks, 'it is not the same thing to be acquainted with the ambiguity of a term, and to be practically aware of it, and watchful of the consequences connected with it.' After giving the most precise definition of a word, a writer may be found unconsciously passing from his own defined signification of the term to another, and drawing an inference from his own blunder. It is not enough to understand the meaning of terms, whether conventionally agreed upon or arbitrarily defined: unless we are careful to understand our own meaning *at the moment of using them*, in the precise connexion in which they occur, they will often be found to slip their meaning, and cheat us with a verbal fallacy. 'It is impossible,' Mr. Lewis justly remarks, 'to legislate in matters of language: the evils arising from its imperfection may be eluded, but can never be removed.' The best way to obviate the ambiguity arising from the variable meaning of words, is, not to attempt to stereotype the forms of thought, but to keep always in recollection the essential imperfection of language as the instrument of thought, so as to rely less upon the intrinsic power of words, than upon the manner of using them.

An inquiry into the meaning of terms is, however, very different from an endeavour to define them, and far more useful. The one is an attempt to ascertain a fact; the other, to lay down a rule, or to frame an hypothesis. What words really mean, can be determined only by their actual *use*: they mean what the person employing them intends by them, and the meaning lies, not in the words, but in the intention. Mr. Lewis's object in this volume is, to illustrate the various uses of the principal terms belonging to political science. His inquiry aspires to occupy 'a middle place between a technical dictionary and a scientific treatise.'

'Even if the definitions which I have either borrowed or suggested should be thought incorrect', he remarks, 'yet the investigation of the various senses of each word as occurring in popular language, must, if properly employed, furnish to others the means of detecting fallacy in political discussion The following researches relate, not to the truth of any particular propositions, but to the meaning of certain terms used in political reasoning: which, being often employed in

different senses in the premises and conclusion, have given rise to countless inconclusive arguments, and have thus caused *fallacies of argument*, in the proper meaning of the word. The soundness of an inference cannot depend on the truth of a proposition, though it may depend on the use of a term.' pp. v—vii.

In fact, unsound inferences very generally turn upon the double sense of a word. A palpable example of this occurs in a sentence cited from the Edinburgh Review, in which the word 'right' is used in two different senses, and the argument entirely hinges upon the double sense.

"If it be *right* that the property of men should be protected, and if this can only be done by means of Government, then it must be *right* that some person or persons should possess political power. That is to say, some person or persons must *have a right* to political power." p. 14.

The apparent force of this argument, Mr. Lewis remarks, rests on a mere verbal fallacy. Right and wrong are terms relating to a standard of morality. It is right, in the sense of *just*, that the property of men should be protected; and it is right, in the sense of *fit* and *expedient*, that some person or persons should be invested with the powers of government for the purpose of affording this protection. But the right, that is the *lawful claim*, of any persons to exercise political power, cannot be deduced from the abstract rectitude of the principle, that property should be so protected. Had it been said, merely, that some person or persons must have political power, the inference would have been correct, though not very weighty. If it be right that property should be protected, some persons must have political power for that purpose; but unless to possess power, and to have a right to possess power, are the same thing, such power may happen to be in the hands of those who have no right to it, and it may consequently be very wrong that they should possess it. Or, again, they may have even a right derived from law, which, the law being itself unjust, it is morally wrong that they should have. Blackstone's definition of municipal law, betrays a similar confusion of ideas. According to him, Law is 'a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a State, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong.' Were this the fact, there could be no bad laws; or, that which commands what is contrary to moral rectitude, would cease to be law. But it is evident from the argument by which this incorrect definition is supported, that the learned Writer confounded legal rights with the morality of actions. 'It is the business of the law', he says, 'considered as a rule of civil conduct, to enforce (such) rights, and to restrain or redress wrongs.' But how can the law be said to *command* rights, and to *prohibit* wrongs? Law creates rights, and determines them; it also defines and punishes wrongs; but

it may command what is wrong, and prohibit what is right; which is the case with all laws that violate liberty of conscience, by commanding a hypocritical conformity to outward rites of religion, and prohibiting the free performance of religious duties.

Dismissing from consideration the terms right and wrong, as denoting the moral qualities of actions, let us examine the substantive *right*, which is itself used with a latitude that becomes a source of ambiguity. The following is Mr. Lewis's definition of the term.

‘ When the sovereign power commands its subject to do or forbear from certain acts, the claim for such performances or forbearances which one person thereby has upon another, is called a right; the liability to such performances or forbearances, is called a duty; and the omission of an act commanded to be done, or the doing of an act commanded to be forborne, is called a wrong.

‘ All rights, therefore, must be subsequent to the establishment of government, and are the creatures of the sovereign power; no claim upon another, which may not be enforced by process of law, i. e. by calling in the assistance of the sovereign, however recommended by moral justice, can, without an abuse of language, be termed a right. The existence of a moral claim may often be a matter of doubt when the facts are ascertained, and one party may demand what the other may not think himself bound in conscience to yield; but, the facts being given, the existence of a right, or a legal claim, can never admit of dispute, as it is defined and conferred by a third party, who will, if required, step in to enforce it.

‘ Properly, therefore, right signifies a claim conferred or sanctioned by the sovereign power, i. e. a legal right. Sometimes, however, it is used to mean a claim recommended by the practice, analogy, or doctrines of the constitution, i. e. a constitutional right; and, sometimes, a claim recommended by views of justice or public policy, i. e. a moral right.

‘ By the first and proper sense, is meant a claim which may be enforced in a court of law, or by the proper authorities, and which actually exists: by the two last, a claim which cannot be enforced by any public authority, and which does not exist. Thus, in the first sense, it is said that a man has a right to his own property, reputation, &c., meaning that he has an available claim which can be enforced by process of law. It is also said that, constitutionally, every British subject who pays taxes, has a right to vote for a member of the House of Commons; meaning that such a claim is supported by the practice or doctrines of our constitution. It is also said, that all the people have a right to be represented; that they have a right to choose their own governors, to cashier their governors for misconduct, and to frame a government for themselves; that the poor have a right to be maintained by the rich; that the poor have a right to spoil the land-owners, and divide their lands; that the poor have a right to spoil the rich, and divide their property, &c. In the latter cases, the persons who use these expressions mean that, in their opinion, there is a claim founded in justice and expediency, which they call a right; though, in truth,

what they mean to express is, that it ought, by the sanction of the legislature, to be made a right.' pp. 7—9.

'We hear of original rights, natural rights, indefeasible rights, inalienable rights, imprescriptible rights, hereditary rights, indestructible rights, inherent rights, &c., where there is no pretence of legislative sanction: indeed, the only object of using these names is to induce the legislature to convert these supposed rights into real rights, by giving them the sanction of law. The phrase, natural right, takes its origin from the doctrine of a state of nature, which will be more fully explained below. It appears to signify a claim recommended by natural law, or by those rules which were recognised by common consent, when mankind were in a state of nature. An indefeasible right is a right which man enjoyed in a state of nature, and which he only surrendered conditionally at the making of the social compact; so that nothing has since been able to defeat or destroy it, and it is ready to be revived at any time. An imprescriptible right is a right which was prior to the social compact, and which continues to exist without being subject to prescription or failure by lapse of time. An inalienable right is a right which cannot be alienated from a man. Indestructible rights, inherent rights, hereditary rights, birthrights of liberty, &c., appear to have nearly the same meaning: viz. that they are dormant rights, never exercised by the possessors, and not extinguishable by any law. In fact, however, these imprescriptible, inalienable, indefeasible rights, in most cases never have been rights, or, if they have, long since were alienated and defeated by the sovereign power. These various expressions have all taken their origin from the theory of the state of nature and the social compact; but they are frequently used by persons who have never heard of this absurd and mischievous doctrine, and would perhaps reject it if they knew it. All that those persons mean is, that, in their opinion, the claims which they call rights ought, in sound policy, to be sanctioned by law. It is the duty of such persons to shew that sound policy requires what they require; but as this would require a process of reasoning, and as reasoning is often both hard to invent and to understand, they prefer begging the question at issue by employing some of the high-sounding phrases just mentioned.' pp. 23—24.

In a subsequent section, civil liberty is defined as signifying, in its positive sense, 'those rights, the enjoyment of which is 'beneficial to the possessor of them', or 'the possession of certain 'rights by one part over another part of the community.' 'Liberties, in the plural number, when employed with a political 'reference, is always equivalent with rights.' Liberty is also used to denote immunity from burdensome duties, or exemption from hurtful restraints. In a note, the unsatisfactory character of Blackstone's definition is pointed out.

'Blackstone divides rights into absolute and negative; and absolute rights he defines to be "such as would belong to persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man is entitled to enjoy, whether out of society or in it."—1 Com. 123. He then says, that "the absolute rights of man are usually summed in one general appellation, and de-

nominated the natural liberty of mankind. This natural liberty consists properly in a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the law of nature."—Ibid. 125. Thus far it appears, that absolute rights are not positive rights conferred by a legislature, but a mere absence of legal restraint, or natural liberty. Afterwards, he lays it down, that "the absolute rights of every Englishman, taken in a political and extensive sense, are usually called their liberties:" and proceeds to explain how these "rights and liberties" exist by virtue of certain acts of Parliament.—Ibid. 127. Here, then, liberties are positive rights conferred by the legislature, having no connexion with natural liberty. Finally he says, that "the rights themselves, thus defined by these several statutes, consist in a number of private immunities; which will appear, from what has been premised, to be indeed no other than either that residuum of natural liberty which is not required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience, or else those civil privileges which society hath engaged to provide, in lieu of the natural liberties so given up by individuals."—Ibid. 129. At length, we find that these "absolute rights" may be either the immunity from certain legal duties, or the possession of certain legal rights, or perhaps both at the same time. It is, perhaps, difficult to conceive greater confusion and obscurity of thought, than is displayed in this laboured discussion.' p. 204.

The notion which would make political or civil liberty consist in that portion of natural liberty which human laws have spared, is alike fallacious and pernicious. It would, if correct, justify Paine's notion, that all government is a necessary evil. Political liberty consists in the possession of those legal rights which are created by law, and secured by government. Law, therefore, instead of being an abridgement of liberty, is the parent of it. No man is free, who is not protected against wrongs; and that protection is afforded by law. To have the full benefit of *frank law*, is the very definition of civil freedom. In the savage state of natural liberty, might is the only acknowledged right. In such a state of things, the strongest alone can be said to possess any rights, since they alone can protect them. The weak are not free, because unprotected: they possess no rights; for the absence of all restraint is to them the negation of all rights, being the exposure to all wrongs. Hence, liberty is not only, as Sir James Mackintosh remarks, 'the object of all government', but it is the creature of government. 'Men,' remarks the learned Author of the Discourse on the Law of Nature and Nations, 'are more free under every government, even the most imperfect, than they would be, if it were possible for them to exist without any government: they are more secure from wrong, more undisturbed in the exercise of their natural powers, and therefore more free, than if they were altogether unprotected against injury from each other.' But, while natural liberty, or the free exercise of our natural powers, is secured by government, which protects

against all but itself, civil liberty may more properly be said to be derived from law, which is the protection against arbitrary rule, against the abuses of government, and generally partakes of the character of a concession to the governed. What are our laws, but the title-deeds of our liberties, obtained by gradual concessions, and devised as a remedy against specific wrongs?

The idea of natural liberty in a social state, as derived from an imaginary social compact, is not merely a fiction,—‘the supposition of a thing which never had any existence’; but, as explained by the advocates of the theory, involves a contradiction. This theory teaches, that mankind, when in the state of nature, made a compact by which the right of self-government was surrendered by the whole community on condition of being well governed. But this very compact supposes a state of civil society, and the pre-existence of social rights, which are never found existing in savage life. Blackstone, however, contends, that such an original contract, though never formally expressed, must be understood and *implied* in the very act of associating together. In the language of the English law, *implication* has a meaning nearly equivalent with fiction. Thus, in many cases, a contract is implied, where no contract was made; it being thereby meant, that the legal consequences are the same as if such contract had been really made, and that their existence may be assumed in argument without proof. But, remarks Mr. Lewis,

‘It is evident, that neither on the common nor on the legal explanation of *implication*, can the assumption of the social contract be supported. It cannot be inferred from the existence of government, or all must admit that government *may* exist without a previous convention. Nor can it be considered as a legal fiction; for a legal fiction is a supposition avowedly false, but treated as if it were true, for the imagined convenience of administering the law. A legal fiction without the sanction of law, is a mere absurdity; and therefore it cannot be pretended that the social compact, which serves as the foundation of all law, derives its own force from the existence of law.’

pp. 211, 212.

Yet, the popular notions respecting the natural liberty and equality of mankind rest upon this baseless political theory; although not unfrequently entertained by persons ‘ignorant of the polluted source to which these expressions may be traced.’

But, while we agree with our Author in his general definition of legal-rights as conferred by law, and as implying correlative social duties in others, (which are the only species of rights that political or juridical science is concerned with,) we are not prepared to admit that there is no such thing as natural rights, anterior to government, independent of human laws and institutions, because springing out of the original natural relations. Mr. Lewis remarks, that Filmer’s argument, that men are born in subjection

to their parents, and, being under their authority, are not by nature free, 'is founded on the customary confusion of law and 'morality; for, though a child, in a savage state, owes a moral 'duty to his parents, he is bound to them by no legal obligation.' But, if he owes a moral duty to his parents, they must possess a correlative moral right, because rights and duties imply each other. And this right must be regarded as an actual and inherent right, recognised, but not created by law, antecedent to all social institutions, and of which no man can be justly deprived. Granting that there can be no political rights, no legal obligations, anterior to human laws and institutions, morality, as well as law, has its rights, which are neither metaphysical nor supposititious, nor dormant: they belong not to 'a state of nature,' but to nature in every state, and are never surrendered. The source of these moral rights and obligations is the law of God and the divine constitution of our nature.

Another term respecting which great confusion of ideas has prevailed, is, *sovereign* and *sovereignty*. By many writers, sovereignty is confounded with royalty: by others, the word is used in a vague and half metaphorical sense, as denoting the will of the whole community, or the moral influence of the nation, or a part of it, upon the acts of the sovereign. 'In its proper sense,' says Mr. Lewis, 'the word sovereignty means the 'supreme power of the person or persons who are sovereign in the 'state, and are legally uncontrolled both from within and without.' This definition is not very happy. That sovereignty means the power of the sovereign, is obvious, but this throws little light upon the precise import of either term. The truth is, however, that sovereignty, that is irresponsible and uncontrolled power, is an attribute rarely attaching, in fact, to those who are styled sovereign. Absolute sovereignty, and absolute supremacy, can be predicated of God alone. 'The King of England is usually styled sovereign, and such is his legal and constitutional 'title, because he is in all things supreme.'

'Nevertheless,' Mr. Lewis remarks, 'according to the scientific definition of sovereignty, the King of England cannot be considered as sovereign, i. e. as possessing the entire sovereign power; as he is not able to make laws by his sole authority, and it is necessary that the advice and consent of two bodies, irresponsible in a corporate capacity for such advice and consent, should previously be offered and obtained. Hence it is that the King of England is termed a limited monarch, and the government of England is called a limited monarchy; because the power of the King in enacting laws, is limited by the necessity of obtaining the consent of two Houses of Parliament to their enactment. And thus the King of England cannot properly be said to possess the entire sovereign power, because all sovereign power is unlimited and uncontrolled; and a *limited sovereign* is a contradiction in terms. The

difference between an absolute and a limited monarchy is, that in one the entire legislative sovereignty belongs to the prince, in the other it is shared with several. It is indeed generally admitted, that all sovereign power is uncontrolled; and it is expressly laid down by Blackstone, that "the sovereignty of the British constitution is lodged in the three branches of the Parliament;" and in another place, he calls the King "one of the constituent parts of the sovereign legislative power:" so that, although, according to our legal language and the written doctrines of our constitution, the King is our sovereign lord, yet in a general sense he cannot properly be called a sovereign, or be said to possess the entire sovereign power: sovereignty, in this peculiar acceptation, being only equivalent to preeminence, or supremacy, and not signifying unlimited and absolute authority.' pp. 50—52.

According to the theory of the constitution, the King has *no* power of enacting laws. The legislative sovereignty, that is, the uncontrollable power of making, repealing, or expounding laws, is substantially vested in the Parliament; and the King shares in that sovereignty, according to the theory, only by his veto; according to fact, only by the influence of the Crown exerted through his ministers. It is only a part therefore, 'and that the least 'important part,' of the sovereign power, that is possessed by the King. With regard to the administration of the laws and the declaration of peace and war, he is sovereign. Blackstone lays it down, that the whole executive power of the English nation is vested in the King. This may be the constitutional theory; but even the executive sovereignty is, in fact, shared with the Parliament, by whom, through the responsibility of those who administer the government, the royal prerogative is effectively controlled. It is true, that the officers intrusted with the administration of the laws or of the executive government, being responsible for their acts, cannot be said to have any share of sovereignty vested in them, because sovereign power is irresponsible. Still, the responsibility of ministers, not to the Crown merely, but to Parliament, proves that the executive, not less than the legislative sovereignty is, in practice, shared by the Crown with the Parliament. The personal irresponsibility of the King, intended to secure the inviolability of his prerogatives, does not extend to his acts, which are under constitutional control.

Mr. Lewis correctly remarks, 'that it is the royal, not the sovereign 'power that is limited in a limited monarchy.' There may be a divided sovereignty, or rather a joint sovereignty; but 'a limited 'sovereign is a contradiction in terms.' In every government, there is a supreme authority, in which the *jura summi imperii* reside, a power from which the constitution has provided no appeal. This unlimited, uncontrolled power certainly does not reside in the King of England, who, though supreme, is not uncontrolled; though invested with the royal prerogatives, is not

absolutely or strictly a *monarch* *. The limitation of his prerogatives extends to his executive as well as his legislative functions. Even the judicial sovereignty, which may with more strict propriety be said to reside in the Crown, has been virtually surrendered, since the Judges have been rendered independent of the royal pleasure, and consequently irresponsible. Or may we not say that, in this country, the Crown itself, with its sovereign prerogatives, is *put in commission*?—that while the majesty of the State is lodged in the hands of a single person, who is the fountain of all honours and dignities, the rights of sovereignty are divided among the respective Commissions to whom the judicial, military, legislative, and administrative powers have respectively been assigned by the theory or the practice of the Constitution? All the powers of the Crown still exist, but they are no longer vested in the monarch. Of the monarchy, if we may be allowed the expression, the Supreme magistrate is but the co-trustee; sovereign in his reserved prerogatives, but not in his authority; the head, but not the possessor of the actual sovereignty.

In these as well as in some other respects, the British Government, though including monarchical institutions, resembles, Mr. Lewis remarks, that of the United States of America, 'barring the differences caused by the nature of a federal union,' far more nearly than the monarchies of Russia, Austria, and Spain.

'If, at the Revolution, the *name* (title) of the King of England, as well as his power, had been changed, but he had nevertheless exercised precisely the same influence in the Constitution as the Crown has exercised since that time, the Government would have been called republican, instead of monarchical; although the only difference would have been, in the name of the first person in the State.' p. 68.

The English Government is, scientifically considered, though not in popular language, a commonwealth or republic: it is so, inasmuch as the sovereign power is divided, and not in the hands of a single person. A limited monarchy must, in the very nature of things, be a republic, and, in the spirit of the government, in effect an aristocracy.

The phrase, *sovereignty of the people*, is one to which, our Author remarks, it is not very easy to give any determinate meaning, but, as generally employed, it seems intended to express 'the moral control and influence exercised by the community at large upon the acts of the legislature.' Sometimes, however,

* 'It is perhaps unfortunate,' Mr. Lewis remarks, 'that usage has sanctioned the extension of the term monarchy to all states in which a King is chief; in other words, has identified *monarchy* with *royalty*.' p. 66.

the phrase means, 'the admission of all the members of the community, or all the free adult males to the election of representatives or magistrates.

'In this sense, it appears to be applied to the government of the United States of America: but this usage is not less improper and figurative than the other just mentioned; as the right of voting for the election of one who is to possess a share of the sovereignty, is itself no more a share of the sovereignty, than the right of publishing a political treatise or a political newspaper. The exercise of the one right may influence the decision, as the exercise of the other may influence the formation, of the sovereign body.

'When the difference between the literal and metaphorical meanings of the sovereignty,—between legal power and moral influence,—is clearly perceived, there is no danger in speaking of the sovereignty of the people in states where the people is not sovereign: we may indeed avoid it, as a clumsy and inaccurate mode of expressing an idea which may be conveyed by precise and convenient terms, but not from any fear of its producing a worse result than obscurity. This phrase, however, is often presented to persons little acquainted with political reasoning, who may easily confound real with figurative sovereignty, and thus be led to suppose that the people truly possess the sovereign power, and therefore are not subject to it. On the mischievous tendency of such notions, which are incompatible with the existence of government, it is unnecessary to make any comment.' pp. 43, 44.

The origin of the phrase, Mr. Lewis derives from Rousseau's theory of a social contract and the opinions connected with it.

'The origin of Rousseau's error,' he remarks, 'appears to have been, that he saw the whole community so far virtually possesses the sovereign power, that if all, or a large part of the members of it agree to destroy the existing government, and to substitute another, they can carry their agreement into effect, as all government is ultimately a question of superior force. But, because the community holds in its hands the issues of sovereignty, it is not to be called sovereign; any more than the Earl of Warwick is to be called *King*, because he was called *King-maker*.' pp. 47, 8.

The power of resistance or rebellion is assuredly not a legal—we question whether it can be termed a virtual sovereignty. Something beyond this, indeed, would seem, according to Mr. Coleridge's Idea of the Constitution, to reside in the nation at large;—a latent, reserved power in the people, which under a free constitution, is never alienated nor delegated, and which, under extraordinary circumstances, becomes as it were constituent and sovereign*. When this metaphysical notion, however, is analysed, it comes to this; that the moral energy of a nation will, where political liberty is enjoyed, operate as an efficient check

* Eclectic Rev. 3d Series, Vol. VI. p. 8.

upon the Government; a truth which cannot be doubted. There are moral limits to legal sovereignty, wherever it resides. Absolute despots have found their powers limited in this respect; but we do not attribute sovereignty to either the press or the bowstring.

Rousseau pushes his notion, that sovereignty essentially consists in the general will, to the absurd conclusion, that, as will cannot be represented, the deputies of the people cannot be its representatives, but are only its delegates. 'The English people 'imagines,' he says, 'that it is free, but it is much mistaken: it 'is free only during the election of members of parliament: as 'soon as they are elected, it is enslaved; it is nothing.' This ridiculous statement proceeds on the supposition, that the electors are, between the sessions of Parliament, possessed of the sovereign power, which they surrender to their representatives. The fact is, that except during the session of Parliament, the legislative sovereignty in this country is in abeyance; and as to the executive sovereignty, that at no time vests in the representatives of the people, as such.

'In all cases of delegation, one party puts another in his place; transferring to the delegate an authority which he is either unwilling or unable to exercise for himself. Thus a man delegates to his steward the management of his estate, to a tutor the education of his children; arming them with certain powers, which, for specific purposes, he possesses in his capacities of proprietor and father. But no one can delegate a power which he does not possess. If an elector does not himself, under any circumstances, possess the power of making laws, he cannot properly be said to delegate to another the power of making laws. A representative exercises this power by virtue of the votes of his constituents, but not by a delegation from them.' pp. 140, 141.

'The right of voting is properly a political right; nor does it bear any resemblance to the exercise of sovereignty. The possession of this right enables a voter to influence the formation of the sovereign body; but a voter never has any part of the governing power, nor does he wield a power which in any way resembles the authority of government, except that the decision of those who really wield that authority may be influenced by his vote. The moral duty incumbent on an elector is to vote for that candidate whose services as a member of the legislature are, in his judgement, most likely to prove beneficial to the state. His power, conferred by this right, is strictly limited, and is confined to one point, namely, the contributing to the choice of the supreme legislative body. There is no question of public policy,—no matter of legislation, in the decision of which he has directly any voice. At the times when the mass of electors are called on to exercise their franchises, (for example, after a dissolution of Parliament in this kingdom,) the legislative sovereignty is in abeyance, and no law can be made. But the power of a member of the legislature is by law unlimited, and may extend to any matter falling within the compass of legislation.

‘ Indeed, no two things can be more clearly distinguished, than the powers of a member of a sovereign representative assembly, and the right of voting for his election. Yet they are perpetually confounded in popular discourse; as when a state is called a democracy, because a majority of its freemen have a vote for the election of representatives; for instance, the United States of America, the government of which, as has been already observed, is in strictness an aristocracy; and when the same term of universal suffrage is applied to the votes of the citizens in the ancient democracies, who were members of the supreme legislature, and to the votes of electors in modern states, who are not. Nor is this confusion always confined to popular usage, but it occurs even in the most recent works of political philosophers.’ pp. 131, 2.

But is it not an erroneous notion which confounds the representative and the legislator as one character, because the two characters are, in certain cases, united in the same person? That they are really distinct, a moment’s consideration will be sufficient to render palpable. The Peer is no representative, although a legislator; whereas, originally, the burgess attended parliament, not as a legislator, but simply as a delegate, appointed to protect the interests of his constituents, but having little or no share in the affairs of Government. By slow degrees, legislative powers were conceded to compliant parliaments; and at length, the whole business of legislation and government has come to be carried on by the instrumentality of the House of Commons. Yet, in its constitutional forms, and its exclusive right to originate money bills, its primary character is still to be traced, as the representative and guardian of the municipal, mercantile, and agricultural interests of the people.

The fundamental principle of the Constitution is, that the people shall tax themselves by their representatives. Upon this, some would graft the claim to govern themselves by their representatives. But this supposed right of self-government, (so favourite a notion with the democratic politicians of America,) is a mere theory, involving something very nearly approaching to a contradiction; since self-government must imply, in such a reference, the not being governed by others, or the non-existence of that sovereign power which is essential to government. The care of public interests may be delegated to representatives as trustees; but the governing power cannot be delegated by the people, who never possessed it. In choosing the person by whom that power shall be exercised, they do not *convey* the power which the Constitution vests in the office. A constable, for instance, though elected by the parish, derives his powers, not from the people, but from the Crown. All government is a control upon the will of the community, and cannot therefore emanate from that will. As law and arbitrary rule are opposed, so are law and arbitrary conduct in civil intercourse; and the freedom and security derived

from the protection of the laws against despotism on the one hand, are not less dependent upon the restraining force of the laws upon the popular will and the conduct of individuals on the other. A community in a capacity to govern itself, through the universal prevalence of virtue, intelligence, political wisdom, and self-restraint, and standing in need of no other protection than a mutual good understanding,—such a community might safely exist and cohere without any sovereign, without any government. In such a state of society, laws would need no sanctions; there would be no wrongs to redress; there would be no occasion for superiors to command; there would be no subjects, for all would rule; and the public will, the homogeneous aggregate of the will of each individual, would be the supreme law. There are principles which, if fully developed and ascendant, would produce a condition of things answering to this supposition; but they are not political principles; they have but slender relation to the elements of human politics. To realize their triumphant operation, and the felicitous results, is reserved for the economy of heaven.

To return, however, to the subject of representation. Mr. Lewis remarks, that ‘the distinction between *real* and *virtual* representation appears to be founded on the erroneous notion, ‘that a representative is merely the delegate of his constituents.’ But so far as he is their representative, we should say, he is merely a delegate. The error lies in considering him as a mere representative, when he is also entrusted with a share in the public business of legislation. As regards the specific interests of his constituents, the representative is bound to act as their delegate; but it is not as their delegate that he is called to act in the national councils. In all that affects the trade and local interests of the towns they represent, the members for Liverpool, or Leeds, or Birmingham, are constitutionally bound to represent the sentiments, to watch over and defend the rights and privileges of their constituents. But, as the people of Leeds or Liverpool have no right to legislate for England, their representatives, not deriving from them their legislative powers, but acting as trustees for the nation at large, are, in all public questions, required to consult only the general welfare. Having to legislate for the empire, no member of the national council ought to be guided by instructions that may be dictated by local interests, when they interfere with the general interests of the country. This is the opinion of our highest constitutional authorities; it is also that of the most enlightened American jurists, who deny that even the constitution of their republic confers upon constituents the right of giving binding instructions to representatives, or that such right is the consequence of the relation between the representative and his constituents. ‘Neither the expressed will nor the known wishes of constituents, to whatever respect they may be entitled,

'but the public welfare, ought to be the guide of the representative's conduct.'* And for this obvious reason; that the people of Liverpool can have no right to legislate in questions affecting the property of the people of Birmingham; the inhabitants of Yorkshire can have no right to impose laws upon those of Devonshire; nor can the expressed will or known wishes of one class, overrule the will and wishes of another. All that constituents have a right to exact from their representative, is, that he will act as their attorney in protecting their own property; as their delegate, in representing their own grievances. But, as the proxy cannot exceed the powers of the principal, it is evident, that, in sitting as a legislator, he ceases to be a mere proxy, and exercises a higher trust than any body of electors can convey. In one character, he is the *real* representative of his constituents, and of them only: in the other, he is the *virtual* representative of public opinion, the guardian of the national interests, or of the common rights of the people.

Among the other terms, the use and abuse of which are illustrated in the present volume are, Monarchy, Aristocracy, Democracy, Oligarchy, Tyranny, Balance of Powers, Estate, Rich and Poor, People and Community, Power, Authority, and Force. Other terms will occur to reflective readers, some belonging to political science, some to jurisprudence, which equally require to be rescued from fallacious ambiguity. If it be true, that 'every improper term contains the germ of fallacious propositions', (of which the instances we have given may be considered as affording sufficient evidence,) if 'improper terms are', as Bentham has remarked, 'the chains which bind men to unreasonable practices', the inquiries of Mr. Lewis will not be deemed of small value or slight importance. We cordially thank him for the very useful volume which he has furnished, the utility of which will greatly consist in its leading the reader to follow out the hints which the Author has suggested, and, by a similar process of examination extended to other terms, to detect the fallacies which are thickly scattered over the whole field of inquiry.

Art. III.—1. *Works of Robert Hall, A.M.* With a brief Memoir of his Life by Dr. Gregory, and Observations on his Character as a Preacher, by John Foster. Published under the Superintendence of Olinthus Gregory, LL.D., F.R.A.S., &c. Vol. VI. 8vo. London, 1832.

2. *The British Critic, Quarterly Theological Review, and Ecclesiastical Record.* No. xxvi. April. Art. WORKS OF ROBERT HALL.

IN preceding articles, it has been attempted to delineate Mr. Hall's intellectual character, and to furnish an estimate of his

* See Eclectic Review, Third Series, Vol. VII. pp. 491, 2.

genius and attainments, both as a pulpit orator and a writer. We have reserved for our concluding notice of these volumes, a more special consideration of his character as a preacher, as analysed, we might almost say dissected, by his friend Mr. Foster, whose disquisition, the Reviewer in the *British Critic* remarks, 'like every thing which issues from the mind of that distinguished writer, is singularly acute and powerful, and, withal, tremendously elaborate.' It is, indeed, a most valuable dissertation upon the art and business of preaching, touching upon a variety of topics connected with the proper discharge of pulpit ministrations.

The graphic powers of the Writer's pen are displayed with admirable success in the exact portrait of Mr. Hall as he appeared in the pulpit.

'As a preacher, none of those contemporaries who have not seen him in the pulpit, or of his readers in another age, will be able to conceive an adequate idea of Mr. Hall. His personal appearance was in striking conformity to the structure and temper of his mind. A large-built, robust figure was in perfect keeping with a countenance formed as if on purpose for the most declared manifestation of internal power; a power impregnable in its own strength, as in a fortress, and constantly, without an effort, in a state for action. That countenance was usually of a cool, unmoved mien at the beginning of the public service; and sometimes, when he was not greatly excited by his subject, or was repressed by pain, would not acquire a great degree of temporary expression during the whole discourse. At other times, it would kindle into an ardent aspect as he went on, and toward the conclusion become lighted up almost into a glare. But for myself, I doubt whether I was not quite as much arrested by his appearance in the interval while a short part of the service, performed without his assistance, immediately before the sermon*, allowed him to sit in silence. With his eyes closed, his features as still as death, and his head sinking down almost on his chest, he presented an image of entire abstraction. For a moment, perhaps, he would seem to awake to a perception of the scene before him, but instantly relapse into the same state. It was interesting to imagine the strong internal agency which it was certain was then employed on the yet unknown subject about to be unfolded to the auditory.'

Mr. Foster proceeds to describe his manner of public prayer,

* Persons unacquainted with the Dissenting order of service may, perhaps, wonder in what this part consisted. It is usually called *the singing*, and this term too often describes all that it is, but not all that it ought to be. If it were worship, there would be a manifest impropriety in the minister's taking no part in it. If it be only an interval intended for the relief and repose of the minister, it were earnestly to be desired that some more seemly expedient were adopted; such as the reading of a scripture lesson, or some performance that did not affect to be devotion.

which, 'considered as an exercise of thought, was not exactly 'what would have been expected from a mind constituted like his.'

'As to the devotional spirit, there could be but one impression. There was the greatest seriousness and simplicity, the plainest character of genuine piety, humble and prostrate before the Almighty. Both solemnity and good taste forbade indulgence in any thing showy or elaborately ingenious in such an employment. But there might have been, without any approach to any such impropriety, and, as it always appeared to me, with great advantage, what I may venture to call a more *thinking* performance of the exercise; a series of ideas more reflectively conceived, and more connected and classed, if I may so express it, in their order. . . . The succession of sentences appeared almost casual, or in a connexion too slight to hold the hearer's mind distinctly, for a time, to a certain object. A very large proportion of the series consisted of texts of Scripture; and as many of these were figurative, often requiring, in order to apprehend their plain sense, an act of thought for which there was not time, the mind was led on with a very defective conception of the exact import of the phraseology. He did not avail himself of the portion of Scripture he had just read, as a guiding suggestion of subjects for the prayer; and very seldom made it bear any particular relation to what was to follow as the subject of the discourse.'

In one word, the public prayers of Mr. Hall were singularly and strikingly *inartificial*. In illustrating this characteristic, Mr. Foster must be considered as bearing testimony to the singleness of purpose, the entire sincerity, and the heart-felt devotion which those who heard Mr. Hall engage in any devotional exercise, could not but ascribe to him. By some persons, the very excellence of his prayers may be thought to have consisted in what Mr. Foster describes as their deficiencies. That they should have consisted of a succession of spontaneous expressions of devout feeling, rather than of 'trains of petitionary thought', or of 'accumulated sentiments' on any specific topic,—that they should have savoured so much more of the closet than of the pulpit,—that there should have been uniformly observable so entire an avoidance of intellectual effort, such an abeyance of the imagination, such a prostration of soul before the footstool of the Divine Majesty,—will be regarded by many as constituting the true beauty and moral sublimity of Mr. Hall's devotional exercises. Upon our own minds, we must confess, the governing impression which they produced was, This is prayer; this is worship. And the almost irresistible result of such an impression is, to join in the *act*, and, instead of a listener, to become a worshipper.

We are extremely anxious to do justice to Mr. Foster's sentiments upon this important topic. The opinions of such a writer are entitled to deferential attention; and something may be learned from them, even when we are compelled to question their entire soundness. We must concede that Mr. Hall's *public*

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prayers might have been all that we have described them, in point of spirit, and yet their structure have been different. The feeling might have been perfectly inartificial, even if the composition had not been so. The most natural feelings of sincere devotion are continually being expressed in the highly artificial form of verse. There can be no reason, then, why premeditated trains of thought and precomposed forms or modes of expression should not be rendered subservient to the pouring forth of the most unaffected feelings of penitence, holy aspiration, and humble intercession. Had Mr. Hall studied his expressions or the order of his thoughts in prayer, we feel persuaded that the result of his highest elaboration would only have been, a more perfect simplicity of phraseology, a rejection of figurative language, and a studious accommodation of the style of thought to the humblest capacity.

There is also a very important distinction between precomposing prayers for public delivery, and studying the best method and models of devotional exercises. Admitting prayer to be a gift, (as is every qualification,) it is a gift that requires cultivation; and the unpremeditated effusions of the heart will take their character from the pains bestowed upon preparatory acquisitions. "To him that hath, shall be given." The spirit of prayer is most likely to be imparted to him who has honoured the Author of that spirit, by applying the best faculties of his mind to the consideration of the most appropriate method of conducting this solemn part of our religious services. In rejecting forms of prayer, there is some danger, perhaps, of running to the opposite extreme of undervaluing models of devotion: a study of these might correct the taste, enrich the barrenness, and elevate the feelings of many who, from mistaken notions, have been led to inflict upon their congregations the vapid production of customary occasion.

But we are apprehensive lest Mr. Foster's remarks should be understood as countenancing, not merely 'a more *thinking* performance of the exercise', but a style of thinking or of performance which we should earnestly deprecate. No one, he hopes, will mistake his meaning so far as to imagine, that he is recommending the introduction of '*pieces of discussion*, formal developments of doctrine, nice casuistical distinctions, like sections 'of a theological essay.' But his disclaiming such a meaning seems to intimate, that the style he is recommending might run into that most unhappy species of impropriety. Mr. Foster must have heard such specimens of *preaching* prayers, to a devotional mind most distressing. It has happened to us to attend at places of worship where the whole service has seemed to us to consist of *sermon*. The minister has first prayed a sermon, then the congregation have sung a short sermon, and thirdly, has come the

regular discourse. We cannot conceal our extreme jealousy lest, in objecting against Mr. Hall's prayers, which were at the furthest remove from a sermonizing cast, Mr. Foster should be thought to favour the practice of praying *to* a congregation, or *at* them, instead of conducting a common act of devotion. In recommending a selection of topic, with a view to variety and *impression*, he says:

‘I might ask, why should *sermons* be constructed to fix the attention of a mixed congregation on distinct parts of religion, instead of being, each in succession, vaguely discursive over the whole field? *I would not say that the two exercises are under the same law*; but still, is there a propriety, that, in a discourse for religious instruction, some selected topics should stand forth in marked designation, to work one certain effect on the understanding or the feelings, and *no* propriety that any corresponding principle should be observed in those prayers which may be supposed to request, and with much more than a passing momentary interest, such things as that instruction would indicate as most important to be obtained?’

If Mr. Foster means only to recommend, in public prayer, a definiteness of object and language, as opposed to a vague generality of expression which is comprehensive of nothing, and which is unaffecting because it is unmeaning;—if he intends only to suggest the desirableness of a specific adaptation in the matter of supplication to the occasion and the other parts of the service,—of a determinateness in the general direction of the thoughts, so that prayer shall seem, what it always ought to be, the fruit of meditation, and the expression of deliberate desire;—then, we must say, that we entirely agree with him, and should be happy to believe that his remarks will gain attention where they are likely to be most useful. ‘Distinct and somewhat prolonged ‘petition’ on different topics, would give not only variety, but greater propriety to our public prayers. Only let it be petition, not description; let it be the iteration of desire, not the mere amplification of sentiment. In a word, let it be prayer. Whatever deficiency there might be in the structure of Mr. Hall's public devotional exercises, *considered as a model*, (on which our limited opportunities of hearing him prevent us from pronouncing a decided opinion,) the fervour, simplicity, and *reality* of his prayers rendered them, as regarded their spirit, most impressive and worthy of imitation.

The very reverse of this ‘defect of concentration’ or indeterminateness in the direction of thought,’ imputed to Mr. Hall's public prayers, was conspicuous in his preaching.

‘He surpassed perhaps all preachers of recent times, in the capital excellence of having a definite purpose, a distinct assignable subject, in each sermon. Sometimes, indeed, as when intruders had robbed him

of all his time for study, or when his spirits had been consumed by a prolonged excess of pain, he was reduced to take the license of discoursing with less definite scope, on the common subjects of religion. But he was never pleased with any scheme of a sermon in which he could not, at the outset, say exactly what it was he meant to do. He told his friends, that he always felt "he could do nothing with" a text or subject till it resolved and shaped itself into a topic of which he could see the form and outline, and which he could take out both from the extensive system of religious truth, and, substantially, from its connexion with the more immediately related parts of that system; at the same time not failing to indicate that connexion, by a few brief, clear remarks to shew the consistency and mutual corroboration of the portions thus taken apart for separate discussion. This method insured to him and his hearers the advantage of an ample variety. Some of them remember instances in which he preached, with but a short interval, two sermons on what would have appeared, to common apprehension, but *one* subject, a very limited section of doctrine or duty; yet the sermons went on quite different tracks of thought, presenting separate views of the subject, related to each other only by a general consistency. His survey of the extended field of religion was in the manner of a topographer, who fixes for a while on one separate district, and then on another, finding in each, though it were of very confined dimensions, many curious matters of research, and many interesting objects; while yet he shall possess the wide information which keeps the country at large so comprehensively within his view, that he can notice and illustrate, as he proceeds, all the characters of the relation of the parts to one another and to the whole.' p. 150.

Mr. Foster proceeds to delineate the plainness both of thought and language, which was uniformly observed in Mr. Hall's introduction to his discourse; the quiet and almost feeble manner in which he commenced the delivery; the inartificial distribution and division of his discourses; and the strict connexion of thought which marked the earlier and middle portions, but of which, towards the conclusion, there was generally a remission, when the Preacher would 'throw himself into a strain of declamation, 'always earnest and often fervid.'

'This,' Mr. Foster remarks, 'was of great effect in securing a degree of favour with many to whom so intellectual a preacher would not otherwise have been acceptable: it was this that reconciled persons of simple piety and little cultivated understanding. Many who might follow him with very imperfect apprehension and satisfaction through the preceding parts, could *reckon* on being warmly interested at the latter end. In that part, his utterance acquired a remarkable change of intonation, expressive of his own excited feelings.'

The intellectual qualities of Mr. Hall's preaching are analysed and portrayed in the following paragraphs with equal truth and force of expression.

'He displayed, in a most eminent degree, the rare excellence of a

perfect conception and expression of every thought, however rapid the succession. There were no half-formed ideas, no misty semblances of a meaning, no momentary lapses of intellect into an utterance at hazard, no sentences without a distinct object, and serving merely for the continuity of speaking: every sentiment had at once a palpable shape, and an appropriateness to the immediate purpose. If, now and then, which was seldom, a word, or a part of a sentence, slightly failed to denote precisely the thing he intended, it was curious to observe how perfectly he was aware of it, and how he would instantly throw in an additional clause, which did signify it precisely.

Every cultivated hearer must have been struck with admiration of the preacher's mastery of language, a refractory servant to many who have made no small efforts to command it. I know not whether he sometimes painfully felt its deficiency and untowardness for his purpose; but it *seemed* to answer all his requirements, whether for cutting nice discriminations, or presenting abstractions in a tangible form, or investing grand subjects with splendour, or imparting a pathetic tone to expostulation, or inflaming the force of invective, or treating common topics without the insipidity of common-place diction. His language in the pulpit was hardly ever colloquial, but neither was it of an artificial cast. It was generally as little *bookish* as might consist with an uniformly sustained and serious style. Now and then there would be a scholastic term, beyond the popular understanding, so familiar to himself, from his study of philosophers and old divines, as to be the first word occurring to him in his rapid delivery. Some conventional phrases which he was in the habit of using, (for instance, "to usher in," "to give birth to," &c.) might better have been exchanged for plain unfigurative verbs. His language in preaching, as in conversation, was in one considerable point better than in his well-known and elaborately composed sermons, in being more natural and flexible. When he set in reluctantly upon that operose employment, his style was apt to assume a certain processional stateliness of march, a rhetorical rounding of periods, a too frequent inversion of the natural order of the sentence, with a morbid dread of degrading it to end in a particle or other small looking word; a structure in which I doubt whether the augmented appearance of strength and dignity be a compensation for the sacrifice of a natural, living, and variable freedom of composition. A remarkable difference will be perceived between the highly-wrought sermons long since published, and the short ones now printed, which were written without a thought of the press; a difference to the advantage of the latter in the grace of simplicity. Both in his conversation and his public speaking, there was often, besides and beyond the merit of clearness, precision, and brevity, a certain felicity of diction; something which, had it not been common in his discourse, would have appeared the special *good luck* of falling without care of selection on the aptest words, cast in elegant combination, and producing an effect of beauty even when there was nothing expressly ornamental.

From the pleasure there is in causing and feeling surprise by the exaggeration of what is extraordinary into something absolutely marvellous, persons of Mr. Hall's acquaintance, especially in his earlier life, have taken great license of fiction in stories of his extemporaneous

eloquence. It was not uncommon to have an admired sermon asserted to have been thrown off in an emergency on the strength of an hour's previous study. This matter has been set right in Dr. Gregory's curious and interesting note (prefixed to Vol. I.) describing the preacher's usual manner of preparation; and showing that it was generally made with deliberate care. But whatever proportion of the discourse was from premeditation, the hearer could not distinguish that from what was extemporaneous. There were no periods betraying, by a mechanical utterance, a mere recitation. Every sentence had so much the spirit and significance of present immediate thinking, as to prove it a living dictate of the speaker's mind, whether it came in the way of recollection, or in the fresh production of the moment. And in most of his sermons, the more animated ones especially, a very large proportion of what he spoke must have been of this immediate origination; it was impossible that less than this should be the effect of the excited state of a mind so powerful in thinking, so extremely prompt in the use of that power, and in possession of such copious materials.

Some of his discourses were of a calm temperament nearly throughout; even these, however, never failing to end with a pressing enforcement of the subject. But in a considerable portion of them (a large one, it is said, during all but a late period of his life) he warmed into emotion before he had advanced through what might be called the discussion. The intellectual process, the explications, arguments, and exemplifications, would then be animated, without being confused, obscured, or too much dilated, by that more vital element which we denominate sentiment; while striking figures, at intervals, emitted a momentary brightness; so that the understanding, the passions, and the imagination of the hearers, were all at once brought under command, by a combination of the forces adapted to seize possession of each. The spirit of such discourses would grow into intense fervour, even before they approached the conclusion.

It has been observed that he had the command of ample and various resources for illustration and proof. The departments from which he drew the least might be, the facts and philosophy of the material world. His studies had been directed with a strong and habitual preference to the regions of abstraction and metaphysics. And he furnished a fine example of the advantage which may be derived from such studies to the faculty for theological and moral discussions, by a mind at the same time too full of ardour, sentiment, and piety, to be cooled and dried into an indifference to every thing but the most disembodied and attenuated speculation. The advantage, as exemplified by him, of the practice and discipline of dealing with truth in the abstract, where a severe attention is required to apprehend it as a real subsistence, to see and grasp it, if I may so speak, in tangible forms, might be noted as twofold. First, (that which has been anticipated in former remarks,) the utmost precision in every thing he uttered. He could express each dictate of thought in perfect freedom from doubt whether it might not be equivocal; whether it might not be of loose import and vague direction, instead of strictly to the point; whether it might not involve some latent inconsistency within itself or in its immediate conjunction with another idea; whether it were exactly

the very thing he intended. It was of complete formation in his understanding; it had its including line and limit, instead of being confused with something else. As it was once happily said by himself of Johnson, "he shone strongly on the angles of a thought." The consequence of his rigorous habits of thinking thus came with eminent value into discourse addressed and intelligible to ordinary good sense, where there was no obvious intervention of that refined speculation which was nevertheless contributing, in effect, so much to the clearness and strength of its consistence. What was of philosophic quality in its most immediate agency, became a popular excellence in its result.

'But secondly: besides the distinctness and precision of all the particulars of thought in detail, that exercise of abstract speculation had brought him into possession and mastery of those general principles, in virtue of which these particular sentiments must have their authority. It is not at all necessary in any ordinary course of instruction, to be continually tracing the particular back, for its verification, to the general; but it is a great advantage to be able to do so when it is necessary, as it sometimes will be. He could do this; he knew from what original truths could be deduced the varieties of sentiment which the speaker utters in unqualified assertion, as not liable to be questioned. Any of them, not self-evident, he could have abstracted into a proximate principle in a generalization, and that again resting on a still deeper or ultimate one. He had seen down to the basis, and therefore, was confident of the firmness of what he stood upon; unlike a man who is treading on a surface which he conceives or suspects to be hollow, and is ignorant and fearful of what there may be underneath. Or, to change the figure, he could trace the minor outermost ramifications of truth downward into the larger stems; and those larger into the main trunk and the root. This conscious ability of the preacher, or any other discourser, to sustain upon first principles what he is advancing with the freedom of unhesitating assertion and assumption, will impart a habitual assurance of safety while he is expatiating thus in what may be called the outward, free, and popular exposition of his subject.

'It is presumed that this representation of the use he made, in sermons, of his power and habits of abstract speculation, may suffice to prevent a notion, in the minds of any of our readers who may seldom or never have heard him, that he was in a specific sense a philosophical or metaphysical preacher. He did often indeed (and it was a distinguishing excellence equally of his talking, preaching, and writing,) point to some general principle, and briefly and plainly shew how it authorized an opinion. Occasionally, in a more than usually argumentative discourse, he would draw out a more extended deduction. He would also cite from the doctrines of philosophy, with lucid application, some law of the human mind (for instance, and especially, that of association). But still it was far more a *virtual* than a formal result of his abstruser studies that pervaded his preaching.

'His intimate acquaintance with many of the greatest authors, whom he had studied with a sentiment of reverence, and whose intellectual and religious wealth was largely drawn into his own capa-

cious faculties, contributed to preclude an ostentation of originality. His sermons would make, on cultivated hearers, a general impression of something new, in the sense of being very different, by eminent superiority, from any common character of preaching; but the novelty would appear less to consist in absolute origination, than in the admirable power of selection and combination. It was not exhibited in a frequency of singularly bold prominent inventions, in the manner of the new mountains and islands sometimes suddenly thrown up on tracts of the globe; but rather in that whole construction of the performance by which the most appropriate topics, from whatever quarter, were brought into one array, were made imposing by aggregation, strong by unity of purpose, and often bright by felicitous apposition; in short, were so plastically ordered as to assume much of the character of a creation. It is probable that if his studies had been of slighter tenour, if his reading had been less, or more desultory, if his faculties had been suffered to run more loose, his discourses would have more abounded with ideas starting out, as it were singly, with an aspect like nothing ever seen before. His mental ground was cultivated too industriously and regularly for substantial produce, to leave room for those often beautiful wild-flowers, which spring spontaneously in a fertile half-wrought soil. His avowed indifference to poetry might be taken as one indication of a mind more adapted to converse with the substantialities of truth, than to raise phantoms of invention. Perhaps the most striking feature of his originality was seen in his talent (like the chemistry which brings a latent power into manifestation and action) of drawing from some admitted principle a hitherto unthought-of inference, which affects the whole argument of a question, and leads to a conclusion either new or by a new road.' pp. 155—164.

The remark may occasion surprise to some persons, accustomed to identify exuberance of imagination with the highest attribute of intellect, that, in Mr. Hall's mental constitution, imagination was a subordinate faculty. 'It was never of that prolific power which threw so vast a profusion over the oratory of Jeremy Taylor or of Burke; or which could tempt him to revel, for the pure luxury of the indulgence, as they appear to have sometimes done, in the exuberance of imaginative genius.' In this quality of mind, in absolute originality, we should say that Mr. Hall was transcended by the Author of the "Essay on Popular Ignorance," whose pen has supplied this fine specimen of philosophical discrimination. What Mr. Hall himself valued far more, both in himself and in others, and what, adds Mr. Foster, 'all except very young or defectively cultivated persons and inferior poets must regard as the highest of mental endowments,' is the *intellectual power*. This displayed itself in his 'wonderful ability for comprehending and reasoning, his quickness of apprehension, his faculty for analyzing a subject to its elements, for seizing on the essential points, for going back to principles and forward to consequences, and for bringing out into an intelligible and sometimes very obvious form, what appeared ob-

'scure or perplexed.' And these endowments 'remained unaltered to the last.' This constitution of mind, moreover, tended to indispose Mr. Hall at all times to vague and presumptuous speculations, and no doubt contributed to arm him against the temptation to scepticism, at the time that his theological notions were in some degree crude and unfixed.

'That constitution was not predominantly either imaginative or contemplative; it was *intellectual*, in the strictest sense; in the (perhaps arbitrary) sense, that the matter of his speculations must be what he could distinctly understand, what he could survey in such form and order as to admit of propositions and reasons; so that the speculative process lost its interest with him if carried into a direction, or if exceeding the limit, where it could no longer be subjected to the methods of proof; in other words, where it ceased to comprehend and reason, and turned into conjecture, sentiment, and fancy. He seemed to have no ambition to stretch out his intellectual domain to an extent which he could not occupy and traverse, with some certainty of his movements and measurements. His sphere was very wide, expanded to one circle beyond another, at each of which in succession he left many other men behind him, arrested by their respective limits; but he was willing to perceive, and even desirous to verify, his own ultimate boundary; and when he came to the line where it was signified to him, "Thus far, and no further," he stopped, with apparently much less of an impulse than might have been expected in so strong a spirit, to seek an outlet, and attempt an irruption into the dubious territory beyond.

'With a mind so constituted and governed, he was less given than many other men of genius have been to those visionary modes of thought; those musings exempt from all regulation; that impatience of aspiration to reach the vast and remote; that fascination of the mysterious, captivating by the very circumstance of eluding; that fearful adventuring on the dark, the unknown, the awful; "those thoughts that wander through eternity," which have often been at once the luxury and the pain of imaginative and highly endowed spirits, discontented with their assigned lot in this tenebrious world. No doubt, in his case, piety would have interfered to restrain such impatience of curiosity, or audacity of ambitious thinking, or indignant strife against the confines of our present allotment, as would have risen to a spirit of insubordination to the divine appointment. And possibly there were times when this interference was required; but still the structure of his faculties, and the manner of employing them to which it determined him, contributed much to exempt him from that passion to go beyond the mortal sphere which would irreligiously murmur at the limitation. His acquiescence did not seem at least to cost him a strong effort of repression.

'This distinction of his intellectual character was obvious in his preaching. He was eminently successful on subjects of an elevated order, which he would expand and illustrate in a manner which sustained them to the high level of their dignity. This carried him near some point of the border of that awful darkness which encompasses, on

all sides, our little glimmering field of knowledge ; and then it might be seen how aware he was of his approach, how cautiously, or shall I say instinctively, he was held aloof, how sure not to abandon the ground of evidence, by a hazardous incursion of conjecture or imagination into the unknown. He would indicate how near, and in what direction, lay the shaded frontier ; but dared not, did not seem even tempted, to invade its "majesty of darkness." pp. 168—169.

One of the finest sermons in the present volume strikingly illustrates and confirms the justness of these observations. The text is taken from Prov. xxv. 2. "It is the glory of God to conceal a thing." The general sentiment of the discourse is, that 'a temperature of mingled light and obscurity, a combination of discovery and concealment, is calculated to produce the most suitable impressions of the Divine excellence on the minds of fallen creatures.' Pascal has a similar sentiment, which may possibly have suggested the subject of this truly sublime discourse. Mr. Hall delivered it more than once, but with considerable variation in the filling up of the grand outline of thought. It is here given as taken down in short-hand by Joshua Wilson, Esq., (in September, 1826,) with an admirable fidelity that scarcely leaves room to regret its not appearing as the production of the Preacher's pen. Our own recollection enables us to bear this testimony to the accuracy of several of the reported discourses, while the internal evidence stamps them with genuineness. We cannot refrain from pausing to introduce in this place a few paragraphs from the sermon alluded to.

'1. The Divine Being is accustomed to conceal much in relation to his own nature and manner of existence.

'His essence is altogether hidden from the most profound investigation, the most laborious research, the most subtle penetration, of his creatures. With respect to this, it may be said, "Who by searching can find out God ; who can find out the Almighty to perfection?" We know that he possesses certain attributes, (which we distinguish by different names drawn from analogous excellencies among men,) exclusive of all limit or imperfection found in human nature. We ascribe to him every idea of virtue and spiritual beauty, exalted to infinite perfection. But how the Divine Being himself exists in an essential and eternal nature of his own, without beginning as well as without end,—how he can be present at the same moment in every point of illimitable space, without excluding any one of his creatures from the room it occupies,—how, unseen, unfelt by all, he can maintain a pervading and intimate acquaintance and contact with all parts and portions of the universe,—how he can be at once all eye, all ear, all presence, all energy, yet interfere with none of the perceptions and actions of his creatures,—this is what equally baffles the mightiest and the meanest intellect ; this is the great mystery of the universe, which is at once the most certain and the most incomprehensible of all things ;—a truth at once enveloped in a flood of light and an abyss of darkness ! Inexplicable itself, it explains all besides : it casts a clearness

on every question, accounts for every phenomenon, solves every problem, illuminates every depth, and renders the whole mystery of existence as perfectly simple as it is otherwise perfectly unintelligible, while itself *alone* remains in impenetrable obscurity! After displacing every other difficulty, it remains the greatest of all, in solitary, unsurmountable, unapproachable grandeur! So truly "clouds and darkness are round about him." "He maketh darkness his secret habitation; his pavilion to cover him, thick clouds."

His perfections are impressed on the works of nature; but in such a manner that we learn them only by inference. We ascend from effects to causes; from the marks of contrivance and design, to the necessary existence of an Almighty Contriver. But what sort of being he is, and what is the nature of his contact with his creatures, must, in the present state at least, remain an unfathomable mystery. We are utterly at a loss in all such speculations; yet this affords no diminution of the motives of piety. Our belief in the being of a God is the belief of a profound mystery. The very idea of such a Being would appear incredible were it not that it is necessary, because the greatest absurdities would flow from supposing the contrary. Nothing can be accounted for unless we admit the existence of a causeless Cause—a presiding Governor of the universe. We are compelled therefore to choose the less difficulty of the two; or rather, to choose difficulty instead of impossibility, mystery instead of absurdity: and hence we repose on this grand truth.

2. The Divine Being observes the same method of concealment, in a great variety of respects, with regard to the structure and constitution of his *works*. The scenes of nature lie open to our view; they solicit our senses, and are adapted to impress themselves in a most lively manner upon our minds. "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handywork." We cannot look around us without beholding, not only the works themselves, but evident traces of that matchless wisdom, power, and goodness, whence they sprang. Still, the mysteries of nature, with regard to the *essences* of things, and indeed to a multitude of subtle *operations*, are kept in a kind of sacred reserve, and elude the utmost efforts of philosophy to surprise them in their concealments and bring them to light. While Philosophy goes on from step to step in the march of her discoveries, it seems as if her grandest result was the conviction how much remains undiscovered; and while nations in a ruder state of science have been ready to repose on their ignorance and error, or to confound familiarity with knowledge, the most enlightened of men have always been the first to perceive and acknowledge the remaining obscurity which hung around them; just as, in the night, the farther a light extends, the wider the surrounding sphere of darkness appears. Hence it has always been observed, that the most profound inquirers into nature have been the most modest and humble. So convinced was Socrates, the chief luminary of the ancient world, of the great obscurity attending all such inquiries, that he abandoned the search of nature, and confined his disquisitions to moral questions, and rules for the conduct of life. The same illustrious man declared, that he knew no reason why the oracle of Delphos pronounced him to be the wisest

of men, except it was that, being conscious of his ignorance, he was willing to confess that he knew nothing. Newton, the greatest philosopher whom the modern world has known, declared, speaking of a distinguished contemporary from whose genius he augured vast discoveries, but who died in early life, (the celebrated Cotes,) "If that young man had lived, we should have known something." In so modest a manner did he advert to his own imperfect knowledge of that science with which he had attained such prodigious acquaintance as to have become the pride and wonder of the world! Those that have devoted themselves to an investigation of the laws of nature, find, in a great variety of the most common productions, sufficient to engage their inquiries and employ their faculties: they perceive that the meanest work of God is inexhaustible;—contains secrets which the wisdom of man will never be able to penetrate. They are only some of the superficial appearances and sensible properties with which we are familiar. Substances and essences we cannot reach. The secret laws which regulate the operations of nature we cannot unveil. Indeed, we have reason to believe that the most enlarged understanding must, in a very short time, resolve its inquiries into the will of God as the ultimate reason. Thus, one of the best effects of intellectual cultivation, and the acquisition of knowledge, is to restore the mind to that state of natural simplicity and surprise in which every thing above, beneath, and around us, appears replete with mystery, and excites those emotions of freshness and astonishment with which the scenes of nature are contemplated during the season of childhood.' pp. 35—40.

In the latter part of the discourse, the Preacher shews how the concealment thrown in various respects over the Divine works and ways tends to display his glory:—1. as it is, in part, the necessary consequence of his infinite superiority to all finite beings in wisdom and understanding;—2. because it evinces his entire independence on the wisdom, counsel, and co-operation of any or all of his creatures;—3. because the partial manifestation is eminently adapted to the exigencies and condition of man;—4. because the fuller discoveries of the future state will be a source of great additional happiness to the redeemed.

'The Deity is intended to be the everlasting field of the human intellect, as well as the everlasting object of the human heart, the everlasting portion of all holy and happy minds, who are destined to spend a blissful but ever-active eternity in the contemplation of his glory. This can only be effected by his concealing himself. He will for ever remain "The Unknown God." We shall ever be conscious that we know little compared with what remains to be known of him; that our most rapturous and lofty songs fall infinitely short of his excellence. If we stretch our powers to the uttermost, we shall never exhaust his praise, never render him adequate honour, never discharge the full amount of claim which he possesses upon our veneration, obedience, and gratitude. When we have loved him with the greatest fervour, our love will still be cold compared with his title to our devoted attachment. This will render him the continual source of fresh delight

to all eternity. His perfection will be an abyss never to be fathomed ; there will be depths in his excellence which we shall never be able to penetrate. We shall delight in losing ourselves in his infinity. An unbounded prospect will be extended before us ; looking forward through the vista of interminable ages, we shall find a blissful occupation for our faculties, which can never end ; while those faculties will retain their vigour unimpaired, flourish in the bloom of perpetual youth ; and the full consciousness remain, that the Being whom we contemplate can never be found out to perfection that he may always add to the impression of what we know, by throwing a veil of indefinite obscurity over his character. The shades in which he will for ever conceal himself, will have the same tendency to excite our adoring wonder as the effulgence of his glory ; the depths in which he will retire from our view, the recesses of his wisdom and power, as the open paths of his manifestation. Were we capable of comprehending the Deity, devotion would not be the sublimest employment to which we can attain. In the contemplation of such a Being, we are in no danger of going beyond our subject ; we are conversing with an infinite object in the depths of whose essence and purposes we are for ever lost. This will probably give all the emotions of freshness and astonishment to the raptures of the beatific vision, and add a delightful zest to the devotions of eternity. This will enable the Divine Being to pour in continually fresh accessions of light ; to unfold new views of his character, disclose new parts of his perfection, open new mansions in himself, in which the mind will have ample room to expatiate. Thus shall we learn, to eternity, that, so far from exhausting his infinite fulness, there still remain infinite recesses in his nature unexplored—scenes in his counsels, never brought before the view of his creatures ; that we know but “parts of his ways ;” and that instead of exhausting our theme, we are not even approaching nearer to the comprehension of the Eternal All. It is the mysteriousness of God, the inscrutability of his essence, the shade in which he is invested, that will excite those peculiar emotions, which nothing but transcendent perfection and unspeakable grandeur can inspire.’ pp. 69—71.

Nothing in the range of pulpit oratory, with which we are acquainted, is finer than the sudden descent from this magnificent flight of thought to the common ground of practical duty.

‘ Before I conclude this discourse, permit me to remind you, that while there are many things which God conceals, and thereby advances his glory, he has made manifest whatever is essential for man to know. Whatever is intimately connected with our duty is most plainly taught ; whatever is important to our welfare and happiness is fully revealed. Do not for a moment imagine that he has concealed any thing that bears a near relation to your interest. “ He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good.” He has distinctly set before you the good and evil of a future life. It is true, you know not the time of your death, but you know that you are mortal ; you know not the particulars of what will succeed death, but you know that there will

be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and also of the unjust; that they who have done good shall come forth to the resurrection of life, they that have done evil to the resurrection of condemnation. Jesus Christ has disclosed in the gospel, as far as they are important for any practical purposes, the realities of eternity; has announced to you his second appearance to raise the dead, and decide the eternal destinies of the human race; to separate between the righteous and the wicked, place every individual of mankind in one of those classes, and divide them one from another as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats.'

'These are subjects on which the wisdom of man can say nothing, or can utter but the feeble articulations of infancy.....The highest efforts of human sagacity reach not beyond the bounds of time; they cannot pass the threshold of eternity. They are scanty and inadequate,—and leave the world in darkness and misery, compared with these discoveries of revelation. Do not conclude from the partial obscurity which attends some of its truths, that religion is not the great concern of accountable immortal creatures, or that you will be justified in disregarding such affecting prospects as these. No, my brethren, this obscurity is not such as to hide from you your great interest, to make a right choice doubtful, or to render it matter of the least hesitation whether you should serve God or not. God has revealed enough, where the light of the Gospel comes, to give men the clearest information concerning their eternal welfare; has set before them life, and has set before them death; has pointed out the broad and the narrow way; shewn them the path of destruction, that they may avoid it—and the way of life, that they may walk in it. Jesus Christ has come to render these things so plain and obvious, that even "wayfaring men, though fools, may not err therein." Though, with respect to the constitution of his person, mysterious as his Divine Father, being "the brightness of his glory and the express image of his person;" with respect to the practical purpose of his incarnation, the great design of his appearance in human flesh, he is "the Light of the world: whoso followeth him shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life." "I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father, but by me." If you are earnest in seeking the salvation of your souls, you have all the evidence you can wish; you are distinctly informed, that a remedy has been provided, exactly suited to your case. Though you are guilty, the blood of Christ can expiate that guilt; though you are polluted, the Spirit of Christ can cleanse from that pollution. The gospel is every way adapted to your wants and misery. It has pleased the Father, that in Christ all fulness should dwell. You are invited to come to him at this moment, to receive out of that fulness all spiritual blessings—pardon, sanctification, and life everlasting. He has given you, in reference to these, "line upon line, precept upon precept." Jesus Christ has become the incarnate wisdom of God. No person now need perish for want of a profound understanding, since the method of salvation has been brought down to the level of the meanest capacity: "Wisdom stands at the corners of the streets, and cries; To you, O men, I call, and my voice is to the sons of men." Surely these are the deep things of God,

which the spirit who searcheth all things alone has explored; which the wisdom of the world never knew, the tongue of human eloquence never proclaimed, the discoveries of human philosophy never approached: but now they form the very elements of piety, so that the meanest person cannot neglect them without living in a practical defiance of God, and contempt of his authority. He has thrown an air of obscurity over a thousand other things, but not over the things that make for your peace. You are not left in any uncertainty as to the basis of hope towards God. He has clearly taught you what you must do to be saved; how you may draw nigh to God, even to his seat; and through what medium you may pour out your hearts before him. "Behold, he says, I lay in Zion a foundation stone. Other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid, Jesus Christ. If any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous. He is the propitiation for our sins. Him that cometh unto me, I will in no wise cast out." You know what is that path which will bring you to eternal blessedness; that with shame and confusion of face, on account of your past transgressions, you "flee for refuge to lay hold on the hope set before you;" that he may "of God be made unto you wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption." This is a plain path, open to all. "Secret things belong unto the Lord our God;" but these are "things revealed, that belong unto us and to our children for ever." pp. 71—76.

In the most admired of Mr. Hall's sermons, and invariably in his preaching, Mr. Foster remarks, (and every one who heard him will subscribe to the justice of the encomium,) 'there was 'one excellence of a moral kind, in which few eloquent preachers 'have ever equalled and none ever surpassed him,—*oblivion of 'self.*'

'The preacher appeared wholly absorbed in his subject, given up to its possession, as the single actuating principle and impulse of the mental achievement which he was as if unconsciously performing: *as if* unconsciously; for it is impossible it could be literally so. Yet, his absorption was so evident, there was so clear an absence of every betraying sign of vanity, as to leave no doubt that reflection on himself, the tacit thought, "It is I that am displaying this excellence of speech", was the faintest action of his mind. His auditory were sure that it was as in relation to his subject, and not to himself, that he regarded the feelings with which they might hear him.' . . .

'The entire possession and actuation of his mind by his subject, evident in every way, was especially so by two signs: First, that his delivery was simply and unconsciously governed by his mind. When it was particularly animated, or solemn, or pathetic, or indignant, it was such, not by rule, intention, or any thought of rhetorical fitness, but in involuntary accordance with the strain of the thought and feeling. In this sense, he "spoke as he was moved": and consequently, nothing in his manner of delivery was either out of the right place or *in* it by studied adjustment.

'The other indication of being totally surrendered to the subject,

and borne on by its impetus when the current became strong, was (in perfect contrast to what is described above) the rapid passing by, and passing away, of any striking sentiment or splendid image. He never detained it in view by reduplications and amplifying phrases, as if he would not let it vanish so soon; as if he were enamoured of it, and wanted his hearers to be so for his sake; as if he wished to stand awhile conspicuous by its lustre upon him. It glistened or flashed a moment and was gone.

'The shining points were the more readily thus hastened away, as they intimately belonged to that which was passing. They occurred not as of arbitrary insertion, but with the appropriateness of a natural relation. However unexpectedly any brilliant idea might present itself, its impression was true and immediate to the purpose. Instead of arresting and diverting the attention to itself, as a thing standing out, to be separately admired for its own sake, it fell congenially into the train, and augmented without disturbing the effect. The fine passage would, indeed, in many instances, admit of being taken apart, and would in a detached state retain much of its beauty: but its greatest virtue was in animating the whole combination of sentiments. Mr. Hall's imagination always acted in direct subservience to his intellectual design.' pp. 159, 60.

It was this moral feature of Mr. Hall's oratory that raised it so immeasurably above the reach of servile imitation as to render mimic efforts palpably ridiculous. To preach like Mr. Hall, it was requisite to be like him, and to be like him not so much in power of intellect, as in this self-absorption in his theme, this singleness of purpose, worthy of being emulated by preachers of every order of attainment. At times, this 'absorbing seizure of 'his faculties by his subject' appeared to suspend all distinct consciousness of the presence of his auditory. Mr. Foster, connecting this circumstance of manner with the intellectual character of his preaching, considers it to have operated in some respects unfavourably, by withdrawing his attention from his hearers. While he felt a benevolent interest for the congregation, as a *general* sentiment, which would at times manifest itself expressly and even pathetically, yet, 'during a large proportion of 'his public exercise, and especially in the seasons of highest 'excitement, *the subject itself*, as a subject, was the grand interest. It was by *that* that he was filled, possessed, and borne 'along, with no more than a very general consciousness of being 'in communication with an auditory. The train of his thoughts, 'therefore, swept at a certain altitude, as it were, in the air, 'rather than proceeded on a level and in contact with the people, 'in a series of arresting inculcations and inquisitions.'

Superlatively excellent as was Mr. Hall's preaching, in many of its qualities, Mr. Foster pronounces it to have been, from a defect in certain important ones, *not* the best 'adapted for salutary efficacy.' It was deficient in closeness and cogency of

application ; it did not sufficiently discriminate and individualize human characters ; it was too general and theoretic. This was, at least, its usual characteristic ; for occasionally, sermons were heard from him ' cast in the best imaginable compromise between, ' on the one hand, the theoretic speculation and high-pitched ' rhetoric to which he was addicted, and, on the other, that ' recognition of what men actually are in situation and character, ' to which his mind did not so easily descend.' From passages found in his writings, it is inferred that his conception of the most effective mode of preaching differed considerably from his *general* practice ; and that the defects alluded to partly arose from a repugnance to the kind and degree of labour required in order to produce sermons more specifically accommodated to the diversities of human character and experience.

It may be consoling to such persons as have hitherto felt disheartened, not to say mortified, at the overshadowing superiority of this great Preacher, to be assured that his intellectual strength did not give him a proportionate advantage in the field of moral exertion, but was in great measure wasted on the air. We cannot conceive that it has been precisely Mr. Foster's object to reconcile individuals of smaller mental stature to their conscious dimensions ; but his concession will, we fear, be taken advantage of, beyond what he might intend, as implying almost the inutility of attainments and powers such as Mr. Hall's, in a Christian preacher. ' To attain high excellence in a manner of preaching ' more useful than his, though it requires a clear-sighted faculty, ' disciplined in vigilant and various exercise, is,' Mr. Foster remarks, ' within the competence of a mind of much more limited ' energy and reach than Mr. Hall's power and range of speculative ' thought.' We rejoice to believe this. Burder's Village Sermons have been doubtless more useful, in a certain way, than Barrow's ; and Doddridge's " Rise " has been the means of converting more irreligious persons than Butler's " Analogy." Still, we should not think of estimating the intrinsic value of the several works by their adaptation to popular instruction. Usefulness is a vague term. Even the usefulness of a preacher it is difficult to estimate, so many are the modes of usefulness. To be highly useful to a few, who shall be thereby qualified to act upon the many, in multiplication of the impression they have themselves received, is, in its ultimate effects, more than equivalent to being useful to a multitude in the first instance. It might be regretted that Mr. Hall was not always surrounded with an auditory to whom his style of preaching would have been best adapted to convey salutary impressions ; that his peculiar powers of mind were in great measure wasted in the effort to accommodate himself to the illiterate and unthinking portion of his congregation. But to minds of a certain order, no man was adapted to be so pre-

eminently useful; and that he was not more so, was the fault of his hearers.

We should, however, scarcely know how to set about estimating the actual usefulness of such pulpit ministrations as Mr. Hall's, in all the bearings of their influence. The Reviewer in the *British Critic* remarks with equal candour and acuteness, that the quality of Mr. Hall's mind which led to this abstractedness in his preaching, 'may have greatly aided in the preservation and completion of his own personal faith and holiness, and in marking him out as an example of the blessedness and the dignity of communion with heavenly things. There is little enough of this unworldly quality,' it is remarked, 'exhibited in the world at any time; and never, probably was there less of it than in the present age. In this light it is that men like Robert Hall may chiefly be considered as benefactors to their species. They pour contempt upon that drivelling cant which associates devotional feeling with imbecility of mind. They shew that religion is fitted to absorb the grandest capacities of human nature. It may be the more general purpose of God, that not many wise, not many mighty, not many noble should be chosen to glorify his name, that no flesh should glory in his presence. Nevertheless, it is assuredly an animating spectacle, to see that the most prodigal endowments of the intellect may be made as pinions to convey the spirit out of "this mortal coil" to the place where Christ sitteth at the right hand of God.'*

In the powerfully written and upon the whole fair and liberal article † from which we transcribe these beautiful sentences, it is curious to trace the struggle between generous admiration and ecclesiastical prejudice. There is one point of view in which the Reviewer confesses that he regards the reputation of Mr. Hall as a preacher with something like regret: it may, he thinks, 'tend to confirm that idolatry of preaching which is one of the evils that rushed in together with the blessings of the Reformation.' With many among us, preaching is represented as having become 'a sort of third sacrament; a sacrament, too, which often well nigh thrusts the others into insignificance.' To the Dissenting communities, 'Preaching is nearly what Transubstantiation was to the Romanists. It is the grand instrument with which they hope to move the world.' This is a strange passage to proceed from the pen of a Protestant clergyman; but it indicates the unhappy influence of that sacerdotal theory which has always led the Church of England to discountenance anything deserving

* Brit. Crit. No. XXVI. p. 231.

† We must except the historical misrepresentations respecting Cromwell, and the remarks respecting Mr. Hall's earlier publications, which we have not room to notice.

the name of pulpit oratory. Yet, what would have been thought of a French writer who, in the days of Louis XIV., should have deprecated the fame of Bourdaloue or Massillon, because it might tend to encourage 'a demand for the utterances of the pulpit?' In the preaching of the evangelical clergy, the Established Church gives almost the only signs of spiritual life. That spirit of preaching which has been caught from Dissenting communities, has alone staid in her aged frame the progress of corruption. The greater part of her ministers are, however, still notoriously deficient in those gifts which are requisite for the office of a public teacher; and their vapid school-boy essays, read with professional formality in monotonous tone, are as unimpressive as they are empty of instruction. No wonder that such a church should view with displacency the 'universal craving for excitement', and sicken at the renown of such preachers as Hall! To a writer, intelligent and candid as this Reviewer, it ought, however, to have occurred, that this craving for excitement, so far as it is characteristic of the age, is not peculiar to the religious part of the community: it is seen in all classes; and the demand must be met. It is surely a happy circumstance, and one of which the Christian teacher ought gladly to avail himself, when the appetite for intellectual excitement takes this direction. Surely, it is pusillanimous and imbecile to deplore that which may be turned to so good an account. If it be true, as this Writer alleges, that 'people not unfrequently carry with them into the church, feelings nearly allied to those which they carry with them into the 'theatre', it is at least well that such feelings take the better direction. The remark, however, is most applicable to those polite audiences to whom preaching is no sacrament, and who find their most pleasurable excitement in the ceremonial, the spectacle of the well-dressed company, the breathing organ, and the 'decent rite'. The 'hope of recalling the venerable custom 'of catechizing, and the primitive practice of simple expository 'teaching', is small indeed, where the craving for excitement is fed with such inane vanities. But to render catechetical and expository teaching more generally acceptable, what is wanted, but that ministers of the Gospel should be able catechists and competent expositors, which they never can be while preaching itself is depreciated?

The reputation of Mr. Hall, founded on his pulpit eloquence, instead of having the effect of confirming the idolatry of preaching, (by which we must understand converting the instrument into the end, the medium into the object of worship,) seems to us more adapted to induce a melancholy impression of the inefficiency of that means of promoting the regeneration of society; since the highest order of faculties, applied to the single-minded discharge of the sacred function, under the inspiration of fervent

piety, was found to produce no more extensively decisive results. It was surely not intended by Our Saviour to reflect the character of inefficiency on the ministry of the Baptist; when he reproached the Jews of that generation with their perverseness in not having profited by his ministry; when he compared them to children sullenly refusing to dance when their fellows piped, or to lament when they played the mourner. It may be true that Mr. Hall's general style of preaching was not of a cast which would justify its being held up as a model of popular instruction; but his very faults as a preacher were above the reach of imitation, since they were allied to qualities of mind rarely found in those who could be misled by his example. It was a kind of preaching almost *sui generis*. Of his printed discourses, it is remarked by the Reviewer in the British Critic, that 'these, even when studied without the advantage of any personal knowledge or recollection of the preacher, must always be sufficient to "give the world assurance of a man", such as very rarely has borne the office of turning many to righteousness: and these, — when aided by a vivid remembrance of his outward aspect and demeanour, his overpowering impressiveness of delivery, and his frequent appearance of abstraction from all earthly things, — must convey the notion of one whose faculties were merely as channels for conducting down to earth the choicest influences of heaven.'

Of the sermons contained in the sixth volume, this Reviewer appears to speak in terms of disparagement, which can be accounted for only on the supposition of his not having found time to peruse them. He deems it necessary to 'guard the reader against the delusion of imagining that they have before them in many of the feeble sketchings contained in these volumes, any tolerable representation of the "dazzling miracles" of Robert Hall.' This remark is just as regards some of the briefer sketches, but is quite inapplicable to the discourses given with such felicitous fidelity from the compared notes of Mr. Gurney, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Grinfield, and other gentlemen accustomed to track Mr. Hall's 'fiery course,' and well acquainted with his phraseology. We have given above some specimens of the second discourse in the present volume. There are several others of an equally splendid character, and preserved with similar success. Mr. Foster refers to the XVIth Sermon, on the Love of God, as a remarkable example of 'specific illustration, pointedly applied,' — the quality in which Mr. Hall's preaching is represented to have been ordinarily deficient. The XVIIIth, on the Nature and Danger of Evil Communications, preached at Cambridge in 1826, is a most beautiful specimen of Mr. Hall's admirable and peculiar method of treating a practical subject in a philosophical spirit, yet so as to make the philosophy of the dis-

course strictly subservient to the religious lesson. But, indeed, all the sermons in this volume are, without an exception, highly characteristic and valuable; and the selection, as well as the very careful manner in which they are edited, does great credit to the judgement of the learned Editor of the Works. The public are indeed greatly indebted to Dr. Gregory for the manner in which he has discharged his most honourable but delicate office, both as the biographer of his friend and the superintendent of the whole publication. The blame he has incurred in certain quarters, for not suppressing what the public would not have allowed him to suppress, even had there been any sufficient reason for the attempt, he will know how to appreciate. Had the principle which it is thought he ought to have applied to the published writings of Robert Hall, been observed by the editors of Warburton, South, or Burke himself, we should have been deprived of some of the finest specimens of their eloquence.

Art. IV. 1. *The existing Monopoly, an inadequate Protection, of the Authorized Version of Scripture.* By Thomas Curtis. 8vo. pp. 115. London, 1833.

2. *Oxford Bibles.* Mr. Curtis's Misrepresentations exposed. By Edward Cardwell, D.D., St. Alban's Hall, Oxford. 8vo. pp. 23.

3. *The Text of the English Bible considered.* By Thomas Turton, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge, and Dean of Peterborough. 8vo. pp. 44.

4. *Report from Select Committee on King's Printers' Patents,* ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 8th of August, 1832. Bungay. Reprinted and published by J. R. and C. Childs. 1833. pp. 111.

THE public Version of the Scriptures, is generally described as the 'Authorized Version,' though it would be difficult to assign the grounds on which the authority prescribing its exclusive circulation is supposed to rest. No Act of Parliament was ever passed in its favour. It was not, we believe, even so much as sanctioned or protected by any proclamation. It was undertaken, and, as the title to the Bible declares, was 'with the 'former Translations diligently compared and revised', 'by his 'Majesties speciall commandment.' At the Hampton Court Conference, a new Translation was solicited by the Puritan leader, Dr. Reynolds; and the suggestion being approved by the king, he signified his pleasure, that 'some special pains should be 'taken in this matter for one uniform translation, and this to be 'done by the best learned in both universities; after them to be 'reviewed by the Bishops and the chief learned of the church:

‘ from them to be presented to the privy-council; and last of all
 ‘ to be ratified by his royal authority; and so this whole church
 ‘ to be bound to this translation, and not to use any other.’ Soon
 after, the king issued his commission nominating the persons to
 whom the work should be assigned, and prescribing rules for
 their proceedings. But when the translation was completed and
 published, no authoritative measure on the part of the parliament
 or the king appears to have accompanied it. In preceding reigns,
 the use of the Bible had been allowed or prohibited by royal
 proclamations and acts of parliament. Henry VIII. by his pro-
 clamations directed the Great Bible to be set up in every parish
 church. The parliament of 1546 suppressed Tyndal’s Bible;
 and a proclamation followed, prohibiting the use of any other
 Bibles than those which were allowed by parliament. This act
 was afterwards repealed by the first parliament of Edward VI.;
 and proclamations were subsequently issued, relative to the pos-
 session and use of the English Bible. But none of these pre-
 cedents seem to have been followed in respect to the Translation
 of 1611. In what manner it was ratified by the king’s autho-
 rity, does not appear. ‘ This whole church ’ was certainly not
 ‘ bound to that Translation,’ and ‘ not to use any other,’ since
 the Geneva Bible was still in use, several editions of it being
 printed by the king’s printer subsequently to the year when the
 New Version was issued from the press. The Act of Uniformity
 of Charles II. does not recognize any particular Translation of
 the Bible.

The exclusive privilege of printing the Bible, is assumed as a
 vested right by the King’s Printer and the two Universities of
 England, and by the King’s Printers for Scotland and Ireland.
 It may be proper enough to consider this exclusive interest as a
 trust, intended to protect the Translation of the Scriptures, and
 to ensure its uncorrupted transmission; but even of this there is
 no proof. The privilege was evidently conferred in the spirit of
 the monopolies which were supposed to be dependent on the
 royal prerogative. The monopoly, however, should unquestion-
 ably be considered in reference to the correctness of the books,
 the printing of which it limits. Other considerations necessarily
 present themselves as of importance on the question of the Pa-
 tents of the King’s Printers and the claims of the English Uni-
 versities; but the state of the Bibles in common use, which they
 have issued, is the principal subject which at present requires to
 be examined. It may be of consequence to inquire, whether the
 monopoly does not enhance the price of Bibles and Testaments,
 which might, it is presumed, be sold at less cost if there were no
 restrictions on the preparation and sale of the printed Scriptures;
 but the integrity and fidelity of the copies at present circulated

from the privileged presses, are of greater moment than their cheapness.

No persons acquainted with the process of printing will expect perfect accuracy in any extensive work. Immaculate editions of a book are extremely rare: and in some works which have been thus designated, errors have been detected. It does, however, seem to be too plain a case to allow of successful dispute, that many editions of the English Translation of James I. have been very carelessly superintended. We have been accustomed to note the *errata* of the public Version in the copies used by ourselves, which we have found exhibiting very different marks of the skill and diligence of the editors. In some of these, the errors are few and unimportant; but in others, the faults are more serious, and reflect no credit on the persons entrusted with the final revisal of the copy. 'Jerusalem the prophet' is a strange reading, which we have noted in an edition of 1793, in Daniel ix. 2. The same Bible has, 'The LORD at the right hand.' Ps. cx. 5. 'I will spare them as a man spareth his own son that serveth them.' Malachi iii. 17. 'When he shall come in his only glory.' Luke ix. 26. '—purifying their hears by faith.' Acts xv. 9. 'Thou that mayest thy boast.' Rom. ii. 23. 'It is so, that there is not a wise man among you?' 1 Cor. vi. 5. '—was once suffered to bear.' Heb. ix. 28. '—serving against sin.' Chap. xii. 4; with others less remarkable. A copious list of typographical errors might without much difficulty be obtained from a collation of Bibles, and others of greater moment might be included; but it would then be a question, to what extent they vitiate the text of Scripture. The array would look formidable; and if all the errors were found in one copy, if any particular edition were so deformed, we should not hesitate to repudiate it as disgraceful, and wish it to be suppressed. But the case is very different, when we compare the *errata* with the number of editions, and limit, as we ought to do, our consideration of the alterations thus introduced into the text, to the copy of the Scriptures in our hands. Dr. Cardwell, in reference to a list of errors published by Mr. Curtis, remarks, that the fifty-six mistakes, 'some of importance,' and others 'totally unimportant,' which he has brought forward, are collected from eleven different editions, so that the result of this examination is, that the Oxford Bibles in question contain on an average five errors of the press. (Oxford Bibles, p. 15.) This is certainly far from any very blameable excess of errors in so large a work. Our own opinion, however, from our acquaintance with such copies as have been used by us, would be, in respect to the less recently printed Bibles, not so favourable. In more recent times and at present, the improvements which the Bibles issued from the privileged press exhibit, are in all respects very great.

In his evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, Dr. Lee states, that some of the most incorrect editions of the Bible which have come under his notice, have been printed in Scotland; and afterwards he remarks, that there are several cases in which he thinks the Scottish editions preferable to the English ones. Of this supposed superiority, however, he produces only one example. 'In the tenth chapter of the Gospel according to John,' he observes, 'in all the English editions I have seen, "no man" occur repeatedly, where in the Scottish editions "none" is introduced: the word "man" is not in the original at all, and the word "none" is preferable, inasmuch as it may be held to be a declaration that no created being, though higher than human, has the power.' We cannot in course estimate the comparative value of the Scottish Bibles from the 'several cases' to which Dr. L. refers as shewing their superiority, since he has not particularly described them; but if they are at all similar to the single specimen which he has above given, the character of them is at once decided, since in this example he is altogether in error. We shall shew the state of the question thus raised, by a collation of some of the editions before us in the passages of John's Gospel. The early English editions read, in chap. x., "No man taketh it from me." vs. 18. "—neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand." 28. "—no man is able to pluck them out of my Father's hand." 29. The modern editions, Camb. 1805, 1819, 1823; Oxford, 1793, 1830; London, 1825, 1829, have, "No man—any *man*—no *man*." But in the London edition of 1679, and in the Oxford Quarto, 1765, the readings are, "No man taketh it from me—neither shall any pluck them—none is able to pluck them."

Mr. Curtis has furnished (at p. 86) a list of 'typographical errors in and since Dr. Blayney's edition.' In this list, a reading appears as of an Oxford Testament of 1807, 'purge your conscience from *good* works,' instead of 'dead works.' Heb. ix. 14. From Dr. Cardwell we learn (Oxford Bibles, p. 15), that 'a copy of this edition had been sought for in vain; that another edition of the same year, two of the following, and all editions that could be found of eleven years nearest to the time in question, had been examined, and the passage was printed correctly in them all.' In this list, p. 90, Blayney's Bible, Oxford, 1769, is described as reading 1 John i. 4.—That *our* joy, for "your joy may be full." And this erroneous reading is said to be 'traced in twenty editions of various sizes, and by all the authorized Printers, to Cambridge 12mo. 1824, i. e. *fifty-five* years.' The error is in Blayney, but in Cambridge Testaments before us of 1805 and 1819, the true reading, 'your joy,' is certainly to be found.

In Mr. Curtis's 'Advertisement' to the pamphlet before us, the

reader will find the startling proposition affirmed, that the 'Divine command' to search the Scriptures, *cannot*, in the present state of our Bibles, be complied with so advantageously, by the British public, as it might have been two hundred years ago. On the reverse of his title-page he has printed a list of 'Intentional departures from King James's Bible,' amounting in number to upwards of two thousand nine hundred, suggesting, he remarks, the presumption that there are upwards of *eleven thousand* in the entire version. In this calculation the general alterations of the orthography and minute punctuation are not included. In a modern octavo or nonpareil Bible, there are about eight hundred and fifty pages, so that every page of our modern Bibles will be supposed to contain on an average thirteen errors. Such statements as these cannot be read without alarm, as they must necessarily induce suspicion of the integrity of the text to an extent subversive of the confidence with which unlearned persons, accustomed to read the Scriptures only in the public version, should receive the volume purporting to be a faithful representation of the Hebrew and Greek originals. It is not to be supposed that common readers will be able to determine the character of these alleged alterations; because, as on the one hand they are not produced, so, on the other, it is not to be imagined that the collation of copies is within the means or the competency of readers in general. The Authorized Version has of late years been most widely circulated. Not only have many thousands of copies been distributed in all directions, but some millions of Bibles and Testaments have been sent forth for the use of persons who have no other access to the sources of sacred knowledge, than that which is afforded to them by these substitutes for the original Scriptures. A most serious injury must therefore be received by those who use these Bibles, if, from any impressions forced upon them by statements which they can neither examine nor appreciate, they continue to peruse them with distrust, and are in constant doubt what to accredit as genuine, and what to reject as unfaithful or spurious. Every one who knows the value of the Scriptures, must feel the weight of Dr. Cardwell's remarks in the introductory paragraphs of his 'Letter.'

'In my estimation, there is nothing more deserving of respect and protection, than the honest confidence with which an unlettered peasant looks upon his English Bible as expressing to him the genuine word of God. Take merely the blessings that Bible affords to one single individual, the fortitude it imparts to him in his moments of temptation, and the calmness it gives to days and nights of sickness and sorrow, and there is an amount of virtue inspired by it, which has never been equalled by any other instrument of happiness. But consider also the multitude of places where such individuals may be found, follow our language into every quarter of the globe, and see

that its constant companion, and in many cases the only instructor that it brings with it, is the English Bible; and it will be manifest, that no limit can be assigned to the importance of translating the Scriptures faithfully, and preserving that translation, as far as may be, pure and undefiled.'

On the behalf, then, of unlearned readers, and for the sake of many others, who, not being destitute altogether of the necessary information for determining the question of fidelity in respect to the English Bibles in common use, may not have the means of verifying or refuting the allegations which charge corruptions so extensively vitiating the authorized text, it is proper that they should be brought under the consideration of those tribunals to which the public are accustomed to look for decisions in matters of so grave a character. If many thousands of errors are diffused throughout our modern Bibles;—if, so far as the English text of the English Bible is in question, we clearly have all our modern Bibles printed after copies of *no* authority, or after bad or erroneous authorities, with the important exception of what remains of the Authorized Version itself; (and how much of that remains would seem to be doubtful;) we should be guilty of dereliction of our duty, if we hesitated to denounce evils of such magnitude, and which might involve such perils. If, to the poor, the Bible which is in their hands be not a trust-worthy book, to which they may look with most assured satisfaction that they are not misled in the sentiments and feelings of their faith and hope, it is more than time to warn them of the delusions by which they have been led astray in their judgements, and deceived and abused in their confidence.

It would indeed be a ground of most serious complaint, and could not fail of furnishing matter of grave accusation against parties who have had the ordering of their Bibles, if humble and serious inquirers of the present day could not, with those books open before them, obey the Divine injunction which directs them to the examination of the Scriptures, with as much advantage as was possessed by readers of the Bible two hundred years ago. Has the stone been rolled back upon the well's mouth, that the living waters can no more be drawn from them as in other times? Have briars and thorns been set around it, to become a thicket impervious, or rendering access to the salubrious element perilous and difficult? Or are the footmarks worn out, by which the path was so easily traced by former travellers? The circumstances from which arise the disadvantages to modern readers of the Bible, that place them so unfavourably for the acquisition of the knowledge contained in it, compared with others of a much earlier time, are to be learned from Mr. Curtis's statements, and particularly from the Report of a Sub-Committee of Dissenting Minis-

ters, which we must now present to our readers, as we find it in his pamphlet, p. 114.

‘ Present—Dr. Bennett, Dr. Cox, and Dr. Henderson, a Sub-Committee appointed to verify and report upon a Collation of various editions of the Holy Bible, made by the Secretary.—Dr. Smith, though not of the Sub-Committee, kindly assisting in the investigation, it was

‘ *Resolved*, 1. That this Committee are perfectly satisfied that an extensive alteration has been introduced into the text of our Authorized Version, by changing into Italics innumerable words and phrases, which are not thus expressed in the original editions of King James's Bible, printed in 1611.

‘ 2. That these alterations, so far from being an improvement of our Vernacular Translation, greatly deteriorate it; inasmuch as, in most instances, they convey to the reader the idea that, wherever any words are printed in Italics, there is nothing corresponding to them in the original text: whereas it must at once be obvious to every person who is competent to judge on the question, that what has been supplied in these instances, was absolutely necessary in order to give the full force of the Hebrew and Greek idioms; and, consequently, should have been printed in the same characters as the rest of the text.

‘ 3. That those who have made these alterations, have discovered a great want of critical taste, unnecessarily exposed the sacred text to the scoffs of infidels, and thrown such stumbling-blocks in the way of the unlearned, as are greatly calculated to perplex their minds, and unsettle their confidence in the text of Scripture.

‘ 4. That it be recommended to the General Committee, to take such measures as they shall deem most likely to effect a speedy return to the Standard text, which has thus wantonly been abandoned; but that it is expedient to wait till the reprint of the edition of 1611, now printing at Oxford, be before the public, ere any further correspondence be entered upon with the Universities.

(Signed) ‘ E. HENDERSON.

‘ F. A. COX.

‘ J. BENNETT.’

King James's Translators have prefixed an address to the readers of their Bible, in which they vindicate the undertaking completed by them, and state many particulars in respect to their proceedings in preparing it. On the subject of Italics, however, they have not given us any information. Some readers of the preceding resolutions would be apt to conclude, that the Bible of 1611 was without Italics, or characters answering to Italics. This, however, is not the case: for though, strictly speaking, the Translators do not employ Italics, they frequently have printed words and phrases in a distinguishing type. The letter of the edition of 1611 is a large black one, and the passages distinguished from the other portions of the text, are printed in Roman letters. The Translators, doubtless, had their reasons for

such occasional deviations. They did indeed but follow the mode of printing adopted by their predecessors. In the Bibles of Henry VIII.'s time, we find passages in parentheses and in smaller type, which have nothing corresponding to them in the original, but were introduced as readings from the Vulgate, thus: 'And beholde, it is written in the booke of the righteous. (And he said: Consydre, O Israel, these that be dead and wounded upon thy hie hilles.) O noble Israel the wounded are slaine upon thy hylles.' 2 Sam. i. 18, 19. 'Oh let my mouth be filled with prayse (that I maye synge of thy glory) and honoure all the daye long.' Ps. lxxi. 8. The Geneva Bible has many words and phrases distinguished by a type different from the ordinary letter; and in reference to such cases, the Translators say in their preface: 'Whereas the necessitie of the sentence required any thing to be added (for such is the grace and proprietie of the Ebrewe and Greeke tongues, that it cannot but either by circumlocution, or by adding the verbe, or some word be understood of them that are not well practised therein,) we have put it in the text with another kinde of letter, that it may easily be discerned from the common letter.' Thus we have, 'Salvation belongeth unto the Lord.' Ps. iii. 8. '—answere mee in saving me from the hornes of the unicornes.' 'My prayse shall be of thee.' For the kingdome is the Lords.' Ps. xxii. 21, 25, 28. King James's Translators have printed the text of their Bible, using Italics instead of smaller letters, in a similar manner; but an examination of it will shew many irregularities in the application of their rules, and some instances of the deviation in question are of a very anomalous character. We shall give a few specimens of the inconstant readings furnished by a collation of the edition of 1611. Gen xxii. 2. 'thy sonne, thine only sonne.' vs. 16, 'thy sonne, thine only sonne.' In the original, the expressions are precisely the same; but the Translators have, in the first of these examples, printed the second instance of the word sonne in a manner corresponding to the use of the modern Italics. So, in Gen. xxiv. 19, the reading is, 'draw water,' where no word occurs in the original answering to the noun 'water;' but, in the following verse, where the same mode of expression is used in the Hebrew text, the supplied word is marked, 'to draw *water*.' In Chap. xxxvii. 13, we have, 'feed the flocke;' vs. 16, 'feed their *flockes*;' the Hebrew expressions in each case being the same. 'And Abraham planted a grove.' Gen. xxi. 33. 'Joseph went into the house.' Chap. xxxix. 11. The nominatives are wanting in the Hebrew text in both examples, yet the translation of 1611, marks the one as implied, and the other as expressed. In Matt. xxvii. 46, the Translators have distinguished by their peculiar type the entire sentence, 'Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani;' but in Mark xv. 34, the parallel passage

is printed in the ordinary letters, the two cases being alike in the Greek Testament.

We shall now notice some of the passages brought forward by Mr. Curtis as instances of the depravation of the text by Italics inserted in the modern Bibles. 'In not a few of these instances, 'God's offspring have been bastardized.' Such is the language applied by Mr. Curtis to 'these transmutations.' A list of passages is produced by him, (p. 62.) 'in all of which', it is affirmed, 'the words falsely put into Italics are as much in the 'original, as a man's money is in his pocket, when it is not seen.' Let us consider the following cases.

'Gen. xx. 17.—"And they bare *children*." From a Hebrew verb signifying to bear a child (Gesenius); not bare burdens, evil usage, or any thing of a more general nature.'

The objection here is, that the verb יָלַד is used in Hebrew only to denote the bringing of children into the world, and that, therefore, the text of the Translators has been corrupted by the insertion of the word in Italics by the modern editors of the Bible; and the assumption is, that, in the Bible of 1611, the usage is invariably observed of printing the phrase without any distinction of letters. Such, however, is not the case. The Translators have used the very mode of treating the text, which Mr. Curtis so unceremoniously reprehends. Gen. vi. 4. '—they bare *children*.' Chap. xvii. 17. 'Shall a *child* be borne?'

Gen. xxiv. 52.—"Worshipped, bowing *himself* to the earth." Not bowing to the earth, but bowing his whole person in the entire prostration of the east, to God.'

We have some difficulty in understanding precisely the nature of the objection as here stated. We cannot find in any Bible accessible to us the reading as here inserted by Mr. Curtis. All our modern editions read: 'he worshiped the LORD, *bowing himself* to the earth.' The Bibles of 1611, 1613, and all the early editions have the reading, 'he worshipped the LORD, *bowing himself* to the earth.' The exact rendering of the Hebrew text is, 'he bowed himself to the earth to Jehovah.' וַיִּשְׁתַּחוּ אֶרְצָה לִיהוָה In other instances, the phrase appears in a more complete form, וַיִּפֹּל עַל פָּנָיו אֶרְצָה וַיִּשְׁתַּחוּ, and he fell on his face and worshipped. In Gen. xxvi. 52, the Translators had rendered the whole original phrase adequately and properly, by the words 'he worshipped the LORD;' but, intending to preserve the idiom, they translated more copiously, and marked by the change of letter the peculiarity of the expression. Why the Translators did not mark 'himself,' as well as 'bowing,' we cannot conjecture; but the modern Bibles present the passage in a form which cannot be with any propriety described as a corruption of their version.

‘ Lev. xxiv. 10.—“ This son of an Israelitish *woman* :” meaning an Israelitess, and because he had a father of a different nation ; thus, perhaps, accounting for his blasphemy. The Hebrew word strictly marks the sex, which “ Israelitish” alone would not.’

In his list B. p. 95, Mr. Curtis again adduces this passage. “ Israelitish *woman*.” An Israelitess. Her father being an Egyptian (!)’

In Lev. xxiv. 10, 11. the words ‘ Israelitish woman,’ occur three times in the Bible of 1611 : in the first and third instances, the full phrase appears, אִשָּׁה יִשְׂרָאֵלִית; in the second example, the last of these words is wanting in the original. In these circumstances, the introduction into the text of the modern Bibles, of the term ‘ Israelitess,’ would have been an incongruity in vs. 10 ; and as ‘ Israelitish ’ alone would have been an impropriety, the word added by the Translators is put in the Italic character, to signify its absence from the original text : it appears so marked in the edition of 1679, and, in this form, is not in any respect a violation of the rules followed by King James’s Translators. In Dr. Turton’s tract, the cases which Mr. Curtis has adduced are not brought under examination ; but he has noticed the whole of those which are cited by the Sub-Committee, and submitted them to the test of a judicious and very satisfactory criticism.

Throughout the Bible of 1611, every part of speech is found, in instances almost innumerable, distinguished by being printed in a character different from the letter generally used in the volume : the *copula*, verbs, nouns, pronouns, prepositions, and particles of connection, are all of frequent occurrence ; so are phrases as well as single words. We shall now quote from Dr. Turton’s able and instructive tract.

‘ Why, it is natural to ask, have such words and phrases been thus distinguished by the mode in which they are printed ? The answer is easy. On examining, in the Hebrew and Greek originals, the passages in which the words occur, it is universally found, that there are no words strictly corresponding to them in those originals. It is, therefore, manifestly on this account, that words so circumstanced have been distinguished by a peculiar type. . . . Are we then to conclude that *the meaning* is in such cases imperfectly expressed in the original languages ? Far from it. Considering, for a moment, the Hebrew and Greek as *living languages*, the sentiments would be perfectly intelligible to those to whom they were addressed. The expression might be more or less full ; but the idiom would still be familiar. Even taking the Hebrew and Greek as dead languages, the elliptical brevity of expression (at least, what appears such to us) is, to men of learning, not always productive of obscurity. But when a translation from Hebrew or Greek into English is attempted, it is frequently quite impossible to convey, to the English reader, the full signification of the original, without employing more words than the original contains.

When, therefore, our Translators distinguished particular words in the manner already described, they did not intend to indicate any deviation from the meaning of the original, any diminution of its force; but rather to point out a difference of idiom. Their first object, undoubtedly, was to express in intelligible English what they believed to be the full signification of a sentence; and their next object appears to have been, to point out such words as had been required in addition to those of the original, for the complete development of the meaning. . . . The foregoing observations may, for the present, be sufficient to afford some general notions of the intentions of our Translators, in this by no means unimportant matter.

‘Although the principle above explained, respecting words and phrases in Italics, was undoubtedly adopted by our Translators, we can scarcely expect that it should never have been departed from, in the actual printing of so large a work as the Bible, at so early a period. It was, indeed, departed from in many cases; and attempts have subsequently been made to carry the principle more completely into effect, by applying it to various words which appeared, in the text of 1611, in the ordinary character.’ pp. 4, 5.

We cannot transfer into our pages the several passages which the Sub-Committee have put on record as proofs of the modern depravations of the Bible, and which Mr. Curtis has classed with his extracts in his list of intentional departure from the text of 1611; but the importance of the subject requires that we should lay before our readers some specimens of the clear statements and illustrative remarks comprised in Dr. Turton’s examinations, which are restricted to the texts produced by the Sub-Committee.

‘GEN. i. 9, 10. “Let the dry *land* appear: and it was so. And God called the dry *land*, Earth.” The objection here is, that in the modern editions of the Bible, the word “land” is printed in Italics, the same word being printed, in the text of 1611, in the ordinary character.

‘The Hebrew word translated “dry land” is derived from a root signifying “to be dry;” and itself signifies “the dry.” The adjective is applied by Ezekiel (xxxvii. 4) as an epithet to the bones of the dead: “O ye dry bones, hear ye the word of the LORD.” The precise meaning of an abstract term of this kind must be determined by the context. In this way, the Hebrews constantly use their adjectives alone, as we use substantives connected with adjectives; the substantives actually referred to being decided by the circumstances of the case. In the passage under consideration, the meaning is clear: “Let the waters under the heaven be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry [land] appear.” “Land” indeed is, in point of fact, supplied; there being no corresponding term in the Hebrew. The Hebrew word is, in the Septuagint, rendered by *ἡ ξηρὰ*, and in the Vulgate by *arida*; which words are, in their respective languages, used in very nearly the same manner as the Hebrew word corresponding to them. . . . On the whole, it appears to me, that when “land”

is marked by Italics in the modern editions, they are formed on the general rule which the Translators seem to have prescribed to themselves. In illustration of this point, 2 Kings ii. 21, may be cited: "there shall not be from thence any more death or barren *land*."

' GEN. v. 24. "And he *was* not, for God took him."

' The word "was" has no corresponding term in the original; and in consequence it has been printed in Italics in the modern editions. The principle on which this has been here done is sufficiently recognized by the text of 1611 in other passages. "The eye of him that hath seen me, shall see me no *more*; thine eyes *are* upon me, and I *am* not." Job. vii. 8;—"For yet a little while, and the wicked shall not *be*; yea thou shalt diligently consider his place, and it *shall not be*." Ps. xxxvii. 10;—"As the whirlwind passeth, so *is* the wicked no more." Prov. x. 25;—"Our fathers have sinned and *are* not." Sam. v. 7.

' GEN. vi. 16. "Lower, second and third *stories*."

' "Stories" in Italics is perfectly correct; there being no word corresponding to it in the Original. In Ezek. xlii. 3 (according to the text of 1611) we read: "Over against the pavement which *was* for the utter court, was gallery against gallery, in three *stories*." And so again in verse 6; the word being supplied, as required to express the full meaning. We have here an illustration of that use of the adjective, which was mentioned under Gen. i. 9, 10.

' DEUT. xxix. 29. "The secret *things* belong unto the LORD our God; but those *things* which are revealed belong unto us."

' The complaint here is, that "things" in the former part of the verse, and "things which are" in the latter, should be in Italics. This passage affords a good illustration of the elliptic brevity of the Hebrew. In the original, we have, in fact—"The secret [things]—unto the LORD our God; but the revealed—unto us." The sentiment so expressed was, no doubt, perfectly intelligible to the Israelites; but the generality of English readers would require it to be brought out more fully. Let us see how this is done. First, the Hebrew adjective "the secret" is too abstract for the English idiom; and so it is converted into "the secret things"—which, when fully explained, it really means. Then there is no *verb* to connect "the secret [things]" with "unto the LORD our God;" and accordingly, "belong," the verb manifestly implied, is introduced. We now have the first part of the verse complete; "The secret *things* belong unto the LORD our God:" and if the second part had been literally translated—"but the revealed—unto us," the ellipsis, suggested by the former part, might perhaps have been supplied by an English reader; but the Translators deemed it better to give the sense in full, by supplying the words which must otherwise have been *understood*:—"but those *things* which are revealed belong unto us." Nothing more can be desired, to evince the propriety of the Italics in this passage.

' Isai. xxxviii. 18. "For the grave cannot praise thee, death can not celebrate thee."

' Undoubtedly the negative is, in the Hebrew, *expressed* only in the former member of the sentence, although *understood* in the latter. In the latter member therefore—to convey to the English reader the

complete meaning of the passage—the negative was very properly supplied by the Translators, although the word is not distinguished from the rest of the sentence in the text of 1611. In a case like this, the Italics of the modern editions must be considered as marking a Hebrew idiom; and similar cases have been attended to in the text of 1611. In 1 Sam. ii. 3, we read: “Talk no more so exceeding proudly, let *not* arrogancy come out of your mouth;”—In Job iii. 11, “Why died I not from the womb: *why* did I *not* give up the ghost?”—and in Ps. xci. 5, “Thou shalt not be afraid for the terror by night, *nor* for the arrow *that* flieth by day.” Nothing more needs to be said in behalf of the Italics in Isai. xxxviii. 18.’

From the New Testament, eleven cases are produced by the Sub-Committee, of Italics improperly employed, as they allege, the article being used for the pronoun, and so considered by the Translators. The passages are: Matt. iv. 20, “Left *their* nets.” viii. 3, “Jesus put forth *his* hand.”—20, “Hath not where to lay *his* head.”—ix. 5, “*Thy* sins be forgiven.”—xix. 10, “The man—with *his* wife.” Mark ii. 9. The same as Mark ix. 5. Luke xi. 13, “*Your* heavenly Father.” John x. 30, “I and *my* Father are one.” Phil. iii. 19, “Whose God is *their* belly.” Heb. i. 3, “The brightness of *his* glory.”—xii. 10, “But he for *our* profit.” In the text of 1611, the same manner of printing the pronoun as is here exhibited, was adopted. On looking at some of these instances, Dr. Turton remarks, that they may be divided into two classes; the first comprising examples of the pronoun printed in Italics, when the corresponding word in the original has *no article* prefixed; the second consisting of those in which the article appears.

‘It happens that the pronouns in Italics, in the preceding list, are all to be referred to this second class; and I will venture to say that, if the Italics objected to, be compared with the Italics here adduced from the text of 1611, there can be no good reason assigned why they should be retained in the latter case, and not in the former . . . If nice distinctions—such as our Translators have partially carried into effect—are to be made, there seems to be a propriety in retaining the Italics in the cases now under consideration. Taking, for example, the text, Matt. iv. 20, “Having left *their* nets” (*ἀφέντες τὰ δίχτυα*); St. Mark, relating the same event, writes *ἀφέντες τὰ δίχτυα αὐτῶν*, and in the modern as well as the old editions, we find “their nets”—the word “their” being printed in the ordinary character, on account of its having a word (*αὐτῶν*) corresponding to it in the Greek. It is observable that Beza translates the passage in St. Matthew, “omissis retibus;” and the passage in St. Mark, “omissis retibus suis:”—thereby shewing, as the Latin language easily permitted, his attention to the presence or absence of the pronoun. Beza, indeed, is generally attentive to this matter; and I mention the fact, because his authority was undoubtedly great with the Translators. That, in the printing of so large a work, their principles should have been occasionally lost

sight of, cannot surely be a matter of surprise . . . It is impossible for me to suppose that the eleven specified instances, of modern Italics not warranted by the text of 1611, can need any further defence or apology.

‘MATT. iii. 15, “Suffer *it to be so* now.” (Αφεις ἄρτι.)

‘The Italics in this text are condemned as usual. Now two things I will venture to affirm: 1. that “Suffer *it to be so* now” represents the meaning of the original; and 2, that no other mode of printing those words could so well suggest to the *learned* reader of the English Translation, the precise expression of the Evangelist—Αφεις ἄρτι. How the phrase was understood in ancient times, will appear from the Latin Vulgate—“Sine, modò;” and when Beza gave “Omitte *me* nunc,” as the equivalent expression, he took care to print *me* in Italics—to shew that it was more than the Greek text contained. In the same manner, the words *it to be so* have been printed in Italics, to indicate that there are no words corresponding to them in the original.

‘1 COR. xiii. 3, “If I bestow all my goods to feed *the poor*.” (ἐὰν ψωμίζω πάντα τὰ ὑπάρχοντά μου.)

‘The objection to the Italics in this passage would imply a belief on the part of the objectors, that the words so marked exist, in some way or other, in the verb ψωμίζω. It is not so. In Numbers xi. 4, according to the Septuagint, we find τίς ἡμᾶς ψωμιῖ κρέα; “who will give us flesh to eat?” and in Rom. xii. 20, we read ἐὰν πεινᾷ ὁ ἐχθρὸς σου, ψώμιζε αὐτόν, “If thine enemy hunger, feed him.” The conclusion is, that the Italics are not misapplied.’

Nothing can be more satisfactory than these explanations. It will not, we think, be affirmed by any persons competent to judge on the question, that the Italics of the modern Bibles are applied to cases not sanctioned by the Translators themselves, or that the alterations introduced into them by the additional instances (very numerous ones certainly) of a change of type, are not in conformity with the rules which they manifestly prescribed to themselves in the construction of their text. The last Italics do not in any respect show a usage or a design different from the purpose for which they were at the first employed in the authorized version. No objection can, on principle, be made to the modern Italics, which does not press precisely in the same manner, and with equal force, against the Italics of the Translators. In respect, then, to the Report of the Sub-Committee, Dr. Turton remarks:

‘The alternative seems to be, either that, by censuring the modern Italics as productive of the evils they describe, they intended to pass the same censures on the whole of the Italics, whether ancient or modern; or, that they condemned the modern Italics without being at all acquainted with the nature of the Italics with which the text of 1611 abounds.’

Dr. Turton adopts the latter part of the alternative, and having most completely established the several points necessary to

give to his censures the force of a commanding authority, he proceeds to express his opinions, without reserve, on the proceedings of the Sub-Committee.

The members of the Sub-Committee have, in the face of the world, made themselves responsible for the following resolution in reference to the *Italics*:

‘That those who made these alterations, have discovered a great want of critical taste, unnecessarily exposed the sacred text to the scoffs of infidels, and thrown such stumbling-blocks in the way of the unlearned, as are greatly calculated to perplex their minds, and unsettle their confidence in the text of Scripture.’

‘A great want of critical taste,’ is not the most serious charge, certainly, which might require our consideration in judging the merits of the modern editors of the Bible. There may be violations of taste, where there is no offence against truth; and taste not having a standard by which critics may, to each other’s satisfaction, adjust their respective claims, the want of it may be very questionable in some cases, where the allegation of deficiency may be most strenuously asserted. We are, however, much mistaken, if the members of the Sub-Committee would find themselves prepared to vindicate King James’s *Translators* from the accusation, that ‘a great want of critical taste’ appears in their version. Many editors and critics have found great fault with the *Translation of 1611* in matters of taste. But, in their Report, the Sub-Committee charge upon the authors of the alterations introduced by the modern *Italics*, that they have, ‘unnecessarily, exposed the sacred text to the scoffs of infidels;’ and if such be the fact, the measure of reproach which might be righteously measured out to them, could not be small. The scoffs of infidels will ultimately be found to be most injurious to themselves, as all despite to grave and solemn subjects, depraves the understanding, and disqualifies a man for the conducting of inquiries after truth. But ‘unnecessarily’ to occasion those scoffs by which infidels are rendered more obdurate, and the way of truth is spoken against, shews more than a want of wisdom. Are the modern editors of the Bible then in this predicament? Be it remembered that the Report limits the entire of the alleged mischievous consequences to the *Italics* of our modern Bibles. We know that contradictions and inconsistencies have been charged by infidels upon the Bible, and that their mockery has been directed against its hallowed pages read and construed amiss by them. But have the *Italics* been the cause or the occasion of their raillery? Would infidels treat the Bible of 1611 with less irreverence than the Oxford Bible of 1769? Is the latter the book on which they fasten their calumnies and their scorn? We do more than hesitate to approve the Report of the Sub-Committee in this respect:

we must deny the truth of its charges, and utterly repel its insinuations. Were infidels never known to scoff at the Bible before the introduction of the modern Italics as distinctive marks of the peculiarities of its text, as conveyed in a language varying in its idioms from the languages of the originals? The Italics are blameless, and do not so expose the sacred text.

In addition to all this mischief, the Italics, it seems, have 'thrown such stumbling-blocks in the way of the unlearned, as are greatly calculated to perplex their minds, and unsettle their confidence in the text of Scripture.' The unlearned have a peculiar interest in translations of the Bible. Its contents can be known to them only through the medium of a version. The fidelity of the Version used by them is therefore of primary importance. If the doctrines of the Bible be perverted, or be obscurely exhibited in a translation, or if the form in which the Bible is delivered into the hands of the unlearned be the occasion of ambiguities by which the mind of the reader may be misled, and error or doubts produced, from which his knowledge of the Original texts might be his pledge of safety, the Version might be the means of casting 'stumbling-blocks' in his way, and his 'confidence in the text of Scripture' might be 'unsettled.' But are the Italics of this dangerous character? The unlearned may, indeed, have some difficulty in determining the reasons of the differences in the types of the impression of the Bible before him; but would he not have to make the same inquiries, if he had in his hands the first printed Bible of King James's Translators, as he would with the last issued copy from the Oxford or the Cambridge presses? And if the answers which he might receive in the one case would be satisfactory, and enable him to pursue his course of reading with pleasure and improvement, would he not be equally benefited and prepared by the solution which he might obtain in the other? For our own part, we should have no more hesitation in putting into the hands of an unlearned person a Bible of 1831, than we should one of 1611; and should fear as little in respect to the former, as we should in regard to the latter, that there would be 'thrown such stumbling-blocks in the way of the unlearned, as are greatly calculated to perplex their minds, and to unsettle their confidence in the text of Scripture.' The very copy of Blayney's Bible, 1769, now before us, was for many years the Bible constantly used by a person who was not learned, but who was evangelical and devout, the friend of Cowper's Unwin, of Claudius Buchanan, and of others equally well known for their piety, in whose way it threw no obstacles, whose mind it did not perplex, and whose confidence in the text of Scripture was never unsettled by the Italics which it contained.

We should rather fear that the statements which have been put forth in the aggressive pamphlet before us, and in the Report of the Sub-Committee, would tend to produce the effects which are ascribed to the modern Italics and the other alterations of which so much is made by Mr. Curtis, than that any of the consequences which they ascribe to these supposed causes of peril and mischief have resulted from them. Will the unlearned read with less of distrust and perplexity those Bibles to which they have been accustomed, on being told that thousands of errors abound in them;—‘in the book of Genesis alone, upwards of 800; ‘in the Psalms 600; in the Gospel of Matthew upwards of 400; ‘and in the whole Bible *Eleven Thousand*’?

Dr. Turton’s tract is valuable, not only as an examination of the question raised by the representations in the Report of the Sub-Committee, but as a most able and useful illustration of the text of the English Bible. Our acquaintance with his ‘Vindication of Porson’ prepared us to expect in any production which should proceed from his pen, a clear and ample understanding of his subject, acute and correct criticisms on points requiring elucidation, and the manner of an enlightened and liberal scholar: in these respects, the pages before us receive our commendation. No minister of any denomination should be without this admirable tract. ‘It has become indispensable that ‘the state of the Bibles of King James’s time, as to Italics, ‘should be better understood than it now seems to be.’ One more passage we must copy from the tract.

‘In numerous instances, as I have already observed, it is quite impossible to convert a Hebrew or Greek sentence into a corresponding sentence in English, without circumlocution. The phrase would frequently be altogether unintelligible in our own language, if presented in the elliptical form of the Original. In some cases, this elliptical form will not be attended with any great uncertainty, as to the import of the Original; and yet different modes of supplying the ellipses, giving slightly different shades of meaning, may be adopted. Even in such cases, it seems desirable that the words actually supplied, fairly to exhibit the meaning in English, should be pointed out. . . . In other cases, the elliptical form is productive of so much obscurity, that the ablest scholars will entertain different opinions as to the mode in which the ellipsis should be supplied. Nothing surely can be more manifest than that, in translating works of vast concernment to mankind—works on which their religious sentiments depend—whatever is thus added, for the purpose of conveying the full meaning of the Original, as apprehended by the Translator, *ought* to have some mark by which it may be clearly distinguished from the rest.’ pp. 26, 27.

In pp. 55, 56, Mr. Curtis furnishes a collation of early copies of the Bible of King James, in which are some extracts from the Oxford Reprint of the edition of 1611. On comparing these

extracts with the 'Reprint', we find so many errors committed by him as most remarkably to shew how much he needs the indulgence of the forbearance denied by him to the mistakes of other men. There is no exaggeration of the faults which we detect in this collation, in the following paragraph of Dr. Cardwell's tract.

'Now in a pamphlet where the object of the Author is to hold up certain presses to universal contempt, and more especially in a passage where he was publishing a strict collation for the purpose of distinguishing between two rival documents, we might expect that he would shew his peculiar fitness for such employments. And yet the extracts are printed so inaccurately, that were he to issue an edition of the Bible similar to the one now in progress at the Oxford press, after the copy of 1611, and *with as little correctness as the comparative extracts in pp. 55 and 56, there would be exactly forty errors to a page.* The book will contain 1428 pages; so that the whole amount of the errors would be 57,120.' p. 14.

Mr. Curtis's errors are indeed constantly presenting themselves. The accuracy which he *desiderates* in other writers, is but too frequently wanting in his own case. In his evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, p. 45, he refers to a Cambridge edition of the Bible as containing the reading, "Therefore I have shewed them by the prophets"; instead of "therefore I have hewed them by the prophets." Hosea vi. 5. This was cited, not from memory, but from a memorandum before him. Now the reading of the correct Bibles is, in this passage, 'therefore have I hewed them', and the error of the Camb., as we look to it in a copy before us, is, 'therefore have I shewed them.' In the very same answer to question 1392, Mr. Curtis describes the Oxford Octavo Bible of 1810, as having, in Malachi iii. 1, the superior for the inferior word *Lord*; that is, instead of Lord, the proper expression, LORD is printed. Now so prevalent has been this erroneous mode of representing the term, that, with but one exception, all the Bibles accessible to us, not a few have the reading, LORD, for the original יהוה, in Malachi iii. 1. Why was the Oxford Bible specified in such a case as this? In his 'Four Letters', p. 57, note, Mr. Curtis states, that 'Fleshy' is the reading of Dr. Blayney and all our modern Bibles, in 2 Cor. iii. 3. 'Fleshy' is the reading of the London Bible of 1769, of the Oxford 1765, as well as of some of the early editions. But the reading of these is, in the present case, of no moment, as Mr. Curtis's object is to censure Blayney and all our modern Bibles. It is not correct, however, to affirm that all our modern Bibles have 'fleshy' in this passage; we have before us copies of 1805, 1819, 1831, in all of which the reading is 'fleshy.' On this very page we find such injurious statements as require to be noticed and corrected.

‘ Dr. Blayney seems to have been fully aware that the punctuation may “ preserve ” and of course obscure or destroy “ the true sense ; ” and I must submit, that *whenever a point affects the sense*, we have no modern authority for altering the authorized punctuation. And the position of a comma will sometimes affect the statement of a scripture doctrine: *ex. gr.* Heb. x. 12., that of the all-important doctrine of the atonement. Our Translators, placing their comma at “ ever,” make the verse to read, “ This man after he had offered one sacrifice for sins for ever, sat down on the right hand of God.” Dr. Blayney and the modern Bibles, removing the comma, read, “ This man after he had offered one sacrifice for sins, *for ever* sat down on the right hand of God.” ’

Dr. Blayney was not the innovator. Long before his revision, the punctuation objected to had a place in English Bibles. Blayney is evidently regarded by Mr. Curtis as not very anxious to preserve ‘ the true sense of the passage,’ what then will he say to the Geneva Translators? Their Version reads: ‘ But this man, ‘ after he had offered one sacrifice for sinnes, sitteth for ever,’ &c.

The paragraph marks are noticed by Mr. Curtis, p. 58, note ; but here, as elsewhere, we have to find fault with the rash and indiscriminate judgement which he pronounces. The readers of his pamphlet who may not feel themselves under obligation to submit to a rigorous examination the statements and averments of the Author, must, in following him in his representations, have their minds strongly prejudiced against such editions of the Scriptures as these later times have produced. Here again we find the modern Bibles set in array against the Bible of 1611.

‘ The Translators, placing this mark of a distinct subject, Matt. xxviii. 19, express their opinion that the important commission of that verse was given in the mount of Galilee: the modern Bibles placing it at the 18th verse, indicate a different opinion.’

The commission delivered in the 19th verse is connected by the particle *οὐν* with the words of Christ in the 18th ; and, therefore the paragraph mark, whether it be placed at verse 19th or 18th, cannot give occasion for the inference alleged by Mr. Curtis. But to the point of fact. The modern Bibles are not in opposition to the Bible of 1611. Blayney, indeed, places the mark at the 18th verse, but the modern Bibles are very numerous which have the paragraph mark where the Translators affixed it. So it appears in Cambridge Bibles of 1793, 1828, 1831 ; in Oxford Bibles of 1765, 1822, 1830 ; and in London Bibles of 1821, 1830. In other editions, there is no paragraph mark after the 16th verse.

We are not of counsel for the University of Oxford, nor do we hold a fee as retained advocates for Dr. Blayney’s fame ; but the eager-

ness of Mr. Curtis to accumulate blame upon the late Hebrew professor of Oxford should be rebuked. His revision of the Bible contains many alterations which no one is prepared to defend; and many of them have been corrected in editions which in other respects have been rendered conformable to it. Mr. Curtis's censures might with advantage to his reputation, in many cases have been spared. The 'Contents of Chapters' in Blayney's revision have been, to a great extent, abandoned, and the Bible of 1769 is no longer followed; but, if none of them had been more exceptionable than the following, we do not see in what manner the Bible could have suffered deterioration.

Dr. Blayney and his coadjutors seem also to have been strongly attached (according to these summaries of their doctrine) to the heathen deity Fortune, of whom the Bible of the Translators certainly knew nothing. Thus the predictions of the angel, who is called Jehovah, Gen. xvi., are said to be "informing" Hagar "of her and her son's fortunes;" and Gen. xxv., the struggling of the children during Rebekah's pregnancy, "a token of the future fortunes of their posterity." p. 65.

We could easily refer to writers of unquestionable attachment to evangelical doctrines, and of eminent piety, who have not scrupled to use the language for which Mr. Curtis so severely remarks upon the Oxford Hebrew Professor. But, be the language proper or improper, it is to be read in much more interesting parts of a Biblical page than in the notation of the contents of a chapter: we find it in the text of the Bible itself. In Coverdale's Bible, Eccles. ix. 11, is rendered, 'All lyeth in tyme 'and *fortune*,' and the phrase, '*it fortuneth*,' is frequently employed. 2 Sam. xix. 9. Ruth, i. 1. Job, i. 5. 7. King James's Translators inserted in the Contents of the cxlixth Psalm, 'The 'prophet exhorteth to praise God—for that power which he hath 'given to the Church to rule the consciences of men.' If Blayney had been the author of such a sentence as this, the sharpest animadversions of Mr. Curtis would have been employed to rebuke the temerity of such a proceeding. From the modern Bibles it has been displaced. Blayney's revision has—'for that power 'which he has given to his saints.' Would Mr. Curtis restore the old reading? Nothing short of this could be in satisfaction of his assumption and his arguments.

Mr. Curtis comments in the following manner on the account given by Blayney of his labours in the revision of 1769.

'IV. The COLUMN TITLES.—"The running titles at the top of the columns in each page, how trifling a circumstance soever it may appear, required no small degree of thought and attention." Akin in principle to the abandoned comment above, (Heads or Contents of Chapters,) is the continued one here alluded to, which contains some

corruptions of the doctrines and statements of the Bible, as understood by our Translators, that I am far, my Lord, from regarding as trifling! 'Man's righteousness,' is *their* column—title of that part of Isa. lxiv. which contains the memorable phrase, "And all our righteousnesses are as filthy rags." Dr. Blayney avoids this for—'The calling of the Gentiles,' the subject of the lxv. chapter. So we have for 'None is just,' 'All are alike,' Eccl. vii. and viii. two other subjects substituted, 'Patience and wisdom,' 'Kings are to be respected;' and 'None righteous,' Rom. iii. exchanged for 'The Jews universally sinners.' (Bl.) The first two of these corruptions are in the last Camb. 8vo. Ref. Bible, finished at the period of my visit to that University. 'None is just,' Job xxv., is thus also withdrawn; 'None is clean,' Prov. xx. 'The heart wicked,' Jer. xvii. 'God's justice in punishing sinners—God's ways equal,' Ezek. xviii. (Trans.) exchanged for 'Every man shall stand or fall by his own good or bad actions,' (Bl.) and Camb. 8vo. 1831. Was there any thing honourable in the *animus* of these alterations? The Church of England, we know, furnished during the *last* century, but too many advocates of a righteousness by works, which made 'the grace of God no more grace;' but they should have contented themselves with a fair field, and fair weapons of controversy; thus silently to withdraw an important sanction of a directly *opposite* opinion, was surely any thing but fair or becoming.' Curtis, 66, 67.

This, we hesitate not to say, is one of the most remarkable paragraphs which ever came under the notice of a Reviewer;—remarkable alike for the errors which it embodies, and the disingenuous spirit which pervades it. The language which it contains, is explicit enough, nor are the insinuations at all chargeable with obscurity; neither the one nor the other can be mistaken. Dr. Blayney is boldly charged with the offence of wilfully perverting and corrupting the Scriptures: 'Was there any thing honourable in the *animus* of these alterations?' We shall examine the grounds on which an accusation so grave and serious is founded. Every reader is referred, by Mr. Curtis, to Blayney, the Church of England divines of the *last* century, and the modern Bibles, as the guilty parties, and the witnesses of their desperate proceedings. Now what will our readers think of such charges, when we assure them that the above alterations are not modern; are not of the *last* century, are not peculiar to modern Bibles, and are not chargeable upon Dr. Blayney as the author of them! It is impossible that Dr. Blayney should have been the author of Column-titles in the English Bible, which had a place there a century before the date of his revision. The injustice which Mr. Curtis has shewn towards Blayney, it is impossible for any upright and candid mind to overlook; and our sense of justice, as well as the generous feelings which the occasion requires, impel us to rescue the memory of the learned critic from his unrighteous imputations. As the most unexceptionable testimonies,

we shall produce the readings in the Column-titles of the Authorized Version as we find them in editions of the century *before the last*. Mr. Curtis affirms, that Blayney has displaced the Column-title of Isa. lxiv. 'Man's righteousness,' for 'The calling of the Gentiles.' Now the Column-title of the folio black-letter edition of 1613, is 'A prayer.' A black-letter quarto, 1620, reads 'God our Father—The calling of the Gentiles.' In 1639, the reading is, 'God's power and greatness,' and in 1679, we find, 'The Churches' complaint.—The Jews rejected.' 'None is just—All are alike.' Eccles. vii.—viii., are read in 1613. In 1620 we have 'A good name—No man is just.' In 1639, 'None are just—Good and bad alike;' but in 1679, we have in the Column-titles, 'The difficulty of wisdom.—Kings are to be respected.' 'None righteous,' Rom. 3, is not read at the top of the page in the Bible of 1613, where we have, 'The true Jew—Justification.' In 1620, we have, 'The true Jew—No flesh is justified by the law.' The reading in 1639 is, 'The Jew's prerogative—Justification by faith.' In 1679, 'All are sinners—Justification by faith.' Job xxv. has, in 1639, 'God's power is infinite;' 1679, 'God's infinite power.' Proverbs xx., 'The state of the wicked,' 1679. Jer. xvii., 'The observation of the Sabbath day,' 1613. 'Trust in God,' 1620. 'The observation of the Sabbath,' 1639. 'Judah's captivity,' 1679. Ezek. xviii., 'God's justice in his punishment,' 1620. The charge against Blayney, therefore, must be, not that he introduced innovations into the Translator's readings, but that he followed the example of his predecessors in this department; and if they stand clear of corrupting the doctrines and statements of the Bible, the accusation is not to be sustained against him.

'Our modern Bibles *retain*,' says Mr. Curtis, 'several instances of the withdrawalment of the name and character of our blessed Redeemer from the top of the page. As Ps. xxii. 'A prophecy of Christ,' (Trans.) (one hardly need add quoted by all the Evangelists as such,) changed to 'David complaineth in distress,' Bl. and the modern Bibles, Oxford, 1828, and Camb. 1831. Prov. viii. CHRIST'S ETERNITY,' (Trans.) 'The call of wisdom,' (Bl.) and Oxford, 1828; 'Excellency, &c. of wisdom,' Camb. 1831.—Jer. xxxi., 'Christ promised,' (Trans.) 'Rahel mourning is comforted,' (Bl. and modern Bibles.)—Dan. vii. 'Christ's dominion,' (Trans.) 'The interpretation thereof,' [i. e. the vision just before] (Bl. and modern Bibles).'

Mr. Curtis is so copious in his examples, and so remote from all ambiguity of expression in his statements, as to preserve every reader of them from the possibility of misconceiving his meaning. The imputation again repeated against Blaney is, that he *wilfully falsified* the description of the contents of the chapters of the Bible by withdrawing the direct references which they contain to Christ. Let us then compare the old copies. How stands

the reading of 1620? 'The excellencie of wisdom: Her riches and eternitie.' What is that of 1639? 'The commendation of wisdom.' What is the Column-title of 1679? 'Wisdom's excellency, &c.' In Ps. xxii., the edition of 1679 reads 'David's prayer in distress.' In Jer. xxxi. many modern Bibles *do* read 'Christ promised;' so Camb. 1793. 'Christ is promised' appears in a most beautiful Camb. 12mo, 1828; and so reads the 8vo. edition of London, 1821. Other modern Column-titles are, 'Ephraim's repentance,' 'Israel's restoration.' In Daniel vii., 'Tenne hornes,' 1613. 'Four beasts,' 1620. 'The interpretation thereof,' 1679.

'Other doctrinal views of the Translators, reformed by those of the Oxford Divines of 1769, will be interesting to some of my readers. I shall merely, for the sake of brevity, put down the *withdrawn* doctrine. The reader can generally find the substituted one of Blayney in the modern Bibles. Ps. lvii. 'God saveth his.' Isa. x. 'A remnant saved.'—xliv. 'God's love to his chosen people.'—xlvi. 'God beareth his.'—xlviii. 'God trieth his.'—Jer. xv. 'God saveth his.'—xxx. 'Everlasting love.'—id. 'A new covenant and everlasting.'—Acts v. 'Ordained to life.'—Eph. i. 'The election of the saints.'

It may surprise our readers to learn that not one of these passages is found in the Bibles of 1639, and 1679, and but one of them in the black-letter quarto of 1620, that of Eph. i. Isa. x. has, in 1620, 'A remnant of Israel saved;' and modern Bibles have the similar heading, 'A remnant of Israel shall be saved.' Whatever be the points of doctrine included in these sentences placed at the top of the pages in the chapters specified, Mr. Curtis has charged upon the Oxford Divines of 1769, the withdrawing of them, and the reforming of the tenets exhibited by them. But the editors of 1620, 1639, and 1679, could not withdraw the passages which are exchanged for others in their Bibles from any wish to accommodate them to any doctrines to which Mr. Curtis may suppose Blayney and his coadjutors were favourably disposed.

Mr. Curtis goes on to shew that the Translators, after the example of their Geneva brethren, chose for the head of the page, 'some *notable* word or sentence for the help of the memory', and he copies, p. 68, 'a few of these of which our modern bibles are *denuded*.' These words and sentences, of whatever value they may be, are not of sacred authority; and it is quite obvious, as Dr. Cardwell observes, that they could not have been preserved, unless all editions subsequent to that in which they first appeared had 'corresponded exactly in page and in column with the first impressions.' We shall compare some of these titles as given by Mr. Curtis with the headings in some bibles before us. Exod. xxxiii. 'God not seen'. Not in 1613, 1620, 1639, all of which read, 'Moses talketh with God.' Blayney, 'Moses desires to see the glory of God.' Deut. xxx., 'Mercy to the

'repentant.' Not in 1613, which has, 'His (God's) mercie.' 'Promises to the repentant', is in 1620. Blayney, 'Great mercies 'promised to the penitent.' Ps. xxxix., 'Man is vanity.'; in 1613, 'Man's vanity'; 1620, 'David's care of his thoughts'; Blayney, 'His reflections on the vanity of human life.' Other modern bibles have, 'The brevity and vanity of life.' Ps. xlviii., 'Zion's beauty'; modern bibles read 'The beauty of Zion.' The sentiment in the titles at the head of the page is, in some of the earliest bibles expressed with great brevity and terseness, and is, as Mr. Curtis describes it, adapted to catch a 'careless eye'; but the titles were very early changed, and successive editions shew great variety in the sentences thus displayed. The *denudation* is not by any means peculiar to our modern bibles. And let it not be forgotten, that the passages thus removed, are no part of the sacred Scriptures, the text of which is not affected by these withdrawments or substitutions.

In his fourth 'Letter,' (p. 74, &c.) Mr. Curtis's remarks relate principally to the mode of distinguishing certain Divine names in the printed Bibles. King James's Translators have used the term *Jehovah* but in a very few cases of a peculiar kind. *LORD* is the mode of representing the Hebrew יהוה observed by them, and the same word in a different letter, *Lord*, intimates to the reader of their version, that the Original is אלהים: the former denotes the Self-existent Being, but the latter is used of men or other creatures. These terms are often found associated with each other, and are, respectively, frequently combined with other names of God. It is of considerable importance that these names should be correctly represented in a Translation, and that there should be an unbroken uniformity in the usage adopted. Mr. Curtis severely reprehends Dr. Blayney and the modern Editors for their carelessness in respect to this particular, and points out some of the errors which disfigure their Bibles. We are not acquainted with any English Bibles which, in respect to this class of words, are faultless; and considerable differences are to be found in their modes of representing them. Mr. Curtis, p. 78, quotes Blayney's Bible 1769, as reading in Ps. cxlviii. 3. (7) "O God, the LORD," equal, he remarks, to "O Jehovah, Jehovah!" Now this is another of Mr. Curtis's blunders. Blayney's reading, and the reading of many other modern Bibles, besides that of 1769, is, 'O God the LORD.' This is erroneous, the true mode of representing the original being, 'O God the Lord,' but it does not furnish the kind of objection adduced by Mr. Curtis, 'a repetition of the word never found.' No errors found in the modern Bibles are, however, more in violation of the 'Translators' rules, than instances of these names which are found in the Bible of 1611, and which are four times more numerous than Mr. Curtis represents them to be. What example in Blayney's text is worse

than 2 Chron. xiii. 6, in the Bible of 1611, where the term appropriate to the Self-existent Being is referred to Rehoboam ?

Mr. Curtis denies the right, as in Blayney's case, of any editors to make critical alterations in the Bible, and insists that the Translators themselves possessed no right whatever to make a single critical alteration without a renewed authority. 'When the commission was fulfilled by the delivery of the joint labours of the Translators to his Majesty's printer, I venture to contend that it became in natural course DEFUNCT.' (p. 51.) On this assertion, we do not find it necessary for us largely to remark. The rigid construction of Mr. Curtis's rule would, perhaps, require that the Bible, precisely as in its first form in 1611, should be transmitted to the readers of all coming times. For, if the authority of which he speaks was necessary in respect to critical alterations, it would seem to be necessary in respect to alterations of every description. It might sometimes be very difficult to distinguish typographical errata from errors of a critical kind. But to this question it is not necessary for us to refer more particularly. Our present object has been, the examination of the charges which represent the present state of the English Bibles as so deteriorated and corrupted as to be productive of the evils described by the Sub-Committee. These charges we have examined ; and we assert without hesitation or difficulty, that the text of Scripture in the English Bible is not vitiated by the modern Italics, as the charges allege ; and that, in any copy of the Translation in common use, there is nothing to be found which can render the text of Scripture unworthy of the confidence of the unlearned. It is of the utmost importance, that the refutation of such charges as we find in the Report of the Sub-Committee should go forth into every part of the country ; and those classes of the community amongst whom the Bible most largely circulates should be told, that, in the copies which have been put into their hands, there is neither perversion nor obscuration of the truth. The Bibles of the Oxford and Cambridge and London presses recently issued are most beautiful books, and certainly, in respect to the important purposes of their publication and use, may be read without distrust. We do not affirm them to be immaculate, but they afford no grounds for such imputations as those which have been, we regret to say, so inconsiderately and so reproachfully directed against them.

Into the *perfectly* distinct question relating to the cost to the public of the Bible monopoly, or its effect in restricting the circulation of the Scriptures, we cannot here enter, but must reserve it for a future article.

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Art. V. *The true Dignity of Human Nature*, or Man viewed in Relation to Immortality. By William Davis, Minister of the Croft Chapel, Hastings. 12mo, pp. xxiv. 237. London 1830.

WE owe an apology to the amiable and pious Author of this volume for having omitted to notice it on its first appearance. It is certainly deserving of our cordial recommendation, being very pleasingly written, and well adapted to answer its purpose of counteracting some prevailing religious errors. The main design of the Writer seems to be, to put the reader on his guard against self deception in the all-important concern of his spiritual condition and prospects. We do not think the title happily chosen; nor is the Author's purpose very distinctly intimated. It will also detract from the inviting appearance of the book, that it is not broken into chapters or sections, but runs on continuously without a breathing place. This circumstance may seem immaterial, but it will not be found so in fact. Upon a subject which excites, confessedly, a small degree of interest in the bosoms of vast numbers, it is putting the perseverance of the reader to too severe a test. All that we can say is, that the perusal will repay the reader who is sufficiently in earnest and well pleased with his instructor to read to the end. The introductory paragraphs, which border, more than any other part, upon common place, might have been compressed with advantage to the work. We shall be glad to see these corrections introduced in a second edition, which, we should hope, has by this time been called for.

The admonitory cautions contained in the following paragraphs, will not be deemed unnecessary by any thoughtful Christian acquainted with the deceitfulness of his own heart.

‘Is there not a danger lest, in the midst of increasing efforts, and loud and repeated calls from societies, and from zealous individuals, for time, attention, and continued and persevering exertions, for the benefit of our neighbourhood, of our countrymen, and of the world;—lest in the hurry (if we may be allowed the expression) of religious secularities, the anxieties of directions, and of committees, the excitement of public meetings, and of public business—is there not a danger, lest the very nature of religion itself, as a personal thing, may be mistaken; and safety taken for granted, merely because a feeling of interest has been excited, on behalf of the progress of the Gospel in the world?’

‘We may be allowed to suppose, that the minds of some are impressed with the dangerous idea, that something of merit attaches to all this activity, in which they participate; while there are others who, fearing to regard their benevolent exertions as meritorious, are probably, too much inclined to look to this quarter for the most satisfactory evidence of their safety. There is certainly danger here. We refer not to the fact that many who have been at the greatest remove, both in title and in heart, from a right to the heavenly inheritance, and a qualification for the enjoyment of it, have been in every age, number-

ed among the most zealous advocates of the truth. We refer not to party bigots, nor to the hot-headed, but cold hearted zeal which, like that of Jehu, has self for its object. But we allude to that love of exertion, which appears so natural to some; and to that delight in the approving smiles of our fellow-men, which comes with a charm so soothing on our self-complacent feelings. All this, so far as regards the true interest of our immortal souls, may leave us as wholly destitute of spiritual benefit, as it found us. Or it may have an effect positively injurious, it may inflate our minds with vanity and pride, and assimilate us to the character of the man, who with raised eye, bended knees, and a voice sufficiently audible, commended his piety to those who were around him: who received their applause; and in that applause, had all the reward he sought, and even more than he deserved. It will be allowed that we have the highest authority for affirming that *he* adopts *not* the method appointed by divine wisdom and love for the salvation of the human soul, who seeks the honour that cometh from man in preference to that which descends from God.

‘It becomes us therefore, to take heed that the interest which we feel on religious subjects in general, and in the progress of divine truth in particular, is of the right kind. We call that a spurious zeal for the honour of God, which does not begin with subduing sin, in the breast of him who is the subject of it: and we may denominate that zeal for the promotion of the Gospel, as not the most genuine, which expends its energies for the good of others, while it suffers the soul of the individual himself, to remain without the only satisfactory evidences of a state safe for eternity; with a heart lifted up; with evil passions unsubdued; with a spirit at variance with that inculcated in the Gospel,—without humility, without spiritual peace and joy,—in a word, destitute of that mind which was in Christ Jesus the Lord. Separate from this character, no zeal will avail. To produce this, is one great design of the Gospel: and in every case, in which it is not discoverable, the life-giving power of the religion of the New Testament has not been experienced.

‘We have thus ventured to intimate, that there is in the present day, a very great necessity for examination as to the state of individual character amongst the professors of religion. If we do not require less of the religion of the public meeting, we certainly should not be injured by more of the religion of the closet.’ pp. 92—95.

The Author's remarks on assurance are, upon the whole, judicious and scriptural. We are especially pleased with the following remarks.

‘There are two powerful emotions by which the mind of every genuine Christian is agitated. These are love and fear. Where love prevails, fear will be in abeyance. And where fear prevails, love will become cold. Love is the master principle of all holy obedience. It is called, by the sacred writer, the fulfilling of the law. Obedience, therefore, will correspond with the strength and exercise of this holy affection. If this becomes weakened, and its exercises are feeble, and frequently interrupted, obedience will fail, temptation become powerful, and sin, necessarily, ensue. God has placed in the bosom of all

his servants a principle of fear as well as of love : and where obedience, the necessary effect of love, is absent, there fear will be present. Whether we term fear a gracious affection, though "it have torment," or a mere slavish emotion, its effect on the character and conduct of the backsliding and negligent professor, is unquestionably beneficial. Fear of the consequences of sin will induce abstinence from it ; and fear of the indignation of God, will produce a desire to avert it. Where there is fear there will be pain ; but it is a pain which precedes the healing of the moral malady. And when the disease is removed, or in other words, when sin is abandoned, love will be in exercise ; and if there be a perfect exercise of this grace, it will banish fear. The apprehension of the consequences of sin will cease, and there will be a well grounded assurance that all the blessings of salvation are ours.

' Now we will venture to affirm, making all due allowance for the imperfection of our best services, and the sin that cleaves to our most holy duties, that where love abounds, and where obedience, the fruit of love is consequently found, that there, and there only, will the subject of this holy affection, enjoy a legitimate assurance of the divine favour. Under these circumstances, the Christian's mountain will be immovable, the light of the divine countenance will be beheld, and peace and joy will dwell in the breast. But it is not a mere recollection of this enviable state of the mind and heart, together with a review of the corresponding practice with which it has been accompanied, that will give assurance and confidence to the bosom, if, at the period of this review, the affection and the practice be wanting : nor will any effort, on the part of the individual in such circumstances, to produce this consolatory assurance, be permanently successful. God has inseparably connected a holy frame of mind, and a righteous course of conduct, with scriptural confidence of an interest in the great salvation : and it will be a vain, as it is an unholy and antinomian endeavour, to seek to secure the latter, while conscious to ourselves that we are destitute of the former. Bold abstractions, theoretical notions, subtle distinctions, sophistical reasonings, may amuse and impose on the intellect, but they will give no abiding solace to the heart.' pp. 163-165.

If we have any fault to find with the Author's theological statements, it is, that sufficient prominence is not given to the only source of all religion, Divine influence, and to the means of all religion, prayer. Habitual prayer is stated to be 'one great means of obtaining a consolatory assurance of our interest in the 'Divine favour'; but it is rather *the* means, whatever else may be requisite to the attainment. The doctrine of Divine influence, the grand reconciler of all theological difficulties, the key-stone of the Christian system, is more particularly the best antidote to antinomianism, speculative or practical. This doctrine is clearly recognized in the present volume. We merely mean to suggest, that it does not stand out in due proportion. The genuine encouragement which it is adapted to afford to the sincere inquirer, or to the trembling, self-diffident, unassured believer, might have been exhibited without danger of fostering delusion ; and it would

have obviated the only objection to which, we think, the volume is open.

Art. VI. *A Residence at the Court of London*. By Richard Rush, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States of America, from 1817 to 1825. 8vo. pp. 420. London, 1833.

IN the unpretending form of a simple journal, Mr. Rush has here presented to us a lively and interesting record of the impressions produced by his introduction, as American Minister, to the highest grade of English society, and by the observations which he had the opportunity of making upon our political and domestic institutions, the manners and customs, the wealth and greatness of England. A residence of nearly eight years in this country, he frankly avows, corrected many erroneous impressions he had previously taken up; and he has written this volume 'in the spirit of good feeling towards Britain, which may be cherished by every American compatibly with his superior love for his own country,' and which, he expresses his belief, few Americans fail to cherish who stay here as long as he did. 'Enough has been written and said on both sides to irritate. My desire is,' says Mr. Rush, 'and such my effort, to soothe.' The volume is, indeed, well adapted to promote a cordial feeling between the intelligent classes in both countries. It displays a spirit of frank and manly courtesy towards the people of this country, which ought to shame us out of the illiberal jealousy and spirit of detraction which have been too often displayed towards the Americans. The Englishman may learn from this volume to appreciate more highly his own institutions; to estimate more justly the political and moral greatness of his own nation; while he will at the same time be led to feel increased respect for that nation which, in all its essential characteristics, its laws, language, literature, religion, its spirit of freedom, commercial enterprise, and religious zeal, not only betrays its English origin, but is one with the people of England. What God has so united, let no one attempt to sunder.

Mr. Rush disclaims having attempted to scan all our institutions and character; but has merely thrown out brief and cursory reflections upon those portions which fell under his immediate observation. The opinions, he says, in which he feels most confidence, are those which refer to the wealth and power of England, and their steady augmentation. Since the time of his residence among us, great political changes have taken place; but, adds Mr. Rush, 'I do not, at my distance, believe that any essential changes will yet have been produced by them, bearing upon the character or habits of the nation. Those

‘ when the growth of ages, alter slowly in any country. In England, they will come about more slowly than in most countries.’

‘ I went to England again in 1829. An interval of four years had elapsed ; yet I was amazed at the increase of London. The Regent's Park, which, when I first knew the west-end of the town, disclosed nothing but lawns and fields, was not a city. You saw long rows of lofty buildings, in their outward aspect magnificent. On this whole space was set down a population of probably not less than fifty or sixty thousand souls. Another city, hardly smaller, seemed to have sprung up in the neighbourhood of St. Pancras Church and the London University. Belgrave Square, in an opposite region, broke upon me with like surprise. The road from Westminster Bridge to Greenwich exhibited for several miles compact ranges of new houses. Finchley Common, desolate in 1819, was covered with neat cottages, and indeed villas. In whatever direction I went, indications were similar. I say nothing of Carlton Terrace, for Carlton House was gone, or of the street, of two miles, from that point to Park Crescent, surpassing any other in London, or any that I saw in Europe. To make room for this new and spacious street, old ones had been pulled down, of which no vestige remained. I could scarcely, but for the evidence of the senses, have believed it all. The historian of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire remarks, that the description, composed in the Theodosian age, of the many stately mansions in Rome, might almost excuse the exaggeration of the poet ; that Rome contained a multitude of palaces, and that each palace was equal to a city. Is the British metropolis advancing to that destiny ? Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, and other provincial towns that I visited, appeared, on their smaller scales, to have increased as much.

‘ In the midst of it all, nearly every newspaper that I opened rang the changes upon the distress and poverty of England. Mr. Peel's bill banishing bank-notes under five pounds from circulation, had recently passed. There was great clamour—there is always clamour at something among this people. Prices had fallen—trade was said to be irrecoverably ruined, through the *over-production of goods*. I have since seen the state of things at that epoch better described perhaps, as the result of an *under-production of money*. Workmen in many places were out of employ ; there were said to be fourteen thousand of this description in Manchester. I saw portions of them walking along the streets. Most of this body had struck for wages. I asked how they subsisted when doing nothing. It was answered, that they had laid up funds by joint contributions among themselves whilst engaged in work. In no part of Liverpool or its extensive environs did I see pauperism ; the paupers for that entire district being kept within the limits of its poor-house ; in which receptacle I was informed there were fifteen hundred. I passed through the vale of Cheshire ; I saw in that fertile district, in Lancashire, Staffordshire, Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Warwickshire, Worcestershire, appearances of wide-spread prosperity, in the lands, houses, canals, roads, public works, domestic animals, people—in every thing that the eye of the merely transient traveller took in.’ pp. xi.—xiii.

Such are the contradictory elements of the complex state of society, which perplex the observation of a stranger visiting this country. An enlightened member of the diplomatic corps told Mr. Rush, that, at the end of his first year, he thought he knew England very well; when the third year had gone by, he began to have doubts; and after a still longer residence, his opinions were more unsettled than ever: some he had changed entirely; others had undergone modification; and he knew not what fate awaited the rest.

‘ There was reason in his remark. If it be not contradictory, I would say, that he shewed his judgment in appearing to have at present no judgment at all. The stranger sees in England, prosperity the most amazing, with what seems to strike at the roots of all prosperity. He sees the most profuse expenditure, not by the nobles alone, but large classes besides; and, throughout classes far larger, the most resolute industry supplying its demands and repairing its waste; taxation strained to the utmost, with an ability unparalleled to meet it; pauperism that is startling, with public and private charity unfailing, to feed, clothe, and house it; the boldest freedom, with submission to law; ignorance and crime so widely diffused as to appal, with genius and learning and virtue to reassure; intestine commotions predicted, and never happening; constant complaints of poverty and suffering, with constant increase in aggregate wealth and power. These are some of the anomalies which he sees. How is he at once to pass upon them all? he, a stranger, when the foremost of the natives after studying them a lifetime, do nothing but differ!’

The civil festival on the 9th of November, on which occasion Mr. Rush dined at Guildhall, suggests the following reflections, which must be gratifying to all but those incorrigible *croakers* who delight in predictions of evil.

‘ I should not soon have done if I were to mention all the instances of which I chanced on this occasion to hear, of riches among mechanics, artizans, and others, engaged in the common walks of business in this great city. I heard of haberdashers who cleared thirty thousand pounds sterling a-year, by retail shop-keeping; of brewers whose buildings and fixtures necessary to carry on business, cost four hundred and fifty thousand pounds; of silversmiths worth half a million; of a person in Exeter Change, who made a fortune of a hundred thousand pounds, chiefly by making and selling razors; of job-horse men, who held a hundred and forty thousand pounds in the Three per Cents; and of confectioners and woollen drapers who had funded sums still larger. Of the higher order of merchants, bankers, and capitalists of that stamp, many of whom were present, whose riches I heard of, I am unwilling to speak, lest I should seem to exaggerate. I have given enough. During the late war with France, it is said that there were once recruited in a single day in the country between Manchester and Birmingham, two thousand able-bodied working men for the British army. It is the country so remarkable for its collieries,

iron-mines, and blast-furnaces. Its surface is desolate. A portion of it is sometimes called the fire country, from the flames that issue in rolling volumes from the lofty tops of the furnaces. Seen all around by the traveller at night, they present a sight that may be called awful. Sometimes you are told that human beings are at work in the bowels of the earth beneath you. A member of the diplomatic corps, on hearing of the above enlistment, remarked, that could Bonaparte have known that fact, and seen the whole region of country from which the men came, seen the evidences of opulence and strength in its public works, its manufacturing establishments and towns, and abundant agriculture, notwithstanding the alleged or real pauperism of some of the districts, it would of itself have induced him to give over the project of invading England.

‘ In like manner, let any one go to a lord mayor’s dinner; let him be told of the sums owned by those he will see around him and others he will hear of, not inherited from ancestors, but self-acquired by individual industry in all ways in which the hand and mind of man can be employed, and he will be backward at predicting the ruin of England from any of her present financial difficulties. Predictions of this nature have been repeated for ages, but have not come to pass.

‘ Rich subjects make a rich nation. As the former increase so will the means of filling the coffers of the latter. Let contemporary nations lay it to their account, that England is more powerful now than ever she was, notwithstanding her debt and taxes. This knowledge should form an element in their foreign policy. Let them assure themselves that instead of declining she is advancing; and that her population increases fast; that she is constantly seeking new fields of enterprise in other parts of the globe, and adding to the improvements that already cover her island at home new ones that promise to go beyond them in magnitude; in fine, that instead of being worn out, as at a distance is sometimes supposed, she is going a-head with the buoyant spirit and vigorous effort of youth. It is an observation of Madame de Staël, how ill England is understood on the continent, in spite of the little distance that separates her from it. How much more likely that nations between whom and herself an ocean interposes should fall into mistakes on the true nature of her power and prospects; should imagine their foundations to be crumbling, instead of steadily striking into more depth, and spreading into wider compass. Britain exists all over the world in her colonies. These alone give her the means of advancing her industry and opulence for ages to come. They are portions of her territory more valuable than if joined to her island. The sense of distance is destroyed by her command of ships; whilst that distance serves as a feeder of her commerce and marine. Situated on every continent, lying in every latitude, these, her out-dominions, make her the centre of a trade already vast and perpetually augmenting—a home trade and a foreign trade—for it yields the riches of both, as she controuls it all at her will. They take off her redundant population, yet make her more populous; and are destined, under the policy already commenced towards them, and which in time she will far more extensively pursue, to expand her empire, commercial, manu-

facturing, and maritime, to dimensions to which it would not be easy to affix limits.' pp. 390—93.

Speaking of our national debt, Mr. Rush remarks, that, as an absolute sum it must strike the world as enormous; but that it loses this character when viewed in connexion with the resources of Great Britain, which have increased in a *ratio* greater than her debt. In proof of this position, he adduces the fact, that in the face of this debt, our Government could, at any moment borrow from British capitalists fresh sums, larger than were ever borrowed before, and than could be raised by the united exertions of the Governments of Europe.

'Credit so unbounded can rest only upon the known extent and solidity of her resources; upon her agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial riches; the first coming from her highly cultivated soil and its exhaustless mines, not of gold and silver, but iron and coal, for ever profitably worked; the second, from the various and universal labour bestowed on raw materials, which brings into play all the industry of her people, suffering none to be lost for want of objects; the third, from a system of navigation and trade, followed up for ages, which enables her to send to every part of the globe the products of this vast and diversified industry, after supplying all her own wants. This system of navigation and trade is greatly sustained by a colonial empire of gigantic size, that perpetually increases the demand for her manufactures, and favours the monopoly of her tonnage. These are the visible foundations of her incalculable riches; consequently of her credit. Both seem incessantly augmenting.' pp. 248, 9.

These remarks would suggest matter for extended comment, but we waive any reflections of our own, and shall proceed to give a specimen or two of the lighter portions of the Journal. The splendours of the English Court appear to have had a fascinating effect upon the Writer's imagination, without, however, putting him out of conceit with the simpler habits and customs of republican society. The following description is given of the Queen's drawing-room.

'The doors of the rooms were all open. You saw in them a thousand ladies richly dressed. All the colours of nature were mingling their rays together. It was the first occasion of laying by mourning for the Princess Charlotte, so that it was like the bursting out of spring. No lady was without her plume. The whole was a waving field of feathers. Some were blue, like the sky; some tinged with red; here you saw violet and yellow; there, shades of green; but the most were like tufts of snow. The diamonds encircling them caught the sun through the windows, and threw dazzling beams around. Then the hoops! I cannot describe these. They should be seen. To see one is nothing. But to see a thousand—and their thousand wearers! I afterwards sat in the ambassadors' box at a coronation. That sight faded before this. Each lady seemed to rise out of a gilded little barricade, or one of silvery texture. This, topped by

her plume, and the 'face divine' interposing, gave to the whole an effect so unique, so fraught with feminine grace and grandeur, that it seemed as if a curtain had risen to show a pageant in another sphere. It was brilliant and joyous. Those to whom it was not new, stood at gaze, as I did. Canning for one. His fine eye took it all in. You saw admiration in the gravest statesmen; Lord Liverpool, Huskisson, the Lord Chancellor, every body. I had already seen in England, signs enough of opulence and power; now I saw, radiating on all sides, British beauty. My own country I believed was destined to a just measure of the two first; and I had the inward assurance that my countrywomen were the inheritresses of the last. *Matre pulchrâ filia pulchrior.* So appeared the drawing-room of Queen Charlotte' p. 103.

We must select, as our last specimen, an account of a dinner at Jeremy Bentham's.

'From my house north of Portman Square, I was driven nearly three miles through streets for the most part long and wide, until I passed Westminster Abbey. Thereabouts, things changed. The streets grew narrow. Houses seemed falling down with age. The crowds were as thick, but not so good-looking, as about Cornhill and the Poultry. In a little while I reached the purlieus of Queen Square Place. The farther I advanced, the more confined was the space. At length turning through a gateway, the passage was so narrow that I thought the wheels would have grazed. It was a kind of blind-alley, the end of which winded into a small, neat, court-yard. There, by itself, stood Mr. Bentham's house. Shrubbery graced its area, and flowers its window-sills. It was like an oasis in the desert. Its name is the Hermitage.

'Entering he received me with the simplicity of a philosopher. I should have taken him for seventy or upwards. Every thing inside of the house was orderly. The furniture seemed to have been unmoved since the days of his fathers; for I learned that it was a patrimony. A parlour, library, and dining-room, made up the suite of apartments. In each was a piano, the eccentric master of the whole being fond of music as the recreation of his literary hours. It was a unique, romantic little homestead. Walking with him into his garden, I found it dark with the shade of ancient trees. They formed a barrier against all intrusion. In one part was a high dead wall, the back of a neighbour's house. It was dark and almost mouldering with time. In that house, he informed me, Milton had lived. Perceiving that I took an interest in hearing it, he soon afterwards obtained a relic, and sent it to me. It was an old carved baluster, from the staircase, which there was reason to think the hand of the great bard had often grasped—so said the note that accompanied the relic.

'The company was small, but choice. Mr. Brougham, Sir Samuel Romilly, Mr. Mill, author of the well-known work on India, M. Dumont, the learned Genevan, once the associate of Mirabeau, were all who sat down to table. Mr. Bentham did not talk much. He had a benevolence of manner, suited to the philanthropy of his mind. He seemed to be thinking only of the convenience and pleasure of his guests, not as a rule of artificial breeding, as from Chesterfield or Ma-

dame Genlis ; but from innate feeling. Bold are his opinions in his works, here he was wholly unobtrusive of theories that might not have commanded the assent of all present. Something else was remarkable. When he did converse, it was in simple language, a contrast to his later writings, where an involved style, and the use of new or unusual words, are drawbacks upon the speculations of a genius original and profound, but with the faults of solitude. Yet some of his earlier productions are distinguished by classical terseness.

Mr. Brougham talked with rapidity and energy. There is a quickness in his bodily movements indicative of the quickness of his thoughts. He showed in conversation the universality and discipline that he exhibits in Parliament and Courts of Law. The affairs of South America, English authors, Johnson, Pope, Swift, Milton, Dryden, Addison, (the criticisms of the last on *Paradise Lost*, he thought poor things) ; anecdotes of the living Judges of England ; of Lord Chancellors, living and dead ; the errors in Burrow's Reports, not always those of the reporter, he said ; the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge ; the Constitution of the United States—these were topics that he touched with the promptitude and power of a master. He quoted from the ancient classics, and poets of modern Italy, (the latter in the original also,) not with the ostentation of scholarship, which he is above, but as if they came out whether they would or no amidst the multitude of his ideas and illustrations. He handled nothing at length, but with a happy brevity ; the rarest art in conversation, when loaded with matter like his. Sometimes he despatched a subject in a parenthesis ; sometimes by a word, that told like a blow. Not long after this my first meeting with him, one of his friends informed me that a gentleman whose son was about to study law, asked him what books he ought to read. "Tell him to begin with Demosthenes and Dante."—"What, to make a lawyer?" said the father.—"Yes," he replied, and "if you don't take, we won't argue about it." Mr. Mill, M. Dumont, and Sir Samuel Romilly, did their parts in keeping up the ball of conversation. Sheridan being spoken of, Sir Samuel Romilly, who had often heard him in the House of Commons, said "that nothing could be more marked than the difference between the parts of his speeches previously written out, and the extemporaneous parts. The audience could discover in a moment when he fell into the latter. It was well known," he added, "that all the highly wrought passages in his speeches on Hastings' impeachment, were prepared beforehand and committed to memory."

After we rose from table, Mr. Bentham sought conversation with me about the United States. "Keep your salaries low," said he ; "it is one of the secrets of the success of your Government.—But what is this," he inquired, "called a Board of Navy Commissioners that you have lately set up? I don't understand it." I explained it to him. "I can't say that I like it," he replied ; "the simplicity of your public departments has heretofore been one of their recommendations, but *boards* make *screens* ; if any thing goes wrong, you don't know where to find the offender ; it was the board that did it, not one of the members ; always the *board*, the *board* !" I got home at a late hour, having witnessed a degree of intellectual point and strength

throughout the whole evening, not easily to have been exceeded.' pp. 286—291.

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- Art. VII. 1. *Wages or the Whip.* An Essay on the Comparative Cost and Productiveness of Free and Slave Labour. By Josiah Conder, Author of "The Modern Traveller", "Italy", &c. 8vo. pp. 92. Price 2s. 6d. London, 1833.
2. *A Vindication of a Loan of £15,000,000 to the West India Planters*, shewing that it may not only be lent with perfect safety but with immense advantage both to the West Indians and to the people of England. By James Cropper. 8vo. Price 6d.
3. *A Letter from Legion to the Right Hon. E. G. Stanley, &c. &c. &c. Secretary of State for the Colonies*, upon his Scheme for the Abolition of Colonial Slavery. 8vo. pp. 32. Price 1s. London, 1833.

OF the first of these pamphlets we shall say nothing more, than that it comprises a mass of documentary evidence abundantly attesting the correctness of the proposition, that Slavery is a political blunder. Slave labour is shewn to be dearer in its prime cost, dearer from its inferior productiveness, dearer from the waste and bad economy to which it uniformly leads, dearer from the capital sunk, and dearer from the state expenditure which it entails. The enormous expense of uncertain profits of cultivation by slave labour are shewn to be, according to the highest authorities, from Bryan Edwards down to Earl Belmore, the main cause of the present distressed state of the planters. And finally, the practicability of securing a regular supply of free labour in the sugar colonies is established by facts drawn from official documents and other sources, relating to the effects of emancipation on manumitted negroes, and to the success with which plantations are worked by free labour in the Spanish colonies. Slavery, however, it is remarked, must be abolished, with the burdens it entails before the motive to employ the cheaper labour of the freeman or to economize the dear labour of the slave, can come into operation. No plan of emancipation can be either effective or safe that is not of a decisive character.

'It must not attempt to combine the two opposite and incompatible systems of free and slave labour. It must not superadd the cost of free labour to the waste and burden of slavery. It must not destroy coercion, by a plan which supplies no motives for labour; which precludes alike the stimulus of competition, the sense of gratitude, or the immediate prospect of advantage. It must not detain upon the plantations that redundant portion of labour which might be altogether economized by a better system. It must not continue to hang a dead weight upon the elastic springs of human industry, while the machinery is yet expected to work without embarrassment. The sub-

stitution of free labour for bond labour of every description can alone indemnify the planter for the loss of his living capital, and redeem him from the effect of the standing economical blunder in which he has so long and so fatally persisted. Slavery must be abolished. Its total abolition will carry compensation with it. Any thing short of entire and immediate emancipation will fail of its object; will be ruinous to the planter, unjust to the slave, unsafe to the colonies, and, in a word, not merely impolitic, but impracticable.

Mr. Cropper takes a similar view of the necessity of a total abolition of slavery in order to the realizing of any of the advantages to be derived from the proposed loan; but slavery being abolished, he proves by the logic of arithmetical calculations, that the advance may be made without hazard, and with great benefit to all parties, which is designed to relieve the planter from his present embarrassments, and to enable him to disentangle himself at once from the expenses of slavery and of his commercial bondage. Mr. Cropper has shewn, that what would be saved to this country by the abolition of slavery, with the burdens it entails, would enable Government to deal liberally with the West India Colonists.

Mr. Stanley's plan of emancipation is an ingenious one; and twenty years ago it might have been possible to make the experiment he proposes; although, in the working, it would assuredly have failed. In the present state of things, it would be alike perilous and impracticable. 'It is founded,' as the Author of the Letter from Legion remarks, 'on two propositions, each of which 'is self contradictory in its enunciation, and iniquitous in its 'operation. 1. The slave is entitled to his freedom, and therefore he shall redeem himself. 2. The slave is unfitted, by long 'and brutal coercion, for the discharge of spontaneous labour, and 'therefore, for twelve years to come, he shall be compelled to 'three parts of his labour by coercive means.' With legal acuteness, this Writer, who is generally understood to be the son of the late distinguished philanthropist James Stephen, Esq. dissects the ministerial plan, and exposes its illusive, crude, unjust, and visionary character. Even the best, because the most specific part of the plan, the liberation of the children, is shewn to be open to fatal objections, the very principle of the condition with which it is encumbered being unjust and cruel.

'Slavery is offered as the alternative of maintaining them, when the very means of maintenance are taken away. *Ex hypothesi* the parent's wages must be accumulated to redeem his own freedom. If he takes one sixpence from the sacred hoard, his own emancipation is deferred. All the time which can reasonably be exacted for labour through the day, is appropriated to his master, or to his own redemption. Yet you most ingeniously propose that he shall find means to clothe and feed his child, under the penalty of exposing that child to a longer

bondage than himself! Is it not cruel, is it not unnatural, to create this distressing competition between paternal affection and selfish interest? You do not even propose that the child shall receive wages; if this is intended, and on the same scale of proportion between his value and his time, why is his servitude to be of longer duration than his parents? To be consistent it should be less, because if his tender years admit of education in moral habits with greater certainty, he need not serve so long a noviciate to qualify him for the rights of citizenship; the only reason that you assign for the long apprenticeship of the adult. But there are other yet more serious objections to this part of the scheme. In the first place you know, or ought to know, that in the case of plantation slaves, the father of the child is too often unknown even to its mother; nor is the relation more likely to be acknowledged when it entails with it a pecuniary burthen, and a serious personal sacrifice; the option, therefore, which you give, serves very well to cheat the superficial enquirer into an acquiescence in the reasonableness of an infant apprenticeship, but in fact it will but rarely furnish a solid hope of redeeming the poor child from his eighteen years of servitude. It would have been more honest to have enacted at once, that all children shall be apprenticed to the age of 20 or 24, for such must be the case at least nine times out of ten. I hate this artful cloaking of a general rule in the guise of an exception. The general rule will be the 18 years of servitude—the parental maintenance will be the exception; and this should have been the honest avowal made to the anti-slavery party. They have lately heard enough of infant slavery to comprehend its meaning. I suspect that on second thoughts, they will scarcely hail with much satisfaction this threatened emigration of it to our colonies.

‘But again: you cannot but be aware that one of the most offensive and intolerable of all the incidents of slavery, is the subjection of young females to the power of their owners. Is your long apprenticeship likely to remove this evil? Will it diminish opportunity, or restrict the power of compulsion? I will not say that it will have the contrary effect, but it appears to me most likely to leave matters exactly where they were.’

The scheme of apprenticed labour must be abandoned. Where it has been tried, as at the Cape Colony, it has been found alike oppressive and unprofitable. The West India proprietors are beginning to perceive, that if the cry for the abolition of slavery is to prevail, it will be for their own interest to consent to immediate and total abolition, rather to any half measures. To them, the compromise proposed would be ruinous, since it would well nigh double the cost of cultivation, without securing to them any adequate equivalent.

It is believed, however, that Ministers will not persist in this part of the plan, and that modification will be proposed that will essentially change its whole character. The scheme of self-redemption must also be given up. The negro, at least, owes no compensation. As to the loan, it may go down with emancipation, but certainly not without it

‘ It has been observed, “ You cannot object to a loan on West Indian security ; for you contend that its value will be improved by emancipation.” I admit that we do so ; but it must be emancipation on our own terms. It must be total and immediate ; no longer deferred than till an efficient police can be established. It must not be a partial diluted measure, breaking up one relation of the parties, to substitute another of equal hardship and more difficult operation. This is unsettling one system, which, bad as it is, can work, and replacing it with another, with such a jumble of bad and good, that it becomes inoperative as a stimulus to labour, though it retains the cruel coercive principle. We must not be fixed with an indemnity against a risk essentially different from that which we proposed. It is what the underwriters call a deviation from the policy : of course it discharges our liability.’

We could have wished that the zeal of “ Legion ” had been somewhat more tempered by courtesy. Such language and such reasoning as we meet with at pp. 21, 22, are unworthy of the cause, and more adapted to give pain and just offence than to convince. The warmth of the Writer’s feelings does him honour, but his judgement should hold a tighter rein.

ART. VIII. LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Mr. Atkinson, of Glasgow, has, we understand, employed the leisure of a lingering illness, during the last winter, in preparing a complete series of the works of The Scottish Poets, with Biographical Notices, after the manner of Dr. Southey and Dr. Aikin’s volumes of the Early and more Recent British Poets. It will shortly appear.

A Treatise on Astronomy, by Sir John Herschel, will form the Forty-third Volume of Dr. Lardner’s Cabinet Cyclopædia, and will be published on the 1st of June.

Dictionary, Practical, Theoretical, and Historical, of Commerce and Commercial Navigation. By J. R. M’Culloch, Esq. 1 large Vol. 8vo. with Maps. A Second and Improved Edition preparing.

On June the 1st will be published, Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, Green, and Longman’s Catalogue of Second-Hand Books for 1833 : comprising a fine Collection of Books of Prints, including many of the Galleries ; Divinity and Ecclesiastical History, Foreign and English ; Valuable Works in various Foreign Languages, and a useful Collection of Works on Topography, History, Biography, Poetry, Voyages, and Travels, &c. &c. &c.

Elements of Musical Composition ; comprehending the Rules of Thorough Bass, and the Theory of Tuning. By William Crotch, Mus. Doc. A New Edition, preparing, in small 4to.

ART. IX. WORKS RECENTLY PUBLISHED.

ASTRONOMY.

Astronomical Observations, made at the Observatory of Cambridge, for the year 1832. By George Biddell Airy, Esq., M.A., Plumian Prof. of Astron., and Exper. Phil., in the University of Cambridge. Royal Quarto. 15s.

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Hints for the Formation and Management of Sunday Schools. By the Rev. J. C. Wigram, M.A., Secretary to the National School Society. 2s.

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The Annual Historian for 1833; comprising the Events of the Previous Year. By Ingram Cobbin, A.M. 18mo. 3s. cloth.

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The Crusaders; or, Scenes, Events, and Characters, from the Times of the Crusades. By Thomas Keightly. With Views, &c. 5s. 6d. Cloth lettered.

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the Abolition of Colonial Slavery, and containing suggestions of a plan really "safe and satisfactory" in its character. 1s.

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Wages or the Whip. An Essay on the Comparative Cost and Productiveness of Free and Slave Labour. By Josiah Conder. Author of the Modern Traveller, &c. &c. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

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